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Abstract 
 
As a mode of global sustainability regulation, private participatory governance first 
emerged in the forestry sector in the early 1990s and from there spread rapidly and 
widely in the global economy. The literature on the topic points to a good fit with 
democratic norms, neoliberal norms, social movement pressure, and the 
entrepreneurial activities of civil society actors and progressive firms as the main 
drivers behind this process of institutional diffusion. Today, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives operate in many industry sectors, ranging from apparel manufacturing and 
diamond mining to aquaculture production and soybean farming. Drawing on new 
developments in the philosophy of democracy, some see these arrangements as part of 
a ‘deliberative turn’ in sustainability politics with the potential to democratise global 
governance institutions. However, the legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives 
remains contested, and there is evidence to suggest that the diffusion of private 
participatory governance in the global economy has introduced variation in a key 
dimension of institutional design: whereas some schemes involve a wide range of 
actors in their governance and standard-setting activities, others are significantly less 
inclusive.  
 
In order to explore this puzzle, this dissertation unpacks the process of institutional 
diffusion. It develops an analytical framework that distinguishes three stages in the 
diffusion process: source selection, transmission, and adoption. For the different 
stages, hypotheses are formulated about the factors that “intervene” in the diffusion 
process, leading to more or less inclusive institutional outcomes. This framework is 
put to work in three case study chapters, examining the diffusion of private 
participatory governance in the biofuels, soy, and sugarcane sectors.  
 
A major finding of this study is that varying levels of coercive institutional pressures 
influenced the diffusion outcome in the cases studied. In environments characterised 
by strong coercive pressures (biofuels and soy), adopting a more inclusive approach 
served institutional designers as a strategy to gain political authority – that is, 
legitimate decision-making power – in these arenas. In comparison, in the low conflict 
environment of the sugarcane sector, no comparable process of ‘institutional fitting’ 
could be observed. Furthermore, this dissertation shows that ideas about private 
participatory governance are far from set in stone. While multi-stakeholder 
institutions diffuse in the global economy, late adopters learn from the experiences of 
prior adopters. Based on these experiences and the lessons they draw from them, they 
interpret, innovate, and de- and recontextualise the model, giving rise to institutional 
variation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the field of global sustainability politics has undergone a 
profound transformation from a state-centred model of regulation toward a system in 
which governance has multiple loci and levels (Abbott, 2012; Arts, 2006; Falkner, 
2003, 2011). In what could be dubbed old global governance, states and 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were the primary, and often only, providers 
of regulation. Rule-making took place at the national level, through international 
negotiations and within IGOs. Rule implementation and enforcement mostly occurred 
through the state and its agencies, as IGOs typically lack direct enforcement powers. 
Moving away from this state-centred model, the “new” system of global sustainability 
governance involves many actors (public and private) and actor constellations.  
 
One important component of the emerging governance architecture in this area is 
business self-regulation. Increasingly, firms and industry associations regulate 
themselves through corporate codes of conduct and monitor their supply chains with 
the help of professional auditing companies (Dauvergne & Lister, 2012; Kolk & van 
Tulder, 2005; Utting, 2005). But also civil society actors and hybrid arrangements 
have come to play an important role in new global sustainability governance. Today, 
many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have developed codes and standards 
of their own and partner with business, IGOs, and states in the context of private 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) and public-private partnerships (Cashore, Auld, 
& Newsom, 2004; Liese & Beisheim, 2011; Pattberg, Biermann, Mert, & Chan, 
2012).  
 
The rise of private authority in the international system has received much attention 
from scholars of International Relations (IR). In the late 1990s, it was the works of 
Susan Strange and others that brought the diffusion of power in the world economy to 
the forefront of debates in the discipline (Biersteker & Hall, 2002; Cutler, Haufler, & 
Porter, 1999c; Higgott, Underhill, & Bieler, 2000; Strange, 1996). Following in the 
footsteps of these early works, many scholars have taken a critical perspective vis-à-
vis private actors and their rule-making activities (Bartley, 2010; Fuchs & 
15 
 
Kalfaggiani, 2010; Guthman, 2007; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005; Locke, Amengual, & 
Mangla, 2009; Nölke & Graz, 2008). A recurrent theme in this literature is their 
democratic deficit. In this regard, it has been argued that private governance 
institutions often lack transparent and participatory structures (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & 
Havinga, 2011), that certain groups enjoy privileged access (Haufler, 2002; Nölke & 
Graz, 2007), and that topics and actors from the global south are often marginalised in 
these arrangements (Clapp, 2005a; Newell, 2005).  
 
Drawing on new development in the philosophy of democracy, others, on the 
contrary, examine these new modes of governance as part of a ‘deliberative turn’ in 
global sustainability politics. An important argument in this literature is that 
procedural values, such as transparency, representation, and participation of societal 
stakeholders can improve the democratic legitimacy of global governance institutions 
(Bäckstrand, Khan, Kronsell, & Lövbrand, 2010c; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; 
Bexel & Mörth, 2010; Börzel & Risse, 2005; Dingwerth, 2007; Mason, 2005; Risse, 
2004). The normative basis of this argument is deliberative democratic theory which 
emphasises the importance of participation and deliberation over the liberal idea that 
rule-makers have to be formally accountable to rule-takers. From this perspective, 
meaningful democratic legitimacy requires that all those affected by a rule are given 
the opportunity to participate in the rule-making process (Bohman & Regh, 1997; 
Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). Because of its focus on process, as opposed to principal-
agent accountability, deliberative democracy has been proposed as a model for 
organising rule-making activity at the transnational level where no clearly defined 
demos or principal exists (Dingwerth, 2007: 21; Dryzek, 2000: 116). In this context, 
particularly MSIs have been praised for their democratising potential. Scholars have 
referred to them as “innovative institutional designs,” “good governance models,” and 
“sites of meaningful deliberation” (Cashore et al., 2004: 298; Dingwerth, 2007: 9; 
Gulbrandsen, 2008b).  
 
As a mode of global sustainability regulation, private participatory governance first 
emerged in the forestry sector in the early 1990s and from there spread rapidly and 
widely in the global economy. The literature on the topic points to a good fit with 
neoliberal norms, democratic norms, social movement pressure, and the 
entrepreneurial activities of NGOs, foundations, and progressive firms as the main 
16 
 
drivers behind this process of successful or close institutional diffusion (Bartley, 
2007b; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012). Today, several 
dozen MSIs operate in many industry sectors where they have become an important 
source of regulation for the world’s forests, factories, farms, fisheries, and mines. 
However, the democratic legitimacy of private multi-stakeholder governance remains 
contested (Cheyns, 2011; Schouten, Glasbergen, & Leroy, 2012), and there is 
evidence to suggest that the institutional diffusion of MSIs has not spread a universal 
model of private participatory governance. One example is Fransen’s and Kolk’s  
(2007) study of 22 MSIs which finds that real-world initiatives vary significantly in 
their participatory quality.  
 
Findings about varying levels of inclusiveness are not trivial. Inclusiveness is one of 
the core procedural requirements of deliberative democratic theory. Without broad 
participation from those affected by a rule meaningful deliberation, and therefore 
democratic legitimacy, is not possible. In other words, MSIs with a narrow 
stakeholder base call into question the promise of a deliberative turn in global 
sustainability politics. Furthermore, inclusiveness is thought to influence the 
outcomes of regulatory processes. In this regard, Mattli and Woods (2009) 
hypothesise that exclusive, closed, and secretive arrangements are more prone to 
produce capture regulation – that is, regulation that serves particularistic interests 
instead of the common good – than more inclusive arrangements. However, at the 
same time, stakeholder inclusion is thought to be costly. From collective action theory 
we know that a group’s ability to reach collective decisions decreases as its size 
increases (Olson, 1965). In other words, there appears to be a trade-off between norms 
of legitimacy on the one hand and the efficiency of a process on the other (Carmin, 
Darnall, & Mil-Homens, 2003: 529; C. Scott, Cafaggi, & Senden, 2011: 13). Against 
this background, findings about more and less inclusive MSIs create an interesting 
empirical puzzle: why has the diffusion of private participatory governance in the 
global economy led to variation in this key dimension of institutional design?  
 
The central task of this dissertation is to find an answer to this question. Therefore, it 
develops an analytical framework that unpacks the process of institutional diffusion. It 
asks: where do ideas about institutional design come from (source selection); what is 
transmitted (transmission); and what is adopted (adoption)? For each of these stages, 
17 
 
hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships that make diffusion outcomes 
vary are formulated. In this context, processes of learning, institutional bargaining, 
and the nature and strength of environmental pressures at the point of adoption are 
considered. Integrated into a causal model, this framework is put to work in three case 
study chapters which trace the diffusion of private participatory governance the 
agriculture sector – the most dynamic site of MSI diffusion in recent years.  
 
To further introduce the subject of this dissertation, the remainder of this chapter 
proceeds in four sections. The first section introduces the concept of private 
governance and how it has been studied by scholars of IR. The chapter then sketches 
the rise of private sustainability governance. It is illustrated how private arrangements 
have become an important source of sustainability regulation in the global economy. 
This is followed by a discussion of the deliberative turn in global sustainability 
politics, detailing its philosophical foundations and implications for global 
governance. The chapter then directs its attention toward private participatory 
governance (MSIs). It describes their distinguishing features, historical genesis, and 
institutional diffusion, and conducts an inventory of a large sample of environmental 
MSIs (N = 16). In this context, their institutional designs are examined, allowing for a 
“first cut” distinction between MSIs with a high, medium, and low level of 
inclusiveness. The chapter closes by providing the reader with a road map of the 
dissertation.  
 
1.2 Private Governance in the Study of International Relations 
In their landmark volume Governance without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics, Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) theorised about a profound 
transformation of the international system. They and their contributors argued that the 
nature and role of the state is changing and that in the future the international system 
will include many more actors. This work opened intellectual space for further 
inquiries into the future of statehood and the role of private actors in international 
politics. It led some scholars to hypothesise about a structural shift in the global 
economy and a general decline of the state and its power (Evans, 1997; Schmidt, 
1995; Strange, 1996). In her influential book, The Retreat of the State, Susan Strange  
(1996: 46) described how a “progressive integration of the world economy, through 
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international production, has shifted the balance of power away from states and 
toward world markets”. She argued that this has led to a diffusion of authority in the 
global economy and ultimately to a decline of the state. In particular, multinational 
corporations were seen as the beneficiaries of this process. As the main causes behind 
this transformation Strange identified the accelerating pace of technological change, 
the increasing importance of financial markets in the global economy, and the 
neoliberal agenda of politicians in the United States (US) and Europe. However, 
empirically these rather drastic descriptions of an “eclipse” or “evaporation” of 
statehood could not be verified and more recent works examining the changing role of 
the state and its institutions have painted a more nuanced picture. The tenor of this 
literature is that the role of the state is changing, but not in the radical way suggested 
by Strange and others (Leibfried & Zürn, 2005; Mosley, 2005; Rothgang & 
Schneider, forthcoming; Sørensen, 2004).  
 
Today, most scholars seem to agree that globalisation has not resulted in a general 
retreat of the state. The increasing importance of private actors in international affairs, 
however, remains a widely uncontested fact and scholars of IR have started to theorise 
about their new political role. In their landmark volume, Private Authority in 
International Affairs, Claire Cutler and her colleagues (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 
1999b: 16) observe that “private actors are increasingly engaged in authoritative rule-
making that was previously the prerogative of sovereign states”. Subsequent works by 
Higgott et al. (2000) and Biersteker et al. (2002) provided further evidence for the 
expansion and pervasiveness of private authority in the global political economy.  
 
The study of non-state actors and private rule-making is now a well-established 
subfield of the discipline of IR. In their volume, Cutler et al. (1999b: 5) 
conceptualised private rule-making activity as a form of private authority which they 
define as the existence of legitimate decision-making power of an individual or 
organisation over a particular issue area. Whereas the literature on private authority 
followed a critical agenda, with a focus on uncovering power relationships and the 
changing nature of authority in the international system (Biersteker & Hall, 2002; 
Cutler et al., 1999c; Green, 2010a; Higgott et al., 2000), others have taken a more 
functionalist perspective. In an influential article, Robert Falkner (2003: 72) described 
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more institutionalised forms of collective private rule-making as private governance 
which he defines as “interactions among private actors, or between private actors on 
the one hand and civil society and state actors on the other, giving rise to institutional 
arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behavior in an issue specific area”. In 
the private governance literature, private actors are often examined as providers of 
rules and services which can complement or in some cases even replace governance 
by states or IGOs (Abbott, 2012; Börzel & Risse, 2010; Gulbrandsen, 2004).  
 
The emergence of private authority or private governance is often discussed in the 
context of economic, technological, ideological, and societal transformations (Bartley, 
2007b; Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999a; Pattberg, 2005). In many of these works, 
parallels are drawn with Polanyi’s (1944) discussion of the co-evolution of modern 
market economies and national regulatory systems. It is argued that processes of 
globalisation have created pressures to re-embed the emerging global economy in a 
regulatory structure. It is believed that, in a neoliberal context, this has given rise to 
private regulatory arrangements (Bartley, 2007b; Guthman, 2007; Raynolds, 2000). 
Drawing on regime theory, others have hypothesised that firms create private 
regulatory institutions to both increase their power as well as the efficiency of their 
interactions (Cutler et al., 1999a; Haufler, 2000). Furthermore, reputational pressures 
have been identified as an important driver behind private institution building. It has 
been argued that firms within an industry share a common reputation. In the case of 
corporate scandals, this often leaves entire sectors “tarred by the same brush” through, 
for example, stricter public regulation or NGO campaigns. In order to protect 
themselves against common sanctions, firms are believed to engage in self-regulation 
(Barnett & King, 2008; A. A. King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002).  
 
Increasingly, the focus of research has shifted away from the emergence of private 
governance institutions to the question of private governance effectiveness (Bartley, 
2010; Gulbrandsen, 2009; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013a; Liese & Beisheim, 2011; 
Marx & Cuypers, 2010; Vogel, 2009). In the political science literature, effectiveness 
is often understood in terms of goal attainment or problem solving (Underdal & 
Young, 2004). To determine effectiveness, effectiveness criteria are derived from a 
regime’s officially stated goals or are defined by the researcher. Drawing on Easton’s 
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(1965) system theory, output, outcome, and impact indicators are then used to 
measure progress towards these goals. For the field of private governance, Wolf 
(2010) defines output as the (self-)commitments of actors, outcome as the behavioural 
changes based on such commitments (i.e. compliance), and impact as the actual 
contribution to goal attainment or problem solving resulting from behavioural change. 
In their work on the effectiveness of global health partnerships, Liese and Beisheim 
(2011) hypothesise that an initiative’s level of effectiveness is influenced by its degree 
of institutionalisation as well as its process management and capacity building efforts. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of relevant stakeholder groups and an initiative’s capacity 
to induce processes of organisational learning are discussed as important factors. For 
Kalfaggiani and Pattberg (2011) organisational structure, policy design, information 
strategies, and the external institutional context are important conditions that 
determine a transnational rule-setting organisation’s effectiveness. Other studies find 
that the outcome and impact of private governance remains limited (Bartley, 2010; 
Marx & Cuypers, 2010) and that there is variation across private regulatory 
arrangements (Vogel, 2009). For example, Vogel identifies the Kimberly Process 
Certification Scheme and the Better Factories Cambodia project as relatively effective 
arrangements, whereas the Publish What You Pay Campaign has had little effect on 
actors’ behaviour.  
 
Another important topic in the private governance literature is the interaction of 
private regulatory arrangements with one another (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; L. W. 
Fransen, 2011; Overdevest, 2010) as well as with public regulatory frameworks 
(Abbott, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2013; Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014; Schleifer, 2013). 
There are several studies that argue that interaction between private governance 
arrangements has facilitated convergence among them. In this regard, Overdevest 
(2010), shows how interscheme competition has led to a ratcheting up of private 
standards in the forestry sector. In a similar vein, Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) 
argue that transnational rule-making organisations share common features because of 
norms arising from social interactions between them. However, others believe that 
institutional variation will persist (Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2013). For example, Fransen 
(2011, 2012a) finds that the degree of convergence between private governance 
institutions in an issue area depends on a number of factors such as the homogeneity 
of civil society networks, the structure of the industry, and the nature of NGO-
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business relationships. Furthermore, scholars have turned to examine the relationship 
between private governance institutions and public regulatory frameworks. It has been 
argued that public regulators should actively support and embrace private governance 
arrangements as this would strengthen the international regulatory system and help 
reaching sustainability goals (Abbott, 2012; Abbott & Snidal, 2009b). In response, 
others have started to examine the emerging public-private governance architecture in 
various issue areas (Gulbrandsen, 2013; Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014; Schleifer, 2013). 
 
Besides studying the emergence, effectiveness, and interaction of private governance 
institutions, the legitimacy of these arrangements has sparked much debate among 
scholars of IR. In this debate, it has been argued that the democratic potential of 
private governance institutions remains limited (Fuchs et al., 2011; Nölke & Graz, 
2007). For some they even pose a threat to democracy and accountability in the 
international system (Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002). On the other hand, others have 
suggested that these new modes of governance could increase the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of global governance institutions (Bäckstrand et al., 2010c; Bexel & 
Mörth, 2010). The following sections provide a more detailed account of the debate 
surrounding the legitimacy of private governance institutions. To this end, the next 
section sketches the proliferation of private sustainability governance, illustrating the 
various ways in which private actors nowadays participate and contribute to global 
governance in this issue area. Then, the discussion moves toward the so-called 
deliberative turn in global sustainability politics.  
 
1.3 The Rise of Transnational Sustainability Governance  
The increasing importance of private actors in global sustainability governance is well 
documented (Arts, 2006; Falkner, 2003, 2011; Green, 2010a). According to Falkner 
(2011), the policy field is currently undergoing a profound change from a state-
centred model of governance toward a system in which governance has multiple loci 
and levels. This does not mean that states have become insignificant. Ever since the 
United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 
they have been at the centre of global sustainability politics. Over the last four 
decades, their efforts have led to the emergence of what could be called a regime 
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complex for sustainability – that is, a set of loosely coupled institutions (cf. Keohane 
& Victor, 2011). This regime complex encompasses IGOs and multilateral 
agreements such as the UN Environmental Programme, the Montreal Protocol, the 
Global Environmental Facility, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 
Kyoto Protocol as part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. But, as 
noted by Abbot and Snidal (2009a: 87), “the state is far from the only game in town, 
and may no longer be the most important game in town”. Starting in the 1980s, and 
further accelerating in the 1990s, a set of new actors and non-state governance 
arrangements began appearing on the stage of global sustainability politics. Part of 
this “megatrend” is the inclusion of non-state actors in intergovernmental regulation, 
the emergence and growth of corporate codes of conduct, and the proliferation of 
public-private partnerships, and private MSIs.  
 
Since the end of World War II the number of NGOs with consultative status with the 
UN has steadily increased. An indicative example of this trend is the number of 
NGOs registered with the UN Economic and Social Council. In 2013, the number of 
registrations totalled 3,900 with most of the increase occurring since the 1990s 
(ECOSOC, 2013; Falkner, 2011: 7). NGOs have been particularly active in 
international environmental politics (Oberthür et al., 2002; Willetts, 1996). In this 
regard, even by the time of the Stockholm Environmental Conference in 1972, some 
250 NGOs were registered as observers – then, the highest number of civil society 
participants at any UN conference. Among the 113 participating countries, 47 even 
included NGO representatives in their official delegations (Willetts, 1996: 68). The 
quality and quantity of civil society participation in UN environmental summits 
further increased at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 
1992 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg 
in 2002 (Carr & Norman, 2008).  
 
The involvement of NGOs in intergovernmental policy-making processes is 
increasingly matched by participation from business groups in these forums. 
According to Clapp (2005b), firms were keen to get involved in these processes as 
they were afraid that, left on their own, states and NGOs would produce policy 
outcomes which would negatively impact on their commercial interests. At least since 
the 1992 Rio Summit, business groups have therefore been very active in global 
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sustainability politics. Their lobbying activities surrounding international 
environmental agreements are well documented. Besides the Rio summits, business 
groups, for example, played an active role during the negotiations of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety and were well represented at the meetings of the Codex 
Alimentarius of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Clapp, 2005b; 
Falkner, 2008).  
 
Also, non-state actors are now very active in the implementation of intergovernmental 
policies. In an historical analysis of 152 multilateral environmental treaties, Green 
(2010a) shows that the rate of delegation to private actors has increased markedly 
over the past 25 years. Her data suggests that states increasingly rely on non-state 
actors as arbitrators, auditors and, most importantly, as providers of expert 
knowledge. Furthermore, firms and NGOs have come to play an important role in the 
context of so-called Type II partnerships (Liese & Beisheim, 2011; Pattberg et al., 
2012). At the WSSD in 2002 it was decided that states and IGOs need to engage more 
strongly with civil society and the private sector in order to implement Agenda 211. 
Since the summit in Johannesburg, some 350 public-private partnerships have been 
created (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, website). With a main focus 
on implementing sustainability goals in developing countries, these initiatives span a 
broad spectrum of activities and policy fields. Many of them cover environmental 
aspects of sustainable development. One example is the Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Partnership which promotes appropriate energy regulation and 
green business models in developing countries. Other public-private partnerships with 
a clear focus on environmental issues are the Global Conservation Trust, the Global 
Bioenergy Partnership, and the International Renewable Energy Alliance. 
 
But the new role of private actors in global governance is not limited to their 
involvement in intergovernmental policy-making processes. Independent from states 
and IGOs, firms and NGOs have taken on important governance functions in the field 
of international sustainability regulation. One central pillar of the emerging system of 
                                                          
1
 Agenda 21 was one of the main policy outputs of the 1992 UN Earth Summit in Rio. It defines an 
action plan for the UN, other IGOs, and individual governments to advance social and environmental 
sustainability in four key areas: social and economic sustainability; conservation and management of 
resources for development; strengthening the role of major groups; and means of implementation 
(United Nations, 1992).  
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private sustainability governance is business self-regulation (Kolk & van Tulder, 
2005; Utting, 2005). In response to corporate scandals and pressures from NGOs, 
governments, and consumers, many firms and industries have developed corporate 
codes of conduct and standards of their own. Today, literally all highly branded 
companies engage in corporate social responsibility activities of one sort or another 
(Dauvergne & Lister, 2012). In fact, business has proven very capable of organising, 
networking and mobilising around sustainability issues. One important platform is the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). Formed by 
business leaders in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the WBCSD 
promotes the sustainable development agenda within the wider business community. 
For instance, in collaboration with the World Resource Institute, the WBCSD 
developed the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, the world’s leading carbon accounting 
standard (Green, 2010b). Examples of other important industry-led sustainability 
initiatives are:  
 
• Global Sustainable Electricity Partnership – an association founded by leading 
electricity companies to promote renewable energy projects 
• GlobalG.A.P. – initiated by leading European retail companies, GlobalG.A.P. 
develops standards for food safety and sustainable agriculture 
• Responsible Care – active in more than 50 countries Responsible Care 
promotes health, safety and good environmental practices in the chemical 
industry  
 
Besides corporate codes of conduct, MSIs have become a second important pillar of 
private sustainability governance over the last two decades. Probably the best-
established system of this kind is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Created in 
1993, the FSC is jointly governed by firms and social and environmental NGOs. It 
sets standards for sustainable wood production and controls corporate compliance 
along the wood supply chain via third-party monitoring. As a market-based 
mechanism, the FSC differentiates products for environmentally conscious consumers 
and rewards acquiescent firms with reputational benefits. Over the last two decades, 
FSC-like initiatives have diffused rapidly and widely in the global economy and today 
MSIs regulate transnational production networks in industries as diverse as forestry  
(Bloomfield, 2012; Cashore et al., 2004) agriculture (Fuchs et al., 2011; Ponte, 2013), 
apparel (Bartley, 2007b; L. W. Fransen, 2012a), fisheries (Auld, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 
2009), mining (Haufler, 2009; Kantz, 2007), and tourism (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: MSIs in the Field of Global Sustainability Regulation2 
Sector Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Main Focus Year of 
Foundation 
Forestry Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)  
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) 
Environment 
Environment 
1993 
1999 
Apparel Fair Labor Association (FLA) 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) 
Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) 
Rugmark International/Good Weave (GW) 
Social Accountability International (SAI) 
Labour rights 
Labour rights 
Labour rights 
Labour rights 
Labour rights 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1995 
1997 
Agriculture  
 
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) 
Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI) /Bonsucro  
Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO) 
Flower Label Programme (FLP) 
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef 
(GRSB) 
International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) 
International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification (ISCC) 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP) 
Utz Certifed 
Common Code for the Coffee Community 
Association (4C)                                                
Environment 
Environment 
Fair trade  
Labour rights 
Environment  
 
Labour rights 
Environment 
 
Environment  
Environment 
Environment 
Environment 
Environment 
Environment 
2009 
2009 
1997 
1999 
2012 
 
2002 
2010 
 
2006 
2009 
2004 
in formation 
2002 
2006 
Fishery Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
Marine Aquarium Council (MAC) 
Environment 
Environment  
Environment 
2009 
1999 
1998 
Mining Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS) 
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance 
(IRMA) 
Corruption  
 
Illicit trade  
 
Environment 
2002 
 
2003 
 
in formation  
Tourism Global Sustainable Tourism Council 
(GSTC) 
Environment 2008 
Energy Equitable Origin (EQ) 
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment 
Protocol (HSAP) 
Environment 
Environment  
2009 
2013 
 
The overview shows how private actors have become part and parcel of global 
sustainability governance. Today, firms and NGOs actively participate in 
intergovernmental policy-making processes and cooperate with states and IGOs in the 
context of public-private partnerships. Recent years have also seen an explosion of 
private sustainability initiatives with no or little direct participation from states or 
IGOs. As already mentioned above, the growing importance of private actors in 
global governance has sparked much debate about the democratic legitimacy of their 
                                                          
2
 This table lists organisations that 1) develop standards for sustainable production (social and 
environmental); 2) are dominated by private actors; 3) involve business and civil society actors at the 
board-level; 4) operate globally.  
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rule-making activities. In this context, concerns have been raised that outsourcing 
regulatory functions to private actors will lead to “less democracy and accountability 
around the world” (Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002: 121). Others, however, are less 
pessimistic about the new political role played by private actors. On the contrary, they 
believe that public-private partnerships, multi-stakeholder dialogues, and involving 
civil society actors in intergovernmental processes can counteract the democratic 
deficit of global governance institutions. They see the rise of these new modes of 
governance as part of a deliberative turn with the potential to increase the democratic 
quality and effectiveness of global governance institutions (Bäckstrand et al., 2010c; 
Bexel & Mörth, 2010). 
 
1.4 The Deliberative Turn: Toward Legitimate Transnational Rule-
Making? 
Since the 1990s, democratic theory has taken what is often referred to as a 
deliberative turn (Bohman & Regh, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). According to 
Dryzek (2000: 1), this “turn represents a renewed concern with the authenticity of 
democracy: the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than 
symbolic, and engaged by competent citizens”.  In light of this, deliberative thinkers 
stress the importance of process over the idea of formal accountability which 
permeates liberal democratic theory. In essence, the argument goes that true 
democratic legitimacy requires that all those affected by a rule have to have the 
opportunity to actively and equally participate in the rule-making process. As noted 
by Dryzek (2000: 1-8), this emphasis on deliberation is not an entirely new 
phenomenon. Elements of deliberative democracy can be found in the polis of ancient 
Greece and in the works of Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill. However, prior to 
the 1990s the term deliberative democracy was rarely used. It was invented by Joseph 
Bessette and given impetus by Bernand Manin and Joshua Cohen. The concept then 
gained in importance and became the focal point of democratic theory when Jürgen 
Habermas and John Rawls identified themselves as deliberative democrats in their 
major works.  
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Smith (2003: 54) traces the deliberative turn in democratic theory back to a 
widespread dissatisfaction with the dominating liberal model of democracy. Liberal 
democratic theory is based on what could be called a principal-agent form of 
accountability. In this model, individual preferences are aggregated through an 
electoral mechanism. In this way, collective decisions are made which are then 
delegated to an agent (government) for execution. The model’s legitimacy ultimately 
rests on the right and ability of the principal to hold its agents to account, to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities, and to impose sanctions if these 
responsibilities have not been met (Grant & Keohane, 2005: 29). Smith (2003: 54) 
notes that although periodic elections have a disciplining effect on the elected to act in 
the voters’ interests, the mandates that representatives enjoy typically extend over 
several years in which the electorate has little influence on the decision-making 
process. He and others criticise that this has given rise to political disillusionment and 
a growing distance between citizens and their representatives.  
 
It is this dissatisfaction with the liberal conception of democracy which has renewed 
interest in the process of political decision-making. It is believed that “getting the 
process right” can help to revitalise and restore democratic legitimacy (Bohman & 
Regh, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). Strongly influenced by Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, the deliberative approach essentially boils down to two 
procedural criteria: inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue (Lövbrand & Khan, 
2010; Smith, 2003). Inclusiveness requires that all those affected by a rule need to be 
given the opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. The second criterion 
necessitates that the only authority is that of a good argument. In other words, the 
deliberative process needs to be free from domination, manipulation, and strategic 
behaviour. The theory goes that if these criteria are met meaningful deliberation, and 
thus democratic legitimacy, becomes possible. 
 
Because of its focus on process instead of formal accountability, deliberative 
democracy has been proposed as a model for organising rule-making at the 
transnational level. The background to this is that the above-outlined shift away from 
intergovernmental regulation to increasingly hybrid and private forms of rule-making 
has raised questions about the legitimacy of global governance institutions. Similar to 
rule-making at the national level, intergovernmental regulation is based on preference 
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aggregation and the principal-agent model of accountability. Through international 
negotiations and voting within IGOs, member states confer authority to 
intergovernmental bodies. In the case of non-compliance, they are able to withdraw 
their support and thus punish the agent for failing to fulfil its tasks. However, in the 
transnational realm no clearly defined demos, or self-governing community, exists. 
Preference aggregation and principal-agent accountability are therefore not well 
suited for the reality of transnational rule-making with its multitude of actors, diffuse 
authority, and many levels. The private arrangements described above have no 
mandate. They are self-appointed and no there is no principal able to hold them to 
account. Against this background, many scholars seem to agree that deliberative 
democracy is an attractive model not only for revitalising democratic legitimacy at the 
national level, but also for the organisation of governance beyond the nation state 
(Dingwerth, 2007: 21; Dryzek, 2000: 116). 
 
Among the various private governance arrangements that exist, MSIs are believed to 
most closely approximate the deliberative ideal (Abbott, 2012; Boström, 2006; 
Dingwerth, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2008b). They seek to organise meaningful 
deliberation through participatory elements and procedural transparency. Multi-
stakeholder boards, observer councils, public outreach meetings, and public 
consolation periods are intended to ensure that a wider audience is given the 
opportunity to participate in their rule-making activities. Although transparency is not 
equivalent to unconstrained dialogue, it is widely regarded as a key element of good 
governance. According to Esty (2007: 525), seeing the decision-makers in action and 
observing who has influenced a decision is essential to establishing a sense of 
fairness, rationality, and neutrality. Also, it exposes the decision-making process to 
public scrutiny and thus discourages rent-seeking and other forms of self-serving 
behaviour. Against this background, it has been argued that MSIs “frequently base 
their decisions on sincere and meaningful deliberation among participants” 
(Dingwerth, 2007: 9). Others have referred to them as a “good governance model” 
(Gulbrandsen, 2008b) and “one of the most innovative and startling institutional 
designs of the past 50 years” (Cashore et al., 2004: 298).  
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1.5 Private Participatory Governance: Theory and Practice  
Over the last two decades, MSIs have emerged as an important source of transnational 
sustainability regulation. MSIs first emerged in the forestry and apparel sectors in the 
early 1990s and from there spread rapidly and widely in the global economy. It is the 
purpose of this section to introduce the theory and practice of MSIs in more detail. 
With a focus on multi-stakeholder certification organisations the central features and 
functions of these schemes are discussed. This is followed by a description of the 
model’s genesis and diffusion. Then, to illustrate the institutional variation in the area, 
an inventory of a larger sample of environmental MSIs (N = 16) is conducted.  
 
1.5.1 Distinguishing Features  
MSIs are “institutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behavior in an 
issue specific area” (Falkner, 2003: 72). They set sustainability standards for 
transnational production and often rely on market forces (certification) to implement 
their standards in the world’s forests, factories, mines, farms, and fisheries. 
Essentially, these systems function as clubs (Potoski & Prakash, 2009). Firms striving 
for membership have to implement the club’s code of conduct in their operations. 
With the help of professional auditing firms, club managers then control corporate 
compliance along the supply chain. Compliant operators are issued a certificate which 
they can use to signal their sustainability performance to consumers, regulators, 
NGOs, and other relevant external audiences. In this way, firms can tap so called 
“markets for virtue,”3 try to forestall public regulation, or hope to divert civil society 
pressure. The amount of reputational benefits/protection a club is able to provide to its 
members thereby depends on its credibility among relevant external audiences 
(Prakash & Potoski, 2007). Due to third-party oversight and the credibility this 
creates, MSIs generally offer a higher level of reputational protection than business 
self-regulation. 
 
In their governance activities, MSIs are largely independent from the state and its 
monopoly of force. They are private arrangements and it is firms and civil society 
organisations which are the primary actors. However, the state and its agencies are not 
                                                          
3
 The term ‘markets for virtue’ refers to markets for sustainably produced goods (e.g. organic food, 
sustainable wood products, and sweatshop-free garments) (Vogel, 2006). 
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completely absent from these processes. Often, they play a background role through, 
for example, endorsing, facilitating, and supporting the activities of MSIs (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2009a: 83-87).   
 
Furthermore, MSIs operate at the transnational level. Sustainability issues, and the 
production and consumption decisions driving them, increasingly transcend 
international borders. Through the collaboration and contestation between business 
and civil society actors MSIs are being developed to govern these transnational 
spaces. But MSIs do not only operate transnationally; they are themselves 
transnational organisations. In this regard, their membership structures and 
governance bodies reflect the transnational nature of the production networks they 
aim to regulate.  
 
Whereas the features mentioned above are shared by many other private governance 
arrangements, MSIs are different in their level of inclusiveness as well as 
transparency. In fact, these governance arrangements seek to organise meaningful 
deliberation through participatory elements and procedural transparency. These 
design features directly follow from the two core procedural principles of deliberative 
democratic theory: inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue. In theory, this makes 
MSIs to private governance institutions in which dialogue, adaption, and learning 
occurs over time and across a wide range of stakeholders (Auld, Balboa, Bartley, 
Cashore, & Levin, 2007: 6). Ideally, no single interest group is able to dominate the 
process and each participant has to engage with the views and interests of others.  
 
1.5.2 Genesis  
The development of private sustainability standards can be traced back to organic 
farmers’ associations and fair trade NGOs. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
organic farmers’ associations emerged in several countries. Early examples are 
Demeter in Germany (1928) and the British Soil Association in the United Kingdom 
(UK) (1946). These organisations developed standards for organic agriculture and 
sought ways to encourage and control their implementation. In this context, it was 
probably the British Soil Association which developed the world’s first national 
organic certification scheme in 1973 (Soil Association, website). Other organisations 
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followed suit. In Germany, a seal for organically produced food was introduced by 
Bioland in 1978 (Bioland, website). Later, many of these national initiatives became 
united under the umbrella of the International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movement (IFOAM). 
 
A second site of initial emergence is the fair trade area. The fair trade movement 
seeks to improve the terms of trade for marginalised producers in the developing 
world. Beginning in the 1980s, fair trade NGOs started to experiment with 
certification and on-product labelling. Fairly traded products were made visible to the 
consumer through a label or seal. Typically, fair trade systems operate on the basis of 
a price premium. These price premiums benefit producers in developing countries, 
mostly smallholders producing coffee, bananas, cotton, and other primary 
commodities. Initiated by the Dutch development NGO Solidaridad, it was the fair 
trade label Max Havelaar,  which pioneered the certification model in the fair trade 
area (1988) (Solidaridad, website). Similar initiatives such as Transfair and Fairtrade 
Mark soon emerged in other European countries and North America. In 1997, many 
of the national fair trade initiatives merged to form the FLO (Fairtrade Foundation, 
website). 
 
These developments in organic agriculture and fair trade set the stage for multi-
stakeholder certification schemes to emerge as a mode of private global governance. 
However, it was events in the forestry and apparel arenas in the early 1990s which 
established and consolidated the model.4 Throughout the 1980s, conservationist 
groups launched a number of high profile campaigns against unsustainable forestry 
practices, specifically against the trade with tropical timber. They initiated consumer 
boycotts and directly targeted do-it-yourself-stores such as B&Q in the UK 
(Schwartzman & Kingston, 1997). The industry reacted by creating various forestry 
labels and certificates, of which many made unsubstantiated sustainability claims. In 
this context, small specialty woodworking firms in North America and Europe began 
to worry about how to differentiate their products from those firms using conventional 
forestry practices. In 1989, they formed the Woodworkers’ Alliance for Rainforest 
Protection and began meeting with forest owners and environmental groups. At the 
                                                          
4
 See Bartley (2007a, 2007b) and Synnott (2005) for a detailed account of the emergence of private 
governance in the forestry sector.  
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same time, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the world’s largest 
environmental NGO, became increasingly dissatisfied with the results of its boycott 
and campaigning activities and adopted a more collaborative approach. In 1991, the 
NGO formed the so-called WWF 1995 Group which consisted of some 20 British 
wood product companies. The goal of the group was to eliminate unsustainable wood 
in their supply chains by the end of 1995 (WWF, website-d). Then, the failure of 
states to reach an international agreement on forests during the Earth Summit in Rio 
in 1992 provided further impetus to the emergence of private governance in the 
forestry arena. Disappointed with the outcome, many civil society groups began to 
support a private and market-based solution to the problem of deforestation. In 1993, 
these developments resulted in the formation of the FSC.  
 
Largely independent from events in the forestry sector, multi-stakeholder certification 
organisations emerged in the apparel product field a few years later (Bartley, 2003, 
2007b; L. W. Fransen, 2012a). After discoveries of poor labour conditions in the 
industry’s global supply networks, the sector was shaken up by NGO campaigning 
activities and negative media coverage. Civil society groups like the Clean Cloth 
Campaign and US Students Against Sweatshops directly targeted leading apparel 
brands for poor labour conditions in their supplier factories (Bullert, 2000). Put in the 
spotlight by NGOs, Nike and other major clothing corporations reacted by drafting 
codes of conduct and by collaborating with labour advocacy groups in the context of 
multi-stakeholder schemes. A significant step toward the creation of MSIs in the 
apparel sector was the formation of the Apparel Industry Partnership in 1997. Initiated 
by the Clinton administration in the US, the Apparel Industry Partnership was a 
coalition of leading apparel brands, universities, student groups, and trade unions. 
However, the initial coalition fell apart when conservative firms and more radical 
NGOs and trade unions clashed over the purpose of the initiative and the content of 
the standard (Abbott & Snidal, 2009a: 72). Notwithstanding these early drawbacks, 
some of the more progressive firms and moderate NGOs continued their collaboration 
on labour issues in the apparel sector. These efforts led to the creation of FLA, Social 
Accountability International, and several other labour-standard MSIs in the late 
1990s.  
 
33 
 
The emergence of MSIs in the forestry and apparel arenas triggered what some have 
referred to as the “certification revolution” (Conroy, 2007). On the one hand, civil 
society groups saw MSIs as a way to bypass slow and ineffective intergovernmental 
policy-making processes and to address the shortcomings of corporate self-regulation. 
On the other hand, through participating in MSIs progressive firms hoped to reap 
branding benefits, deflect civil society pressures, and to forestall more stringent public 
regulation. These, and other factors discussed in more detail in the following section, 
led to the rapid diffusion of the MSI model in the global economy.   
 
1.5.3 Diffusion  
The spread of private participatory governance in the global economy is often 
described as an example of successful diffusion (Bartley, 2007b; Ovodenko & 
Keohane, 2012). Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of diffusion. MSIs first emerged in the 
forestry and apparel industries and then spread to other industry sectors. The 
population of MSIs increased rapidly towards the end of the 1990s and kept growing 
throughout the 2000s. Several schemes are still in formation and new schemes are 
likely to be initiated in the future. What explains the diffusion of the MSI model? The 
academic literature on the topic points to a good fit with prevailing social structures, 
social movement pressure, and the entrepreneurial activities of NGOs, foundations, 
and progressive firms as the main drivers behind this process.  
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Figure 1: The Diffusion of MSIs in the Global Economy5 
 
 
In social science theory, social structures or institutional environments are thought to 
take effect through defining roles, appropriate and inappropriate courses of action, 
and through structuring cognitive processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). With regard to the emergence and spread of MSIs, global market 
norms and norms of good governance are often mentioned as context factors that have 
facilitated their diffusion. In his work on MSIs in the forestry and apparel industries, 
Bartley (2003, 2007b) describes how neoliberal ideas and discourses came to 
dominate national and international policy agendas. He argues that, in this context, 
demand for social and environmental regulation was channelled away from states and 
toward the market as the appropriate forum. In a similar vein, Bernstein and Cashore 
(2007: 352-354) describe a private sector turn in the international political economy. 
As an example, they mention the 2002 WSSD where public-private partnerships were 
promoted as one of the principal mechanisms for implementing international 
sustainability goals. They believe that the neoliberal normative environment reflected 
in contemporary trade regimes has provided an enabling condition for private market-
driven governance. Also, Utting (2002: 5) sees the spread of MSIs in the context of 
                                                          
5
 This figure is based on Table 1, Section 1.3. It depicts the number of MSIs in different industry 
sectors over time.  
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neoliberal capitalism. In his view, economic liberalisation has given rise to the idea 
that social and environmental performance need no longer be ordered through 
command and control regulation but can be attained through voluntary private 
initiatives.  
 
Whereas arguments about an enabling neoliberal environment apply to the 
phenomenon of private governance in general, norms of good governance are more 
specifically associated with the rise of multi-stakeholder regulation. In this regard, 
Bernstein and Cashore (2007: 353) identify a growing normative consensus on the 
need to democratise global governance behind the diffusion of MSIs. They give the 
example of the Rio Declaration on Sustainable Development (Agenda 21), which 
states that environmental issues are best handled with participation from all concerned 
citizens at the relevant level. Another example is the Commission on Global 
Governance which calls for more inclusive and more participatory mechanisms of 
global governance (Utting, 2002: 6). It is argued that the resulting normative pressures 
have influenced institutional design choices in private governance. In this context, 
Bernstein and Cashore (2007: 353) mention the adoption of a three chamber decision-
making process through the FSC, the creation of the Workers’ Rights Consortium, 
and the governance reform of the MSC. 
 
At the actor-level, social movement pressure is discussed as an important driver 
behind private multi-stakeholder governance. In the past, NGOs have used ‘naming 
and shaming’ campaigns to put pressure on firms to reduce their social and 
environmental impacts and to participate in NGO-sponsored MSIs (Sasser, Prakash, 
Cashore, & Auld, 2006). In particular, highly branded firms are believed to be 
vulnerable to these pressures. Evidence from the apparel, diamond, and forestry 
sectors suggest that social movement pressure often precedes the creation of MSIs. 
For example, Bartley (2009: 130) describes how, in the apparel sector, NGO 
campaigning activities played a key role in getting firms to participate in MSIs. He 
argues that social movement pressure operated as a catalysing force that can hardly be 
understated. Accounts of MSI formation in the forestry and diamond industries 
provide further evidence for the importance of NGO pressure. In the diamond 
industry, the ‘blood diamond’ campaign has been identified as a key factor 
contributing to the creation of the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (Haufler, 
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2009: 94). The same is true for the forestry sector in which tropical timber boycotts 
and the targeting of big retail corporations paved the way for the FSC (Bartley, 2003, 
2007b).  
 
However, the role of civil society is not restricted to shaming business into action. 
The rise and diffusion of MSIs is also due to a change of strategy in parts of the NGO 
community, described by Domask (2003: 157) as “a shift from boycotts to global 
partnerships”. In this regard, some of the major environmental NGOs began to 
collaborate with business and to actively promote multi-stakeholder processes. Their 
entrepreneurial activities are seen as a driving force behind the current trend toward 
multi-stakeholder regulation. As shown by Auld et al. (2007), NGOs have been 
instrumental in developing and carrying the MSI model across industry sectors. 
Among others, the WWF has been a key driver and incubator of multi-stakeholder 
governance. The environmental NGO has been involved in the formation and 
governance of some 10 MSIs, certifying fish, aquaculture, timber, cotton, soy, sugar, 
biofuels, beef, and palm oil (WWF, 2010). Another example is the Rainforest 
Alliance. With its SmartWood programme, the Rainforest Alliance was a pioneer of 
forest certification and later applied this model to various other agricultural 
commodities such as bananas and coffee (Auld, 2009). The Rainforest Alliance is also 
a founding member of the Sustainable Agriculture Network and the GSTC. 
Furthermore, the Dutch development NGO Solidaridad has been an important 
advocate of multi-stakeholder processes and certification. In 1988, Solidaridad 
created the fair trade label Max Havelaar and since then has been active in various 
roundtable initiatives such as the RTRS and the GRSB. Besides NGOs, the literature 
points to the role played by philanthropic foundations in consolidating and diffusing 
the MSI model. In this regard, Bartley (2007b) details how US foundations have 
played a key role in the formation of forest certification by providing early investment 
funding and grants. One important foundation is the David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation, which has provided significant funds to support the formation of MSIs in 
the forestry, agriculture, and fishery sectors (Packard Foundation, website).  
 
Besides civil society organisations, business groups have also become proactive 
players in implementing sustainability standards and in shaping and disseminating 
private governance institutions. In their work on private food governance, Fuchs and 
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Kalfaggiani (2010) point to the power and authority of big retail companies as 
important drivers behind the emergence and diffusion of private governance 
institutions in this area. Virginia Haufler (2003) identifies a shift in corporate 
strategies as industry leaders became increasingly worried about the effectiveness of 
naming and shaming campaigns launched by transnational advocacy groups. One way 
for corporate managers to respond to these pressures has been to take the lead and to 
enter new partnerships and to develop alternative forms of regulation. In a similar 
vein, Peter Utting (2005) describes how business actors have proven very capable of 
organising, networking, and mobilising around corporate social responsibility issues. 
According to him, this has given rise to various institutional and organisational forms 
such as collaborative arrangements with NGOs, trade unions, governments, and IGOs. 
The British-Dutch consumer goods manufacturer Unilever is one example of a 
company being very active in the field of multi-stakeholder governance. In 1997, the 
company entered a partnership with WWF to create the MSC. It is also a founding 
member of the RTRS and currently chairs the RSPO (interview with the Director of 
Unilever’s Sustainable Agriculture Programme).  
 
Finally, the background role played by states and IGOs is sometimes invoked (Abbott 
& Snidal, 2009a: 83-87). Acting as orchestrators, states and IGOs sometimes harness 
private regulatory initiatives in order to increase their reach and to reduce the cost of 
regulation (Abbott & Snidal, 2009b; Schleifer, 2013). Although Abbott and Snidal 
identify an overall orchestration deficit, in many areas government agencies and IGOs 
have actively supported and facilitated the emergence of MSIs. For instance, the US 
and UK governments have been instrumental in the developmental phase of the FLA 
and the ETI respectively. Also the Dutch, Swiss, and German governments have 
supported multi-stakeholder processes in the past.  
 
1.5.4 Institutional Variation 
Over the last two decades, private participatory governance has diffused across 
industry sectors. In the forest, apparel, fishery, agriculture, and mining industries, 
MSIs are now an important source of sustainability regulation. For example, by 2014, 
the FSC had certified over 180 million hectares of forests (FSC, 2014); and, in the 
fishery sector, some 7 million tonnes of seafood are now certified by the MSC. This is 
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about 8 percent of the world’s total wild capture harvest (MSC, website). In the palm 
oil sector, the RSPO now covers 2.6 million hectares of land under its scheme – that 
is,  about 15 percent of the globally harvested area (FAO, website-b; RSPO, website-
a). Other MSIs such as the ASC, BSI/Bonsucro, BCI, RTRS, and the RSB have only 
recently finalised their standard-setting processes and launched their certification 
systems. They can be expected to certify large quantities of global aquaculture, 
sugarcane, cotton, soy, and biomass production in the near future.  
 
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that the institutional diffusion of MSIs in 
the global economy has not spread a universal model of private participatory 
governance. For example, in their study of 22 MSIs, Fransen and Kolk (2007) find 
that real-world initiatives vary strongly in the design of their inclusiveness. 
Distinguishing between MSIs with a broad and a narrow level of inclusiveness, they 
describe how “different types of multi-stakeholder standards currently co-exist under 
one and the same flag”. They warn that “those who want to avoid difficult interactions 
with critics and true interest representation have to some extent the opportunity to do 
so” (L. Fransen & Kolk, 2007: 669, 678-679). The following analysis of the 
institutional design of 16 of environmental MSIs provides further support for the 
findings of Fransen and Kolk.  
 
For the analysis, the inclusiveness and transparency of 16 environmental MSIs was 
examined.6 To determine the level of inclusiveness, the analysis focused on the 
composition and constitutive rules of their central decision-making bodies. Typically, 
the central decision-making body is some kind of steering board (SB), or steering 
committee (SC). Some MSIs also feature a General Assembly (GA) or Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), but decision-making is mostly concentrated at the board-
level. As can be seen from Figure 2, there are significant differences in the 
composition of these bodies across MSIs. On one side of the spectrum are initiatives 
like the FSC and RSB which involve all key stakeholder groups in their central 
decision-making bodies and where civil society actors are strongly represented. On 
the other side of the spectrum are initiatives like the ASC, BSI/Bonsucro, and the 
ISCC. Their boards are dominated by corporate interests and civil society actors are in 
                                                          
6
 This dissertation focuses on the population of environmental MSIs as there is evidence to suggest that 
labour rights MSIs do not belong to the same community of practice (Bartley 2003).  
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a much weaker position. Furthermore, the inventory reveals that civil society actors 
from the global south are not very well represented at the board-level. They hold 
board seats in only 5 out of the 16 MSIs that were examined.  
 
Figure 2: Composition of MSIs’ Primary Decision-Making Bodies7 
 
The analysis of constitutive rules provides further evidence for variation in the level 
of inclusiveness (see Table 2). Constitutive rules, or what Elinor Ostrom (1990: 52-
53) calls constitutional-choice rules, create the framework for organised collective 
action. They determine who is eligible to participate in collective decision-making 
and define the formal procedures through which these decisions are reached. For the 
inventory the statues and bylaws of the 16 organisations were examined as to whether 
they require civil society participation and/or participation from organisations from 
the global south at the board-level. Furthermore the decision-making arrangements 
                                                          
7
 This figure has been composed using information provided on the websites of the 16 organisations. 
Typically, these contain a section on governance in which information about the board and its members 
is provided. To create the figure, board members have been identified as either belonging to one of the 
following categories: economic, civil society, or others. Then, the location of their home institution’s 
headquarters has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north or global south). The 
figure displays the proportion of seats held by each stakeholder group.  
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(voting procedures) were examined as to whether they provide protection against 
regulatory capture. As defined by Mattli and Woods (2009: 12) regulatory capture “is 
the control of the regulatory process by those whom it is supposed to regulate or by a 
narrow subset of those affected by the regulation, with the consequence that 
regulatory outcomes favour a narrow few at the expense of society as a whole”. In the 
case at hand, granting formal veto rights or a blocking minority to non-business actors 
is a common design feature to protect against regulatory capture. The analysis 
revealed that the statutes of several MSIs contained all three criteria (4C, FSC, HSAP, 
RSB, and RSPO). On the others hand, the constitutive rules of the ASC and PEFC 
were found to contain none of the above mentioned provisions. Also, it is noteworthy 
that in 10 out of the 16 MSIs examined non-business actors do not hold a formal veto 
right or blocking minority.  
 
Table 2: Constitutive Rules of MSIs’ Central Decision-Making Bodies8 
Initiative Board seats reserved for 
civil society actors  
Board seats reserved for 
actors from the global 
south  
Protection against 
regulatory capture  
4C Yes Yes  Yes  
ASC No  No No  
BCI Yes No  No 
BSI/Bonsucro Yes No No 
FSC Yes Yes  Yes  
GRSB Yes No No 
GSTC Yes No No 
HSAP Yes Yes  Yes 
ISCC Yes No No 
MAC Yes No No 
MSC Yes No No 
PEFC No  No No 
RSB Yes Yes Yes 
RSPO Yes Yes  Yes 
RTRS Yes No Yes 
Utz Certified Yes No No 
 
 
In order to facilitate comparison across organisations, the results of the above analysis 
were used to calculate an ‘inclusiveness score’ (see Table 3). With regard to board 
composition, MSIs received one score point when all key stakeholder groups (civil 
                                                          
8
 This table is based on the bylaws and statues of the 16 organisations (4C Association, 2008; ASC, 
2009; BCI, 2009; Bonsucro, 2011; FSC, 2009; GRSB, 2012; GSTC, 2010; HSAP, 2011; ISCC, 2011; 
MAC, 2002; MSC, 2002; PEFC, 2013; RSB, 2010i; RSPO, 2004; RTRS, 2007c; Utz Kapeh, 2011). It 
was examined whether or not they contain requirements to include civil society actors and/or 
organisations from the global south at the board-level. Furthermore, the design of MSIs’ voting 
arrangements was analysed as to whether they provide non-business actors with a formal veto right or 
blocking minority.  
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society north, civil society south, economic north, economic south) were represented 
at the board-level. Another score point was allocated to those organisations in which 
none of the two business constituencies held more than two-thirds of the seats.9 Then, 
MSIs received a score point for each of the following criteria: representation from 
civil society at the board-level required, representation from organisations of the 
global south at the board-level required, and constitutive rules provide protection 
against regulatory capture. MSIs which scored 5-4 points were ranked as high, MSIs 
which scored 3-2 points were ranked as medium, and MSIs which scored 1-0 points 
were ranked as low. 
 
To determine the level of transparency, the websites of the 16 MSIs were examined as 
to the quality of procedural information they contain. MSIs were assigned a low level 
of procedural transparency when they provided only very basic information about 
governance and standard-setting on their websites. In contrast, initiatives were 
assigned a medium level of procedural transparency when this information was more 
detailed. At a minimum, MSIs had to detail the composition of their central decision-
making bodies, their collective choices rules, and the history and technicalities of the 
standard-setting process. Finally, MSIs’ level of procedural transparency was ranked 
as high when they made the meeting minutes of their central decision-making bodies 
available online (see Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In many democratic political systems a two-thirds majority marks a critical threshold. For example, 
constitutional changes often require a two-thirds majority.   
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Table 3: The Inclusiveness and Transparency of MSIs 
 High Medium Low 
Inclusiveness FSC 
HSAP 
RSB 
 
 
 
4C 
BCI 
GRSB 
GSTC 
MAC 
MSC 
RSPO 
RTRS 
Utz Certified 
 
ASC 
BSI/Bonsucro 
ISCC 
PEFC 
Procedural 
transparency  
FSC 
RSB 
RSPO 
RTRS 
 
4C 
ASC 
BCI 
BSI/Bonsucro 
GRSB 
GSTC 
HSAP 
ISCC 
MAC 
MSC 
PEFC 
Utz Certified 
 
 
This inventory of the institutional design of MSI reveals an interesting pattern. With 
regard to procedural transparency, it was found that all MSIs provided detailed 
information about their governance structures on their websites. Typically, their 
websites contained a section on governance in which their decision-making organs 
and their procedures were explained. All of the websites examined also contained 
information about standard-setting, although there was variation in the depth and 
quality of the information provided. On the other hand, however, very few initiatives 
made the meeting minutes of their central decision-making bodies available to the 
public. At the population level, this can be explained with the “cost” of transparency. 
In this regard, providing detailed information about internal decision-making 
processes is significantly more costly than disclosing generic information about 
procedures and structures. However, only high levels of procedural transparency 
create the institutional environment conducive to unconstrained dialogue. As 
described by Esty (2007: 525), it exposes who has influenced a decision and 
discourages rent-seeking and other self-serving behaviour through public scrutiny.  
 
The cost of inclusiveness can be expected to be even higher. Involving all key 
stakeholder groups in the decision-making process and making sure that no one can 
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unduly influence the regulatory outcome is costly – in particular, for the targets of 
regulation (i.e. business actors). On the one hand, having a larger diversity of interests 
at the table will make decision-making more difficult and conflict prone. On the other 
hand, it will have an effect on the regulatory outcome. In this regard, we can expect 
more inclusive governance arrangements to produce more stringent regulation than 
less inclusive ones (Mattli & Woods, 2009). At the same time, as implied by the term 
multi-stakeholder, inclusiveness is the distinguishing feature of MSIs. Ultimately, it is 
their inclusiveness on which claims about their democratic legitimacy as rule-making 
arrangements are based. Against this background, findings about significant variation 
in this key dimension of institutional design create an interesting empirical puzzle. It 
is this puzzle that this dissertation sets out to resolve. 
 
1.6 Contributions  
By examining the institutional diffusion and variation of private participatory 
governance, this dissertation’s contribution is threefold: 
 
Firstly, a contribution is made to the ongoing debate on the legitimacy of private 
governance institutions (Bäckstrand et al., 2010c; Cheyns, 2011; Dingwerth, 2007; 
Nölke & Graz, 2007; Schaller, 2007; Schouten et al., 2012). However, the main 
purpose here is not to provide yet another “measurement” of the democratic 
legitimacy or deliberative capacity of MSIs. Not surprisingly, given the intangible and 
political nature of the subject, these measurements have produced highly 
contradictory results. Whereas some scholars have praised MSIs for being sites of 
meaningful deliberation (e.g. Dingwerth, 2007; Schaller, 2007), others have contested 
their deliberative capacity, arguing that peripheral groups and critical discourses are 
often excluded from these arrangements (e.g. Cheyns, 2011; Schouten et al., 2012). 
Probably, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. MSIs are not a panacea through 
which the world will enter a golden age of legitimate transnational rule-making. That 
said, from a public interest perspective, they are certainly preferable to business self-
regulation with no involvement of external stakeholders. Still, as shown above, not all 
MSIs are the same. From the vantage point of democratic theory, some MSIs are 
better (more participatory) than others. Against this background, the main goal and 
contribution of this dissertation is an explanatory one. Examining the institutional 
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diffusion of private participatory governance in the global economy, it identifies and 
examines the factors that cause variation in this key dimension of institutional design.   
 
Through exploring the question this question in-depth, the dissertation makes also an 
important contribution to the literature on institutional design. Only very recently 
have scholars of IR started to explore diffusion arguments as an explanation for the 
design of international institutions (Alter, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2011; Ovodenko 
& Keohane, 2012; Sommerer & Tallberg, 2014). These studies show that institutional 
diffusion is a pervasive phenomenon in international and transnational relations. 
Furthermore, this literature suggests that while institutions diffuse, they often vary in 
form and content. However, as of yet, explanations of variation in the diffusion 
process remain largely context-specific and a more general and systematic treatment 
of the topic is still missing (Klingler-Vidra & Schleifer, 2014). In order to fill this gap, 
this dissertation makes an important theoretical contribution to the literature on 
international institutions. It unpacks diffusion “theory” and develops an analytical 
framework that distinguishes three stages in the diffusion process: source selection, 
transmission, and adoption. For each of these stages, hypotheses are formulated about 
the cause-and-effect relationships that make diffusion outcomes vary. In this way, a 
framework for studying processes of institutional diffusion is offered, which is 
applicable beyond the specific empirical context of this dissertation. 
 
Last but not least, this dissertation speaks to the specialised literature on multi-
stakeholder sustainability governance (Auld, 2009; Bartley, 2007b; Cashore et al., 
2004; Gulbrandsen, 2010; Pattberg, 2005). As a more detailed review provided in 
Chapter 2 reveals, this literature has mostly focused on the initial institutional 
emergence of sustainability MSIs in the forestry, fishery, and apparel industries. More 
recently, scholars have turned their focus toward the question of institutional 
isomorphism or convergence between existing organisations. It is noticeable that the 
diffusion of the MSI institutional model has received considerably less attention. The 
works that do exist describe the emergence of institutional variation during the 
diffusion process. However, the underlying causal mechanisms remain poorly 
specified and empirically underresearched. In other words, we still know little about 
the factors that cause institutional variation between MSIs. Also, by studying three 
MSIs in the agriculture sector in-depth, this dissertation makes an important empirical 
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contribution.10 As mentioned above, much of the existing MSI literature focuses on 
the forestry, apparel, and fishery sectors. In particular, the FSC has received much 
scholarly attention. In contrast, the MSIs in the agriculture sector remain largely 
underresearched.  
 
1.7 Road Map of the Dissertation  
The remainder of this dissertation is structured in seven chapters. Chapter 2 begins 
with a more focused review of the literature on multi-stakeholder sustainability 
governance and how it has dealt with the question of institutional diffusion. It 
identifies a gap in the literature, as only very few works have examined these 
processes in more (empirical and theoretical) depth. In order to address this gap, the 
chapter proceeds with a detailed introduction to diffusion “theory”. The concept of 
institutional diffusion is introduced and it is specified why and when diffusion occurs 
and what its primary mechanisms and outcomes are. This discussion serves as a 
background for theorising about the occurrence of variation during the diffusion 
process. To this end, three different stages in the diffusion process are distinguished: 
source selection, transmission, and adoption. For each of the stages, hypotheses are 
formulated about the cause-and-effect-relationships that make diffusion outcomes 
vary. These are then integrated into a causal model that will be put to work in the case 
study chapters. In preparation for the empirical analysis, the chapter closes with 
discussion on questions of research design and methodology. It operationalises the 
dependent variable, discusses the rationale behind the case selection, and explains the 
two-step methodological approach which combines a within-case study analysis 
(process-tracing) with a cross-case comparison.  
 
To set the scene for the empirical analysis, Chapter 3 then provides an introduction to 
the global political economy of agriculture. In a first section, the chapter describes the 
globalisation of agricultural trade and production. It traces this development from the 
emergence of agricultural trade in the colonial era to today’s highly industrialised and 
transnationally integrated agro-supply chains. This is followed by a discussion of the 
                                                          
10
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 for a detailed discussion of the case selection.  
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sector’s various sustainability challenges and the role of private governance 
institutions in addressing these challenges. 
 
Chapters 4-6 examine the institutional diffusion of private participatory governance in 
the agricultural sector – the most dynamic site of MSI diffusion in recent years. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the RSB in the biofuel sector; Chapter 5 examines the RTRS in 
the soy sector; and Chapter 6 studies BSI/Bonsucro in the sugarcane sector. In the 
inventory of environmental MSIs conducted in this chapter, these schemes were found 
to exhibit a high (RSB), medium (RTRS), and low (BSI/Bonsucro) level of 
inclusiveness, respectively. After providing some case context and background 
information, each case study begins with a more in-depth analysis of the composition 
and constitutive rules of their decision-making and standard-setting arrangements. 
Then, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 is used to explain the 
diffusion outcome for each of the three cases. Completing the empirical analysis, 
Chapter 7 compares the findings across cases. This makes it possible to identify the 
causes of variation for the cases studied. It also creates a more solid empirical basis 
for the formulation of more general hypotheses about the variation in the 
inclusiveness of private governance institutions.  
 
In conclusion, Chapter 8 provides a more detailed discussion of the contribution of 
this dissertation to the debate on the legitimacy of private governance institutions, 
research on the relationship between diffusion and institutional design, and the 
literature on multi-stakeholder sustainability governance.  
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Chapter 2: Institutional Diffusion and Variation  
 
2.1 Introduction  
The rise of private participatory governance is often referred to as a case of 
successful, or close, diffusion (Bartley, 2007b; Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012). As a 
mode of global governance, MSIs first emerged in the forestry and apparel sectors in 
the early 1990s and from there diffused rapidly and widely in the global economy. 
Today, several dozen MSIs operate in sectors as diverse as apparel, agriculture, 
fishery, mining, and tourism where they certify the world’s factories, farms, fisheries, 
and mines. Due to their participatory approach, MSIs have been widely praised as 
“innovative institutional designs,” “good governance models,” and “sites of 
meaningful deliberation” (Cashore et al., 2004: 298; Dingwerth, 2007: 9; 
Gulbrandsen, 2008b). However, the inventory of 16 environmental MSIs conducted in 
Chapter 1 revealed significant variation in their institutional designs, notably their 
level of inclusiveness. Whereas some initiatives involve a wide range of stakeholders 
in their governance and standard-setting activities, others have been found to be 
considerably less participatory. It is this institutional variation which this dissertation 
sets out to explain.  
 
To begin the inquiry, this chapter starts with a more focused review of the MSI 
literature and how scholars have dealt with the question of institutional diffusion. 
Identifying a gap in the literature – we still know little about the process of 
institutional diffusion in this area and why it has produced divergent outcomes – the 
chapter provides the reader with a detailed introduction to the “theory” of diffusion. It 
discusses what diffusion is, why and when it occurs, and what its primary 
mechanisms and outcomes are. After introducing the concept of diffusion, a set of 
general hypotheses about when to expect diffusion to produce more or less inclusive 
institutional outcomes is developed. These hypotheses are then integrated into an 
analytical framework (causal model) which will guide the empirical analysis in the 
case study chapters. Finally, in its closing section, the chapter elaborates on questions 
of methodology and research design.  
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2.2 Diffusion in the Study of Multi-Stakeholder Governance 
Much of the existing literature on MSIs focuses on processes of institutional 
emergence. The focus of these works is on the forestry and apparel industries, as sites 
of initial emergence, and combines agency-based and structural explanations (Bartley, 
2003, 2007b; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Haufler, 2003; McNichol, 2006; Pattberg, 
2005; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). As described in detail in Chapter 1, these works 
show how government failures and demonstration effects (e.g. industrial accidents, 
food scares, etc.) gave rise to social movement pressures and how NGOs, foundations, 
and progressive firms became institutional entrepreneurs. In an international 
environment characterised by neoliberalism and democratic norms, these actors 
turned toward the market as a forum for regulation and experimented with multi-
stakeholder governance and procedural transparency in order to provide legitimacy to 
their activities. It is this confluence of factors which is thought to have led to the 
emergence of MSIs as a new mode of global sustainability governance. 
 
The MSI research literature has also looked at the diffusion of the MSI institutional 
model in the global economy. It is described how, largely independent from one 
another, MSIs first emerged in the apparel and forestry industries and how the model 
then diffused to other sectors (Bartley, 2003, 2007b). However, only very few works 
have examined these processes in more detail. Two notable exceptions are a working 
paper by Auld et al. (2007) and Gulbrandsen’s (Gulbrandsen, 2008b, 2010) 
examination of the emergence and “spill over” of the MSI institutional model from 
the forestry to the fishery sectors. In their paper, Auld et al. describe the activities of 
what they refer to as organisational carriers. Identifying three different types of 
carriers (environmental NGOs, certification bodies and philanthropic foundations), 
they provide anecdotal evidence of how these carriers have played a key role in 
spreading the MSI institutional model across industries and how they transformed it in 
the process. Examining the diffusion of the MSIs from the forestry to the fishery 
industry, Gulbrandsen (2010: 112-133) describes how the founders of the MSC 
modelled their organisation on the FSC. However, he finds that they only imitated 
some of the FSC’s features, whereas they filtered out others. 
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More recently, the MSI literature has started to examine the question of convergence, 
or institutional isomorphism, in the field of transnational sustainability governance 
(Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; L. W. Fransen, 2011, 2012b; Kaan, 2008; Overdevest, 
2010; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). As described in more detail below, convergence 
or isomorphism can be defined as any increase in the similarity between entities of a 
social system. Drawing on neoinstitutional theory, Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) 
argue that diffusion in the form of mimetic, coercive, and normative pressures has 
made MSIs converge on a common model, featuring meaningful and costly 
participatory elements. Further evidence in support of the isomorphism hypothesis 
comes from the forestry sector. Here, Overdevest (2010) and Zietsma and McKnight 
(2009) show how interscheme competition between the FSC and its industry-initiated 
competitor programmes created pressures for convergence. However, others believe 
that institutional variation will persist (Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2013). In this regard, 
Fransen (2011, 2012b) argues that civil society actors, retailers, and manufacturers 
continue to struggle over the content and scope of private labour standards and that 
this has limited the possibilities of convergence among private governance 
arrangements in the apparel industry. In his study on the formation and evolution of 
MSIs in the forestry, coffee and fishery industries, Auld (2009) points to a second set 
of mechanisms. He shows how self-reinforcing processes at the organisational-level 
can lock in initial institutional design choices and thus impede later efforts to adapt. 
 
The above review reveals that much of the existing literature focuses on processes 
surrounding the initial emergence of MSIs in the forestry and apparel industries. More 
recently, scholars have turned their attention to the question of institutional 
isomorphism or convergence between existing organisations. It is noticeable that the 
institutional diffusion of the MSI organisational model has received considerably less 
attention. The works that do exist describe the emergence of institutional variation 
during the diffusion process. However, the underlying causal mechanisms remain 
poorly specified and empirically underresearched. In other words, we still know little 
about the cause-and-effect relationships that lead to institutional variation between 
MSIs. In order to shed some light on the issue, the next section introduces the concept 
of diffusion. Drawing on works from sociology, political science and management 
studies, it defines what diffusion is, why and when it occurs, and what its primary 
mechanisms, as well as outcomes, are. This is followed by a discussion of how 
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diffusion theorists have approached the issue of variation and transformation during 
the diffusion process. 
 
2.3 What Is Diffusion? 
The question of why and how institutions and their elements spread across time and 
space has received much attention in several social science disciplines and empirical 
fields. These processes have been studied under various labels. Most commonly used 
is the term diffusion (Rogers, 1995; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garret, 2008; Strang & 
Soule, 1998; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). However, others refer to them as processes of 
translation (Boxenbaum, 2006; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 
2008) or policy transfer (D. Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Rose, 1991). These literatures 
have much in common but there are also differences with regard to concepts, 
methods, and empirical focus.11 This dissertation draws on this large body of 
scholarship. It uses the term diffusion but also builds on insights from the translation 
and policy transfer literatures.  
 
The concept of diffusion originates in the natural sciences where it refers to the spread 
of molecules from an area of high concentration to one of low concentration. But also 
institutions and their elements can diffuse. For example, the multidivisional form has 
diffused among large firms in America (Fligstein, 1985), democratic institutions in 
parts of the developing world (Huntington, 1991), and neoliberal norms globally 
(Simmons & Elkins, 2004). However, as noted by Elkins and Simmons (2005: 4), the 
analogy is not a perfect one. In the natural world, diffusion results in a more uniform 
and thinned-out distribution of molecules, whereas in the social world diffusion has 
no such effect. Social diffusion does not deplete the source, and the practice spread is 
not necessarily less intense.  
 
Despite these differences, the term diffusion has been widely used by social scientists 
studying the spread of a wide range of social practices. As summarised by Strang and 
                                                          
11
 For a detailed discussion on the commonalities and differences of the diffusion and policy transfer 
literatures see Marsh and Sharmann (2009). For a discussion on diffusion and translation see 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996).  
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Soule (1998), classic diffusion studies include Ryan and Gross’ (1943) analysis of the 
spread of hybrid corn, Hagerstrand’s  (1967) investigation of the diffusion of the 
telephone, and Coleman et al.’s (1966) analysis of the diffusion of a prescription drug. 
Ever since diffusion arguments have been very popular with social scientists. In the 
field of organisational studies, diffusion arguments rose to prominence as the new 
institutionalism set out to examine the structuring effects of institutional environments 
and in this context processes of interorganisational mimicry (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Rowan, 1982; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). For social movement scholars, 
diffusion became one of the central explanations for the formation of collective action 
and the spread of protest, symbols, and strategies within social movements (Andrews 
& Biggs, 2006; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Soule, 1997). Also, IR scholars have 
looked at diffusion in their attempts to explain patterns of policy convergence and the 
spread of norms and institutions in the international system (Checkel, 1999; 
Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012; Simmons et al., 2008). 
 
What is diffusion? Diffusion is “the spread of something within a social system” 
(Strang & Soule, 1998: 266). In more a more comprehensive way, it can be defined as 
a causal process in which a diffusion mechanism transmits a diffusion item from a 
point of origin to a point of adoption. Thus, in its most basic form, a diffusion process 
consists of (1) a point of origin, (2) a diffusion mechanism and (3) a point of adoption.  
From this definition it becomes clear what diffusion is and what it not is. The concept 
of diffusion comprises processes that involve the transmission of institutional 
elements between two or more entities of a social system. For example, processes of 
interorganisational learning and imitation fall into this category. However, if the 
adoption of similar practices within a somehow defined population is due to factors 
that are independent from one another (e.g. everybody taking out an umbrella when it 
rains), then this does not qualify as diffusion (cf. Elkins & Simmons, 2005: 2-3).  
 
2.3.1 Causes 
Why does diffusion occur? This question has received considerable attention from 
sociologists and management scholars studying processes of imitation and 
interorganisational learning – two important diffusion mechanisms. The following 
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review is not exhaustive but covers some of the key causes discussed in the 
literature.12   
 
In the literature on the new institutionalism uncertainty has been identified as the 
primary cause of imitation or what they call mimetic diffusion (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). From this perspective, 
organisations need to be perceived as legitimate by their peers and other key players 
in their institutional environments in order to survive. However, in environments 
characterised by high levels of uncertainty organisations do not know how to obtain 
legitimacy. New institutionalism predicts that in such situations organisations turn 
toward those whom they perceive as successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). 
They mimic their structures and strategies, hoping that this will imbue them with 
legitimacy and thus increase their survival prospects in uncertain environments.  
 
In a similar vein, the literature on information cascades invokes information 
asymmetries as a key driver behind imitation. The argument goes that actors engage 
in imitation, because they feel that others possess more and/or better information than 
they do (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Sinclair, 1990). 
Through imitation they hope to reduce information asymmetries and the risk of 
making poor autonomous decisions. This can trigger herd behaviour, fads, and 
fashions in which actors follow the actions of others because the fact that many 
behave in a certain way serves as information that this is the best thing to do.  
 
Students of organisational learning add outcome uncertainty and exploration costs to 
the equation. According to this literature, diffusion in the form of interorganisational 
learning occurs when organisations are confronted with several alternative decision 
pathways with ambiguous pay-offs and high exploration costs (Dutton & Freedman, 
1985; Levitt & March, 1988). In such situations, organisations can reduce the costs of 
exploration through learning from the experience of others who confronted similar 
situations. Closely related, decision-making theory points to imitation as a strategy to 
increase the efficiency of decision-making processes (Pingle, 1995).  
 
                                                          
12
 This subsection draws on Ordanini et al.’s (2008) and Lieberman’s (2006) comprehensive 
discussions of the topic.  
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2.3.2 Facilitating Factors 
What makes diffusion more or less likely, and determines its speed and degree? A 
broad, multidisciplinary literature has grappled with these questions. Some of the key 
findings are presented here.  
 
One of the most intuitive findings of this literature is that social practices flow more 
rapidly and widely among units that are spatially close. Spatial proximity appears to 
involve all kinds of interactions and exchanges and as a result makes diffusion more 
likely. In a review article on diffusion in organisations and social movements, Strang 
and Soule (1998) cite several works dealing with the relationship between spatial 
proximity and diffusion. In this regard, Knoke (1982) examines the effects of 
geographic proximity on the spread of municipal reform, Petras and Zeilin (1967) 
show how radical ideas in Chile spread from mining communities to adjacent 
agricultural communities, and Myers (1997) finds that the propensity to riot falls with 
distance from cities where riots first occurred.  
 
Closely related, interpersonal and interorganisational ties linking prior to later 
adopters have been found to facilitate diffusion. In this regard, Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman (1989) show how interorganisational network ties function as conduits to 
disseminate ideas and innovations throughout organisational fields. Along similar 
lines, Davis (1991) and Haunschild (1993) find evidence that imitation is more likely 
among firms linked through interlocking boards.  
 
Beyond spatial proximity and direct links between prior and later adopters, 
similarities have been found to facilitate diffusion. In this regard, Strang and Meyer 
(1993: 490-492) argue that diffusion will be rapid between actors that fall into the 
same category. They elaborate that processes like mimicking require that the target of 
imitation and the imitator are fundamentally similar, at least with respect to the 
practice at hand. In a similar vein, Checkel (1999: 87) argues that cultural matches 
(i.e. a high degree of congruence between external norms and local cultures) facilitate 
the adoption, and thus diffusion, of international norms. Also, Ovodenko and 
Keohane (2012: 533-538) point to problem similarity and similar issue areas as 
factors facilitating the diffusion of international environmental institutions.   
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Furthermore, the role of theorisation as a facilitating factor has been discussed. 
Theorisation refers to the development of concepts, categories, typologies, and the 
specification of cause-and-effect relationships. Strang and Meyer (1993: 492-495) 
argue that theorised practices diffuse faster and that their diffusion is less dependent 
on direct links and interactions. That is because general models facilitate 
communication even between weakly related actors. As examples they describe how 
the theorisation of environmental issues, educational structures, and welfare policies 
has accelerated their diffusion across states.  
 
In some cases, diffusion processes are facilitated by third parties which can be 
individuals, organisations or states. They act as intermediaries who carry new ideas, 
norms, and practices across time and space. Evidence for the activities of 
intermediaries is abundant in the diffusion literature. For instance, in their pioneering 
study, Coleman et al (1966) examine the diffusion of a prescription drug and describe 
how marketing personal and more “cosmopolitan” physicians spread the new drug in 
their networks. Another example for the activities of intermediaries is Minstrom’s 
(1997) work on education reform. He examines what he calls policy entrepreneurs 
and how they diffused and built support for reform policies in the US. Also, scholars 
in the field of IR have looked at the activities of diffusion intermediaries. These works 
point to the key role played by individuals, NGOs, IGOs and epistemic communities 
in creating and diffusing norms in the international system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998; Haas, 1989; Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  
 
Finally, it is a widely held assumption in the diffusion literature that innovations, 
practices, and strategies are more likely to spread if they have a proven record of 
success and if prior adopters are prestigious and central actors (Soule, 1999: 274-275; 
Strang & Soule, 1998).  
 
2.3.3 Mechanisms 
Diffusion has been defined above as a causal process in which a diffusion mechanism 
transmits a diffusion item from a point of origin to a point of adoption. In the 
literature, various diffusion mechanisms have been examined, of which the most 
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important are briefly discussed here. These are: imitation, learning, coercion, and 
competition. 
 
Imitation, also known as mimicry or emulation refers to processes in which later 
adopters try to copy the behaviour, strategies, policies, structures, or innovations of 
prior adopters. Above, various causes for imitative behaviour have been discussed. 
Organisations and states imitate their peers in order to gain legitimacy, save costs, and 
reduce information asymmetries. As explanations, imitation arguments play an 
important role in institutional theory where it is identified as a key driver behind 
processes of organisational isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991). But 
political scientists have also used imitation to explain policy convergence or 
clustering (Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006). 
 
Learning, or lessons-drawing, is another important diffusion mechanism. In many 
respects, learning is similar to imitation but there are also significant differences. In 
both learning and imitation mode, organisations and states turn towards their peers 
with the intention to copy some of their features. However, unlike imitation, learning 
implies a process of rational reflection on the part of the adopter. The adopter 
carefully considers the pros and cons of a policy, strategy, or design feature. Lessons 
from the experience of others are drawn and, if considered positive, a decision in 
favour of adoption is made. Learning or lessons-drawing plays an important role in 
the policy transfer literature (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1991) but also in 
the field of organisation studies (Levitt & March, 1988).  
 
Furthermore, coercion is discussed as a mechanism through which norms, ideas, and 
practices are spread across time and space. Diffusion via coercion refers to a process 
in which an external actor uses its power to force a state or organisation to adopt a 
certain set of policies, practices, or structures. For example, for DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983: 150) “coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent” . In 
the political science literature coercion is also discussed as the underlying causal 
mechanism of diffusion processes (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Holzinger & Knill, 
2005; Simmons et al., 2006). Here, it is powerful states or IGOs that impose their 
policies and norms on others. In this literature, often a distinction is made between 
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more direct and indirect forms of coercive diffusion (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 
13-17; Simmons et al., 2006: 790-791).  
 
Besides imitation, learning, and coercion, competition is often mentioned as an 
important diffusion mechanism (Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Simmons et al., 
2008). The competition mechanism focuses on how competitive pressures constrain 
the options of policymakers and organisational managers. For example, Simmons and 
Elkins (2004) argue that the adoption of capital account liberalisation policies in one 
state creates pressures for its peers to adopt similar policies (and this pressure 
intensifies as the number of peers that liberalise their capital accounts increases).  
 
2.3.4 Outcomes 
Much of the diffusion literature focuses on cases of successful diffusion in which 
diffusion is used, for example, to explain policy waves and clusters and in this context 
the emergence of institutional convergence or isomorphism (e.g. Jakobi, 2012; 
Marcussen, 2005; Simmons et al., 2008). In fact, the notion of increasing similarities 
between prior and later adopters, as well as among the units of the adopting 
population, is inherent to the concept of diffusion as it is frequently used in the 
literature (Elkins & Simmons, 2005: 2; Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012: 
524).Convergence can be defined as any increase in the similarity between one or 
more institutional characteristics across a given set of political jurisdictions (Knill, 
2005: 768). Conceptually, the study of convergence is closely related to the sociology 
literature on institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991). The 
primary difference between convergence and isomorphism is their area of empirical 
focus. Students of organisational isomorphism focus on the increasing similarities 
between organisations, whereas the convergence literature’s main emphasis is on 
national policy characteristics. Most diffusion studies focus on the increasing 
similarities between the point of origin and the point of adoption, as well as increasing 
similarities among the adopting population. These are what Knill (2005: 769) refers to 
as δ- and σ-convergence, respectively.13 Besides convergence and isomorphism, some 
                                                          
13
 Besides σ- and δ-convergence, Knill (2005: 769) furthermore distinguishes between β- and γ-
convergence: “First, β-convergence occurs when laggard countries catch up with leader countries over 
time, implying, for instance, that the former strengthen their regulatory standards more quickly and 
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studies have shown that sometimes diffusion processes have been prevented or 
interrupted through so-called “firewalls” or a decision to reject a policy, norm, or 
practice. In these cases, we talk about non-diffusion or failed diffusion (Acharya, 
2004; Solingen, 2012) (see Table 4 for an overview of the diffusion process).  
 
Table 4: The Diffusion Process 
Causes (mainly for 
diffusion via imitation 
and learning) 
Facilitating Factors  Mechanisms  
 
Outcomes 
- Uncertainty  
- Information 
asymmetries  
- Exploration costs  
 
- Spatial proximity 
- Network ties 
- Similarities (culture, 
problems, issue 
areas) 
- Theorisation 
(existence of general 
models, 
identification of 
cause-and-effect 
relationships) 
- Intermediaries 
- Prestige, success of 
prior adopters 
- Imitation (mimicry, 
emulation) 
- Learning (lessons-
drawing) 
- Coercion 
(imposition) 
- Competition 
- Successful 
diffusion 
(leading to 
institutional 
isomorphism or 
convergence) 
- Failed diffusion  
 
However, numerous studies suggest that successful diffusion – leading to institutional 
isomorphism – and non-diffusion are not the only possible outcomes of diffusion 
processes. In this regard, Börzel and Risse (2011), for example, show how diffusion 
of the European Union (EU) model has led to significant variation in institutional and 
behavioural outcomes among adopters. In a similar way, the works of Falkner and 
Gupta (2009) and Radaelli (2005) point to diffusion processes that led to only limited 
degrees of convergence. These and other studies show that, as they diffuse, norms, 
ideas, and practices often change in form and content. Typically, what is adopted as a 
result of diffusion processes is not an exact copy of the original practice. However, as 
of yet, explanations of why practices vary as they diffuse have not been systematically 
drawn together. Studies dealing with the question of variation in the diffusion process 
mostly focus on single explanations and a more comprehensive framework is still 
missing. With a focus on the MSI institutional model and its diffusion, the following 
section seeks to address this gap.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
fundamentally than the latter. Second, γ-convergence is measured by changes of country rankings with 
respect to a certain policy”. 
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2.4 Why Do Institutions Vary as They Diffuse? 
In Chapter 1, the successful diffusion of private participatory governance in the global 
economy was described. MSIs first emerged in the forestry and apparel sectors in the 
early 1990s and then diffused rapidly and widely in the global economy. The 
literature on the topic points to a good fit with prevailing social structures, social 
movement pressure, and the entrepreneurial activities of NGOs, foundations, and 
progressive firms as the main drivers behind this process. However, an inventory of 
16 environmental MSIs revealed that this process has not spread a universal model of 
private participatory governance. As the MSI model has diffused in the global 
economy, it has changed in form and content, leading to variation in key dimensions 
of institutional design. In this regard, Chapter 1 uncovered significant variation in 
their institutional designs, notably their level of inclusiveness. In search of an 
explanation, this section draws on the broader diffusion literature and the literature of 
private governance to theorise about the factors that cause diffusion outcomes to vary. 
It identifies different stages in the diffusion process (source selection, transmission, 
and adoption) and for each stage develops general hypotheses about variation in 
diffusion outcomes. These hypotheses are then integrated into an analytical 
framework (causal model) which will structure the empirical analysis in the case 
study chapters.  
 
2.4.1 Source Selection 
The selection of a target institution or source marks the beginning of the diffusion 
process. Standard diffusion models assume the existence of a single point of origin or 
source. March (1999: 137) calls this the broadcasting mode of diffusion. In this mode, 
a norm, idea, or practice is transmitted from a central source to a population of 
potential adopters. For example, diffusion processes within social movements often 
follows this pattern. In this regard, Spilerman (1970) and Oberschall (1989) find that 
protests and social movement strategies spread from initial points of mobilisation and 
innovation to other places as activists learn about them through their interpersonal 
networks and from the media. Also, mimetic processes within organisational fields 
often take the centralised structure of the broadcasting model. The argument goes that 
organisations mimic those whom they perceive as legitimate and successful in order 
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to increase their survival prospects in uncertain environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The Broadcasting Mode of Diffusion 
 
 
 
If the underlying diffusion model resembles the broadcasting model depicted above, 
then a homogenous adopting population is the expected outcome (Hedmo, Sahlin-
Andersson, & Wedlin, 2005: 196). Adopters converge toward the single central 
source that is the target of imitation or organisational mimicry.  
 
However, not all diffusion processes resemble the broadcasting model. March (1999: 
199) furthermore distinguishes a chain mode of imitation. While broadcasting 
originates in a single, central source that spreads an innovation all around, in chain 
mode imitation a diffusion item is transmitted from one adopter to the next and so on. 
This means that late adopters have no direct contact to the initial source and may even 
be ignorant of it. If the underlying diffusion model is best described by the chain 
mode of diffusion, then variation between early and late adopters may occur. The 
children’s game Chinese Whispers illustrates the mechanism at work. In Chinese 
Whispers, one player whispers a message to another, which is passed through a line of 
people until the last player announces the message to the entire group. Errors and 
deliberate modifications accumulate in the retellings. As a result, the statement 
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announced by the last player usually differs significantly from the one uttered by the 
first (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The Chain Mode of Diffusion 
 
Both the broadcasting and chain model of diffusion assume the existence of a single 
(initial) source, but often diffusion processes exhibit a more complex pattern. For 
example, the literature on innovation diffusion suggests that new technologies are 
often not developed at a single point of innovation and are then passed on to a 
population of potential adopters. Instead, Biggs (1990) argues that these processes are 
better captured by a multiple-source diffusion model. For the field of agricultural 
research, he shows how various public and private actors are involved in the 
development and diffusion of new technologies. Whereas single-source diffusion 
models are likely to lead to a homogenisation of the adopting population, multiple-
source models have been found to create room for variation. Two studies from the 
field of IR illustrate this point. In an article on patterns of policy convergence in the 
international system, Drezner (2005) shows how the existence of two (diverse) 
sources can lead to a polarisation of the adopting population as adopters converge to 
one of the two nodes. In a similar way, Falkner’s and Gupta’s (2009) work on 
regulatory politics in key developing countries shows how the existence of multiple 
sources can facilitate diversity among adopters (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: A Multiple-Source Diffusion Model 
 
How can this discussion of different diffusion models help us account for the 
observed variation among MSIs and their level of inclusivness? The existing literature 
suggests that the underlying diffusion model in the field of transnational sustainability 
governance does not follow the broadcasting model described at the outset of this 
section. In this model, later adopters imitate a single central source which leads to 
institutional isomorphism among them. Instead, the diffusion of the MSI institutional 
model exhibits a more complex pattern, involving multiple sources as well as chain 
mode diffusion.  
 
In his study of the emergence of MSIs in the forestry and fishery sectors, Gulbrandsen 
(2008a; 2010: 112-133) describes how the founders of the FSC turned to IFOAM (an 
umbrella organisation of organic agriculture associations) and the International 
Conservation Union of Nature (an environmental NGO) when designing the 
governance structure of their organisation. He furthermore describes how the FSC, in 
turn, has become an organisational template for the MSC in the fishery sector. 
Providing further evidence for the complexity of institutional diffusion in the area of 
transnational sustainability governance Auld et al.’s (2007: 24) discussion of the 
genesis of the RSPO reveals how its founders looked at several MSIs, including the 
FSC and MSC when creating the organisational structures of the palm oil initiative. 
Also, for reasons elaborated in more detail below, institutional variation occurred 
 
 
  
  Adopter 
Adopter 
Adopter 
Adopter 
 Source Source 
62 
 
relatively early in the population of environmental MSIs. In this regard, Gulbrandsen 
(2010: 112-133) describes how the founders of the MSC, which was modelled after 
the FSC, adopted a much leaner governance structure than the forestry initiative. For 
instance, the scheme does not feature a general assembly of its members and its board 
does not feature the carefully balanced stakeholder structure of the FSC board.  
 
As mentioned above, the field of transnational sustainability governance exhibits a 
complex diffusion pattern. This means that for the groups of late adopters we have to 
assume the existence of multiple (diverse) target institutions (see Figure 6). Against 
this background, one possible explanation of variation in diffusion outcomes is that 
late adopters select different target institutions for imitation which differ in their level 
of inclusiveness.  
 
Figure 6: The Pattern of Diffusion in the Field of Environmental MSIs14 
 
 
When institutional alternatives exist, the choice of a target institution is believed to 
depend on a number of factors. As mentioned above, one important factor is 
                                                          
14
 This table is based on the inventory of environmental MSIs conducted in Chapter 1 (board 
inclusiveness scores).  
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perceptions about the prestige and success of the prior adopters. Imitators turn 
towards those whom they perceive to be as successful in order to improve their 
survival prospects in uncertain environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Soule, 
1999; Strang & Soule, 1998). Furthermore, network ties are believed to facilitate 
diffusion among units of a social system (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 
1989; Haunschild, 1993; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Rogers, 1995). From a rational 
choice perspective, this can be explained by the imitator’s desire to minimise 
transaction costs, whereas institutional theory points to the role of familiarity and trust 
(Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989: 456). Closely related to this, spatial proximity is 
thought to facilitate institutional diffusion (Knoke, 1982; Petras & Zeitlin, 1967; 
Strang & Soule, 1998). 
 
To summing up the above discussion, one can expect diffusion to lead to a 
homogenisation of the adopting population when there is a single central source. In 
contrast, diffusion outcomes can vary when the underlying diffusion model has 
multiple sources. In these situations, variation among late adopters occurs, when 
designers select different target institutions for imitation which exhibit different 
institutional features. These decisions are thought to depend on factors such as 
adopters’ network ties, their spatial proximity to prior adopters, as well as their 
perceptions about prior adopters’ performance records. This leads us to the first 
hypothesis:  
 
H1: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if the primary target 
institution exhibits a high (low) level of inclusiveness.  
 
2.4.2 Transmission  
Once a target institution is selected, a diffusion mechanism transmits information 
about the source-model to the point of adoption. Above, competition, coercion, 
imitation, and learning have been identified as the principal diffusion mechanisms. 
The coercion and competition mechanisms describe external forces or pressures that 
impose practices on organisations. On the other hand, the imitation and learning 
mechanisms are adopter-driven. In imitation or learning mode, adopters reach out to 
other entities in order to copy their structures and to learn from their experiences. The 
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following discussion focuses on imitation and learning, whereas coercive pressures 
are discussed in the section on environmental pressures. The competition mechanism 
is not covered here. Typically, competition occurs between mature schemes, whereas 
the empirical focus of this dissertation is on the diffusion and design phases of MSIs. 
For a more detailed treatment of the competition mechanism and how it is thought to 
affect transnational rule-making organisations see Overdevest (2010), Fransen (2011), 
and Abbott and Snidal (2009a: 77-80). 
 
Standard diffusion models in neoinstitutional theory work with imitation or mimicry 
as the underlying causal mechanism. As described above, processes of mimetic 
diffusion are hypothesised to be caused by uncertainty, whereas uncertainty may 
pertain to environments, technologies, or ambiguous goals (Milstein, Hart, & York, 
2002; Siegel, Agrawal, & Rigsby, 1997). If the level of uncertainty surrounding 
adopters is high, they may not know how to behave or which strategy or structure to 
adopt. This creates the risk of making wrong decisions, which, in resource-scarce and 
competitive environments, can be extremely costly – potentially posing a threat to 
organisational survival. In order to minimise the risk of failure, DiMaggio and Powell 
theorise (1983: 152) that “organizations tend to model themselves after similar 
organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful”.   
 
Besides uncertainty, exploration costs have been identified as a cause behind 
diffusion. However, unlike uncertainty which triggers imitative behaviour, 
exploration costs are associated with processes of interorganisational learning (Dutton 
& Freedman, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988). Learning occurs when adopters are 
confronted with several alternative decision pathways with ambiguous pay-offs and 
high exploration costs. In such situations, adopters can reduce the costs of exploration 
through learning from the experience of others, who confronted similar situations.  
 
In both imitation and learning mode, new adopters turn toward popular and familiar 
institutional designs. However, unlike imitation, learning implies a process of rational 
reflection on the part of the adopter. In this regard, learners consider the pros and cons 
of a design feature and lessons from the experience of others are drawn. In doing so, 
they may find that some aspects of the source model are suboptimal for their purposes 
and make modifications accordingly – a process also known as selective imitation (cf. 
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Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Romanelli, 1999). In other cases, designers have been 
found to select and combine elements from different target institutions. In the policy 
transfer literature, this is known as hybridisation or synthesising (D. Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 1996; Rose, 1991) (see Figure 7). Furthermore, learning, as a creative process, 
can produce genuine innovations, creating new institutional forms or design features 
(cf. Morrill, unpublished manuscript). 
 
Figure 7. Synthesis in the Diffusion Process 
 
The existing MSI literature suggests that processes of learning in the form of selective 
imitation and synthesising have played an important role in the evolution of the MSI 
institutional model. For example, Gulbrandsen (2010: 112-133) and Auld et al. (2007) 
describe how the designers of the MSC modelled their organisation on the basis of the 
FSC. However, they did not simply imitate the forestry initiative, but drew lessons 
from its experience. Providing evidence for the learning process at work, Auld et al. 
(2007: 25), quote one of the officers of the MSC: “the MSC very consciously decided 
that they didn’t like all that what one of the FSC supporters in the US terms 
‘psychotic democracy’…they really wanted to avoid the messiness of it all, and they 
really wanted it to become a market mechanism faster”. In other words, based on the 
experience of the FSC, the founders of the MSC decided against a highly participatory 
approach. Furthermore, with regard to synthesis, Auld et al. (2007: 24) describe how 
the designers of the RSPO drew lessons from both the FSC and MSC and developed a 
board and membership structure that synthesised elements of the two organisations.  
 
 
  
Source 
Source 
Adopter 
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In sum, the diffusion outcome is likely to depend on the type of diffusion mechanism 
in operation. If imitation is the primary diffusion mechanisms, then a close replication 
of the source model is the expected outcome. In contrast, learning, via processes of 
selective imitation, synthesising, and innovation, can cause institutional variation. 
However, the outcomes of learning processes are inherently difficult to predict a 
priori. They depend on a range of factors which are often case specific. They are 
likely to depend on the past experiences, information available, and interpretations of 
the adopter, as well as the situation and context in which the learning process takes 
place. However, learning and learning outcomes are empirically observable 
phenomena and we would expect the diffusion outcome to be more inclusive, if 
adopters come to believe that inclusiveness was important for the organisational 
success of prior adopters. This leads us to the second hypothesis:   
 
H2: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if adopters learn that 
inclusiveness was good (bad) for the organisational success of prior adopters.  
 
2.4.3 Adoption  
The adoption of the diffusion item marks the end of the diffusion process. In the 
broader diffusion literature, this process is often described in a somewhat mechanistic 
way in which potential adopters make a decision to either accept or reject a diffusion 
item (Rogers, 1995: 364). However, scholars have criticised this “black box” 
treatment of the adoption process (Yeo and Painter, 2011: 379). Instead, the adoption 
of a diffusion item needs to be conceptualised as a dynamic process in which 
institutional bargaining, as well as environmental pressures at the point of adoption, 
can shape the way in which diffusion practices (here private regulatory institutions) 
are received and implemented (cf. Falkner & Gupta, 2009; Frenkel, 2005; Radaelli, 
2005). 
 
Institutional Bargaining 
Private governance institutions are political arenas in which struggles over influence 
and diverging interests take place (Abbott & Snidal, 2009a; Conzelmann, 2012). The 
adoption of a formal organisational structure typically has significant consequences 
for the distribution of power, resources, and costs in these arenas. For example, 
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formal organisational structures define the way in which collective decisions are 
reached and who can participate in the standard-setting process. These are important 
organisational features with implications for the regulatory outcome of private 
governance institutions. In this regard, Mattli and Woods (2009) hypothesise that 
exclusive and secretive governance arrangements are more prone to produce capture 
regulation – that is, regulation that serves particularistic interests instead of the 
common good – than more inclusive and transparent arrangements. Therefore, when 
institutional designs diffuse, they often become the focal point of institutional 
bargaining (cf. Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012). In their attempts to increase their 
control over the regulatory process, powerful groups may try to block the adoption of 
certain design features or, in return for their support, demand that modifications are 
made (cf. Zietsma & McKnight, 2009: 163-164).  
 
In their work on regulatory standards institutions, Abbott and Snidal (2009a: 70-83) 
conceptualise the design process of MSIs as part of a complex transnational 
bargaining game in which states, firms, and NGOs seek to control regulatory 
governance and hence the substance and form of regulatory outcomes. In this 
bargaining game, the distribution of bargaining power between actors largely 
determines whose preferences prevail and which institutional outcome is selected. As 
an empirical example, they describe the creation process of the Apparel Industry 
Partnership (AIP), an MSI in the apparel industry, in which firms and NGOs differed 
sharply over the structure and governance of the scheme and over the scope and 
content of its standards and procedures. In this particular case, bargaining broke down 
and the AIP was abandoned as there was only limited bargaining space between 
industry and NGO participants.  
 
In their discussion of the institutional bargaining game, Abbot and Snidal (2009a: 59-
62) define firm preferences as being focused on profits. Typically, corporate actors 
therefore try to prevent social and environmental regulation that imposes high costs 
on them. However, not all business actors are the same. For instance, more 
progressive firms may have an interest in raising standards in order to establish a level 
playing field or to reap reputational benefits. Also, firms operating in highly 
competitive environments are likely to be more sensitive to cost increases from 
private regulation than firms operating in sectors were profit margins are higher. 
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Delineating NGO preferences is even more difficult. This actor group comprises 
many types of organisations such as social NGO and environmental NGOs as well as 
labour unions. On a very general level, these “value actors” are motivated by 
principled beliefs (e.g. to protect human rights, the livelihoods of local communities, 
or the environment), although this is not true for all NGOs. Labour unions, for 
instance, have a material interest as they try to improve their members’ wages and 
working conditions. Despite differences within each actor category, Abbott and Snidal 
assume that private actor preferences are largely aligned along the firm-NGO divide. 
As a result of this, when these two actor groups collaborate to create MSIs, they 
bargain over the control of the regulatory process and its outcomes.   
 
In the resulting bargaining game, power is thought to be an important intervening 
variable which can tilt the institutional outcome in one direction or another (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2009a; Thompson, 2010). Essentially, its distribution determines whose 
preferences prevail and which institutional outcome is selected. Abbott and Snidal 
(2009a: 72-82) describe how, when collaborative schemes are created, bargaining 
power essentially manifests itself in two forms: GIAP and “inclusion power”. GIAP 
refers to the ability of actors to unilaterally meet some or all of their goals. For 
example, an NGO possesses GIAP when it can draw on its normative authority, 
expertise, and independence to unilaterally design a standard that becomes the focal 
point in a particular issue area. In a similar way, firms can use their resources to create 
self-regulatory schemes that deflect criticism but exclude non-business stakeholders. 
Thus, GIAP creates an “outside option” for independent action. On the other hand, as 
the term implies, inclusion power creates an “inside option” for participation in 
collaborative schemes. Actors have inclusion power when they possess competencies 
or resources which others need in order to achieve their objectives. For example, 
business actors may find it necessary to include an NGO in their scheme because they 
need its independence and normative authority to legitimise their activities. Similarly, 
NGOs may find it necessary to include a firm in their scheme because of its market 
share and expertise. 
 
In sum, the above discussion suggests that processes of institutional bargaining can 
influence the way in which diffusion practices are received and implemented. When 
firms and NGOs collaborate to create new MSIs, they typically differ sharply over the 
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structure and governance of schemes and the scope and content of their standards and 
procedures. As the targets of private regulation, corporate actors in particular will try 
to maximise their control over the regulatory process. Thus, we would expect to see 
asymmetric institutions where corporate actors are in a strong bargaining position.  
On the other hand, where bargaining power is relatively equally distributed between 
stakeholder groups we would expect to see MSIs that balance the influence of NGOs 
and business actors (Abbott & Snidal, 2009a: 81). This leads us to the third 
hypothesis.  
 
H3: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if corporate actors are 
in a weak (strong) bargaining position.  
 
Institutional Pressures 
The previous sections discussed how the selection of target institutions, learning, and 
processes of institutional bargaining can cause diffusion outcomes to vary. However, 
a comprehensive discussion of the topic also needs to consider environmental factors 
– institutional diffusion does not take place within a vacuum. In the literature on the 
new institutionalism, environmental pressures (normative, coercive, and mimetic 
pressures) are discussed as key drivers behind processes of institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The argument goes that organisations that occupy an 
organisational field are subject to the same environmental pressures, and that these 
pressures make them adopt similar structures.15 Using this framework, Dingwerth and 
Pattberg (2009) have applied the institutional isomorphism argument to the population 
of transnational rule-making organisations. In a recent article, they describe the 
gradual evolution of an organisational field in this area. With a focus on 
accountability structures, they argue that transnational rule-making organisations have 
come to share a set of costly organisational features. They explain these similarities 
with environmental pressures, notably the evolution of social norms that specify how 
accountability structures ought to be designed.  
 
                                                          
15
 Scott (1995: 56) defines an organisational field as “ a community of organizations that partakes of a 
common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one 
another than with actors outside the field”. 
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Environmental pressures can be powerful forces behind processes of institutional 
isomorphism. However, their strength is not necessarily the same in all places and at 
all times. For example, Milstein et al. (2002) find that coercive pressures vary across 
industries and that this can be a source of institutional variation between firms in these 
sectors. Against this background, the following discussion focuses on normative and 
coercive pressures, as mimetic processes have already been discussed in detail 
above.16 The nature of normative and coercive pressures is described below, together 
with how they relate to the questions of institutional isomorphism and variation in the 
field of transnational sustainability governance.  
 
Normative pressures primarily emanate from professionalisation. Professionalisation 
occurs as members of an occupation define the conditions, content, and methods of 
their work, and develop a “cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational 
autonomy” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). DiMaggio and Powell highlight two 
aspects of professionalisation which generate normative pressures: university 
education and the growth and elaboration of professional networks, including 
professional associations. Universities provide the cognitive basis on which 
professional norms are established, networks of professionals and professional 
associations then codify and spread these norms within organisational fields. The 
resulting standards and best practices create normative pressures on organisations – 
they have to conform to these norms in order to gain and maintain legitimacy.  
 
With regard to normative pressures, Dingwerth and Patterberg (2009: 729) note that 
the initiators and managers of transnational rule-making organisations do not yet 
constitute a homogenous “class” or “elite” educated in the same business schools and 
university departments. Still, they consider normative pressures as an important driver 
behind isomorphic tendencies among transnational rule-making organisations, 
highlighting that there is a growing sense that a profession of “global sustainability 
managers” is emerging. Probably the most important driver behind the 
professionalisation of the transnational sustainability governance field is the 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) 
                                                          
16
 Unlike normative and coercive pressures which are external forces, mimetic processes are adopter-
driven. For DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 151-152) institutional mimesis is as a standard response to 
uncertainty.  
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Alliance. Founded by the FSC, IFOAM, FLO, and the MSC, ISEAL is an association 
of leading private standard-setting systems (ISEAL, website-a). ISEAL’s primary 
function is the development of norms for good private standard-setting practices. The 
oldest and most widely referred to normative document developed by ISEAL is its 
Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards (ISEAL, 
2012). First released in 2004, the code lays out principles and criteria of how to create 
credible private standard systems. One of the core procedural requirements of the 
ISEAL code is stakeholder inclusion in the decision-making and standard-setting 
process. In this regard, the code stipulates that (ISEAL, 2012: 8):  
 
• Standard-setting shall be open to all interested parties  
• Participation and decision-making needs to reflect a balance of interests 
(subject matter and geographic scope)  
• Participants shall include stakeholders with an expertise relevant to the 
subject, those that are materially affected by the standard, and those that could 
influence the implementation of the standard. 
 
ISEAL is now widely recognised as a focal point and normative authority in the field 
of transnational sustainability governance (cf. Loconto & Fouilleux, 2013). Against 
this background, it can be hypothesised that ISEAL and the normative framework it 
has created exercises isomorphic pressures on the population of transnational rule-
making organisations as a whole. However, it remains an open empirical question 
how strong ISEAL’s isomorphic effect is.  
 
Whereas normative pressures are likely to affect MSIs in a similar way, the strength 
of coercive pressures may well vary across industry sectors and schemes. For 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150), coercive pressures result from “both formal and 
informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they 
are dependent”. Taking the form of force, persuasion, and collusion, they typically are 
conceived as government regulation, public opinion, and law suits (Milstein et al., 
2002: 152). Given their relevance to the subject area of this dissertation, transnational 
advocacy networks need to be added to the list of coercive forces. In the discipline of 
IR, there is a large body of literature on transnational advocacy groups and how they 
put pressure on states, IGOs, and companies to adopt environmental norms, human 
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rights norms, and to conduct democratic reforms (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Park, 2005; 
Risse, Roop, & Sikkink, 1999; Sasser et al., 2006). 
 
 In the context of transnational rule-making organisations, social movement pressure 
is often discussed as an important driver behind the emergence of multi-stakeholder 
institutions. Firms agree to collaborate with NGOs in MSIs in the wake of scandals 
and when put under pressure through ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns. For example, 
this was the case in the forestry, apparel, and mining industries (Bartley, 2003, 2009; 
Haufler, 2009). However, not all industry sectors that feature MSIs have seen 
powerful transnational activist campaigns. In recent years, the MSI institutional model 
has diffused to various sectors (e.g. sugarcane, cotton, beef, and aquaculture) which 
have only seen very little or no prior NGO activism. Against this background, it can 
be hypothesised that firms’ willingness to engage with critical audiences in the 
context of MSIs will be greater, if coercive pressures are strong. Furthermore, there is 
evidence about how coercive pressures have changed the institutional trajectory of 
already established MSIs. For example, when the MSC adopted an organisational 
structure which provided stakeholders with very limited access to its standard-setting 
and decision-making bodies, the scheme was targeted by transnational activist groups. 
In response to these pressures, the MSC conducted a governance reform and adopted 
a more inclusive approach (Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Gulbrandsen, 2009).  
 
In sum, the above discussion suggests that sustainability MSIs are likely to be subject 
to the same normative pressures. However, it remains an open empirical question how 
strong the resulting isomorphic effect is. On the other hand, there is reason to believe 
that the strength of coercive pressures can vary across industry sectors and schemes. If 
this is the case, then we would expect the diffusion outcome to be more inclusive 
when these pressures are strong. This leads us to the fourth hypothesis:  
 
H4: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if coercive pressures 
at the point of adoption are strong (weak).  
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2.4.4 An Analytical Framework  
The previous sections developed a set of general hypotheses about diffusion 
outcomes. In this section, these hypotheses will be integrated into a framework or 
causal model that will guide the empirical analysis in the case study chapters.  
 
The starting assumption of this model is that a process of institutional diffusion has 
spread the MSI organisational model in the global economy. In particular, for the 
group of environmental MSIs the importance of institutional diffusion is well 
documented (Auld et al., 2007; Bartley, 2007b; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; 
Gulbrandsen, 2008b, 2010; Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012). However, as of yet, it 
remains an open research question why this diffusion process has produced varying 
outcomes. The literature includes some accounts of how selective imitation and 
learning has transformed the MSI institutional model; however, a comprehensive 
analysis is still missing. With a focus on the inclusiveness of MSIs, this dissertation 
sets out to fill this gap.  
 
In the previous section, three different stages in the process of institutional diffusion 
were distinguished: source selection, transmission, and adoption. For each stage, 
hypotheses were formulated about the cause-and-effect relationships that make 
diffusion outcomes vary. In the analytical framework developed here, their causal 
status is that of intervening variables: they intervene in the diffusion process, causing 
it to produce more or less inclusive outcomes (see Figure 8). In the following, the 
three stages are briefly summarised together with how they will be empirically 
examined in the case study chapters.  
 
Stage 1 (Where do ideas about institutional design come from?): The selection of a 
target institution or source marks the beginning of the diffusion process. A decision 
has to be made about whom to imitate or learn from. At this stage, the first 
intervening factor is the adopters’ network ties, their spatial proximity to prior 
adopters, and their perceptions of performance records. When multiple sources are 
available, these factors determine the selection of a target institution. Against this 
background, it was hypothesised that the diffusion outcome will be more (less) 
inclusive if the primary target institution exhibits a high (low) level of inclusiveness. 
To empirically examine this explanation, interviews and primary documents will be 
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used in order to establish which organisations served new adopters as a primary 
source model.  
 
Stage 2 (What is transmitted?): The second intervening factor is learning or lessons-
drawing. When information is transmitted, new adopters often do not simply imitate 
their target institution, but also draw lessons from their experiences. They may find 
that some aspects of the source model are suboptimal for their purposes and make 
modifications accordingly. Also, they may combine the lessons learned at different 
places and thus synthesise new practices. Against this background, it was 
hypothesised that diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if adopters come to 
believe that a participatory approach was good (bad) for the success of prior adopters. 
Learning processes leave empirical “traces” (e.g. reflections about the pros and cons 
of a model) which can be examined through interviews and primary documents (e.g. 
meeting minutes, project proposals).  
 
Stage 3 (What is adopted?): At the adoption stage, processes of institutional 
bargaining will be examined. It was hypothesised that the diffusion outcome will be 
more (less) inclusive if corporate actors are in a weak (strong) bargaining position. To 
examine this claim, the empirical analysis will trace processes of institutional 
bargaining during the adoption phase. Empirically, it is extremely difficult to identify 
measurable criteria for bargaining power ex ante as there are just so many ways in 
which power can manifest itself in a given situation. On the other hand, inductive 
analyses of the causal role of power always run the risk of ex post rationalisations in 
which “power is ascribed to that party which, after the fact, appears to enjoy the 
advantage” (Williamson, 1996: 23). There is now easy way out of this dilemma and 
the investigator has to be conscious and open about the limitations of power analysis. 
In this project, a more inductive approach is taken. The literature on institutional 
bargaining offers some clues about how to identify power in a given bargaining 
situation. In this regard, Thompson (2010) states that the researcher has to delve into 
the details of institutional choice in order to identify particular junctures in the 
negotiating process. Furthermore, Abbott and Snidal (2009a) describe the different 
forms bargaining power (GIAP and inclusion power) can take in these situations.  
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Next to bargaining, the strength of environmental pressures at the point of adoption 
was identified as an intervening factor which can cause diffusion outcomes to vary. 
With a focus on NGO campaigning activities, it was hypothesised that diffusion 
outcomes will be more (less) inclusive if coercive pressures at the point of adoption 
are strong (weak). To examine this explanation, a background analysis about the 
environmental conditions during the adoption process will be conducted. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis will draw on media reports, NGO reports, and secondary 
literature. Furthermore, interviews will be used to examine how adopters perceived 
their institutional environment and how they responded to it.  
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Figure 8: Analytical Framework to Explain the Outcome of Institutional Diffusion Processes 
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2.5 Methodology and Research Design  
After first specifying the causal model, this section elaborates on questions of methodology and 
research design. It operationalises the dependent variable and explains the rationale behind the case 
selection and the methods used.  
 
2.5.1 Dependent Variable 
The inclusiveness of MSIs is the main dependent variable of interest in this project. In Chapter 1, 
board compositions and constitutive rules were used as proxies to examine the inclusiveness of a large 
sample of environmental MSIs. This inventory provided indicative evidence for significant variation 
in this key dimension of institutional design. To allow for a more in-depth analysis, this section 
elaborates on the concept of MSI inclusiveness and develops a set of qualitative indicators. 
 
Inclusiveness is one of the core procedural requirements of deliberative democratic theory (Lövbrand 
& Khan, 2010; Smith, 2003). The inclusiveness norm stipulates that all those affected by a rule have 
to be given the opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. For the case at hand, 
conceptualising MSI inclusiveness therefore requires an identification of those groups who are 
affected by their activities. MSIs are private rule-making arrangements that set sustainability 
standards for global supply chains and often rely on market forces (certification) to implement their 
standards in the world’s factories, mines, farms, and fisheries.  
 
Typically, MSIs are created to regulate production in the global south (e.g. apparel, mining, and 
agriculture), whereas trading, retail, and consumption are located in the global north. The firms 
occupying different positions in the supply chain often differ distinctively in their interests. For 
example, as the primary targets of regulation, upstream producers are typically concerned with the 
costs of private governance – that is, implementation and membership costs. On the other hand, the 
consumer-facing firms at the downstream end of the supply chain are more concerned with 
reputational benefits and the level of assurance private governance arrangements are able to provide. 
To capture these differences among business actors, economic north and economic south are 
introduced as key stakeholder categories.  
 
Civil society actors are the other major stakeholder group in transnational sustainability governance. 
Next to business actors (profits), NGOs are involved in MSIs to represent the interests of the people 
and the planet. For the group of civil society actors, a distinction is also made between actors from the 
global north and the global south is made. The reason for this is that it is generally preferable that 
affected communities in the global south are represented by local groups instead of large northern 
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NGOs. This follows from the discussion on direct accountability being normatively superior to what 
Rubenstein (2007) calls surrogate accountability. Surrogate accountability refers to a relationship in 
which an actor exercises accountability on behalf of others without being itself accountable to them.  
 
After having identified the four key stakeholder groups of MSIs (civil society north, civil society 
south, economic north, and economic south),17 it is now important to measure their level of 
participation. Therefore, the inclusiveness of MSIs’ rule-setting and decision-making arrangements is 
considered. Typically, rule-setting is organised in working groups or standards committees. To 
determine their level of inclusiveness, their openness and composition is examined. As to decision-
making, the analysis will focus on the openness, composition, and collective choice rules of MSIs’ 
central decision-making bodies. Table 5 contains a number of qualitative indicators that will be used 
to distinguish between varying levels of inclusiveness.  
 
Table 5: Qualitative Indicators for MSI Inclusiveness 
 Rule-setting Decision-making 
High Fairly open access and substantial 
participation from all key stakeholder 
groups  
Decision-making power is equally balanced 
between the key stakeholder groups 
Medium Restricted access but balanced participation 
of all key stakeholder groups 
Unequal distribution of decision-making power, 
but no stakeholder group can dominate the 
process. 
Low  Restricted access and unequal participation 
from the key stakeholder groups 
Unequal distribution of decision-making power 
among the key stakeholder groups, and no 
protection against the possibility of regulatory 
capture. 
 
Inclusiveness, as defined for the purpose of this project, focuses on the design of MSIs’ rule-setting 
and decision-making arrangements. This focus on formal organisational structures facilitates the 
operationalisation and measurement of the dependent variable as well as comparisons across cases. 
However, there are also several drawbacks to this approach. One problem is that organisations 
sometimes decouple actual practices from formal organisational structures. This is what Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) refer to as organisational myth and ceremony. Also, the focus on institutional design 
may conceal the fact that certain positions in the wider discourse about sustainability are not included 
in a governance arrangements (Schouten et al., 2012). Therefore, an “inclusive design” should not be 
mistaken for deliberative capacity or democratic legitimacy, and only in combination with other 
indicators should it be used as a proxy for measuring these concepts. Still, institutional design is an 
important aspect of organisational life. Essentially, it lays down the rules of the game – that is, the 
way in which collective decisions are reached and by whom.  
                                                          
17
 This is a common distinction used by leading MSIs to distinguish between key stakeholder groups (FSC, 
website). 
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2.5.2 Case Selection 
The case selection is based on the inventory of 16 environmental MSIs conducted in Chapter 1. 
Analysing MSIs’ board compositions and constitutive rules, this inventory provided a “first-cut” 
distinction between MSIs with a high, medium, and low level of inclusiveness (see Table 6). From 
this larger sample, three MSIs have been selected for a within-case analysis and subsequent cross-case 
comparison. The MSIs selected are the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro. The following briefly details 
the rationale behind these choices.  
 
Table 6: Environmental MSIs and Their Levels of Inclusiveness 
High Medium Low 
FSC 
HPSAP 
RSB 
 
 
 
4C 
BCI 
GRSB 
GSTC 
MAC 
MSC 
RSPO 
RTRS 
Utz Certified 
 
ASC 
BSI/Bonsucro 
ISCC 
PEFC 
 
In Designing Social Inquiry, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 129-149) expressed strong 
reservations about selecting on the dependent variable. They also warned against so-called truncated 
samples – that is, samples that do not cover the whole spectrum of variation in the dependent variable. 
They argue that cases that do not show at least some variation on the dependent variable make causal 
inference impossible and that truncated samples lead to a flattening of the regression line and thus an 
underestimation of an independent variable’s causal effect. In the discussions following the 
publication of Designing Social Inquiry, qualitative methodologists have convincingly addressed 
some of these concerns. In this regard, Bennett and Elman (2006) have argued that within-case study 
techniques such as process-tracing do not suffer from truncated samples and spurious inference in the 
same way as controlled comparisons do. That is because process-tracing does not rely on co-variation, 
but examines the underlying causal mechanisms. The more general point raised by King, Keohane, 
and Verba, however, remains valid. We are likely to learn more about the causes of a general 
phenomenon, if we study cases that vary in the value of their dependent variable. The reason for this 
is that studies that only look at cases in which the outcome is either present or absent lack a baseline 
for comparison. Against this background, and in light of the project’s primary research objective – to 
explain variation in the level of inclusiveness – schemes with a high, a medium, and a low level of 
inclusiveness have been selected.  
 
The RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro have been selected for another reason. As can be seen from 
Figure 1 (Chapter 1, Section 1.5.3), agriculture is currently the most dynamic site of MSI diffusion. 
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The mapping analysis identified 12 MSIs which are currently operating in this sector. Today, MSIs set 
sustainability standards for cotton, sugarcane, beef, cocoa, biofuels, flowers, palm oil, soy, and coffee. 
In other words, multi-stakeholder sustainability governance has become an important source of 
regulation in the global economy of agriculture. For a good reason: agriculture is the sector with the 
highest environmental impact of all economic sectors (see Chapter 3 for details). However, the 
emergence and evolution of MSIs in the agriculture sector remains underresearched. Currently, the 
bulk of the MSI literature focuses on schemes in the forestry (Bloomfield, 2012; Cashore et al., 2004; 
Gulbrandsen, 2009; Marx & Cuypers, 2010; Meidinger, 2006; Overdevest, 2010), fishery (Auld, 
2007; Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Gulbrandsen, 2009; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013a, 2013b; 
Ponte, 2006), and apparel (Bartley, 2003, 2007b, 2009; Blowfield, 2002; L. W. Fransen, 2011, 2012a, 
2012b; O'Rourke, 2006) sectors. Only recently have scholars begun to examine agricultural MSIs in 
more detail (Ponte, 2013; Schouten et al., 2012). Probably, the reason for this is that the forestry and 
apparel sectors are constitutive sites – it was here where MSIs first emerged as a mode of global 
sustainability governance. In contrast, most of the agricultural MSIs have been created since the mid-
2000s. Therefore, by studying the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro in-depth, this dissertation also fills 
an empirical gap in the literature.  
 
2.5.3 Methodology 
For the empirical analysis, the project combines a cross-case comparison with process-tracing. The 
following discusses the rationale behind this approach.  
 
The comparative method can be a powerful technique for drawing causal inference from a small 
number of cases (Lijphart, 1971). Its logic is derived from John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic 
(1864). In this book, Mill develops the “method of difference” and the “method of agreement”. In the 
former, the researcher seeks to explain differences in outcomes by finding two cases that are similar in 
all but one explanatory factor. Having thus “controlled” for alternative explanations, the varying 
factor is then causally associated with the observed variation. In the latter, the researcher seeks to 
explain a common outcome by varying all but one explanatory factor, again through careful case 
selection. If all relevant variables are included in the model, the constant factor must be a sufficient 
condition for the observed outcome. In theory, Mill’s methods are powerful inferential techniques. In 
practice, however, they suffer from several shortcomings. Mill’s methods work through logical 
elimination. But matching cases without verifying whether the assumed causal mechanism really was 
in operation can easily lead to spurious inference. Also, Mill’s methods operate on the basis of single-
cause hypotheses and are thus unable to detect patterns characterised by causal complexity such as 
interaction effects (intervening variables) and conjunctional causation in which multiple independent 
variables coproduce an observed outcome. Another important challenge is to meet the strict 
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requirements of a controlled comparison – that is, to find cases that vary in outcomes and in which all 
but one explanatory factor are constant (George & Bennett, 2005: 153-161).  
 
Process-tracing can help to overcome some of these limitations (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2004; 
George & Bennett, 2005: 205-233). Instead of focusing on co-variation, this within-case study 
technique examines the observable implications of the causal process hypothesised to be in operation. 
It “seeks to uncover a causal chain coupling independent variables with dependent variables and 
evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by a theory” (George & Bennett, 2005: 153). In this way, 
it becomes possible to map out one or more potential causal paths that are consistent with both the 
outcome and the process-tracing evidence. This allows the comparative researcher to go beyond 
correlation and thus to reduce the risk of spurious inference. Also, by studying cases in-depth, the 
technique is well suited to examine hypothesised patterns of complex causality. Finally, process-
tracing makes cross-case comparisons possible even in situations in which not all but one explanatory 
factor can be controlled (George & Bennett, 2005: 214). 
 
The empirical investigation starts with a within-case analysis, followed by a comparison across cases. 
For the within-case analysis, the analytical framework developed in Section 2.4.4 will be used as a 
structuring device. For each of the three cases the process of diffusion will be traced, from the point of 
origin to the point of adoption. Then, the findings from the single case study chapters will be 
compared across cases, with the goal of identifying the factors that have caused the observed 
variation.  
 
2.5.4 Data Collection 
Data sources used for the empirical analysis include meeting minutes, constitutional documents, 
background documents, and websites as well as interview data. The period of investigation spans 
from the initiation of an MSI to the finalisation of the standard-setting process – typically, a period of 
4-6 years. With regard to primary documents, the analysis mostly relied on the meeting minutes of the 
three MSIs’ central decision-making bodies as an important source of information. For the case of the 
RSB, a complete set of meeting minutes of the RSB SB and its stakeholder chambers could be 
obtained, covering the years 2006-2011. Most documents were publicly available from the 
organisation’s website; others could be obtained upon request from the RSB secretariat. The detailed 
meeting minutes allowed an in-depth analysis of internal decision-making processes and interactions 
between stakeholder groups. The quality of the primary documents was of a similar high quality for 
the case of the RTRS. For the period of investigation (2004-2011), a complete set of meeting minutes 
of the RTRS board and GA could be obtained. Also, in this case most documents could be 
downloaded from the organisation’s website or were made available by its secretariat. Accessing the 
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meeting minutes of BSI/Bonsucro’s central decision-making body was more difficult. The 
organisation does not publish its meeting minutes on its website and its secretariat declined several 
requests to share these documents. Still, a larger number of meeting minutes of BSI/Bonsucro’s SC 
could be obtained through other channels, which allowed important insights in the formation phase of 
this scheme (2005-2011).  
 
The information from the meeting minutes, constitutional documents, background documents, and 
websites was triangulated and complemented through interviews. The interviews targeted people who 
had played important roles in the formation phase of the three schemes, but people not directly 
involved in multi-stakeholder sustainability governance or critically opposed to it were also 
interviewed. In total, 51 interviews were conducted (see Appendix 1): 18 people were interviewed 
about the RSB, 15 people were interviewed about the RTRS, and 18 people were interviewed about 
BSI/Bonsucro. The interviews were conducted in-person (N = 16) as well as by phone (N = 35). The 
approach taken was that of a semi-structured interview. In contrast to standardised interviews, semi-
structured interviews are conducted using a more open framework with the aim of ensuring flexibility. 
In this regard, semi-structured interviews are typically organised around an interview guide – 
containing topics or themes to be covered during the interview – rather than a sequenced script of 
standardised questions (see Appendix 3). For the purpose of this dissertation, the interviews were 
guided by the analytical framework developed above. However, depending on the interviewee and 
his/her knowledge about different aspects of the question under investigation, the approach taken 
allowed adapting the sequence and type of questions asked during the interview.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Beginning with a more focused review of how scholars have studied processes of institutional 
diffusion in the area of multi-stakeholder sustainability governance, this chapter revealed a 
gap in the current literature. Whereas much of the early MSI literature has studied the process 
of initial institutional emergence, more recent works have focused on diffusion in the context 
of institutional isomorphism or convergence between existing organisations. In contrast, only 
a few scholars have looked at the institutional diffusion of the MSI organisational model 
itself. The works that do exist describe processes of selective imitation and learning and how 
they have transformed the MSI institutional model. However, we still know little about the 
cause-and-effect relationships that make diffusion outcomes vary.  
 
In order to address this gap, this chapter turned its focus towards diffusion “theory”. It 
defined institutional diffusion as a causal process through which institutions and their 
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elements are transmitted through time and space. It discussed why and when institutional 
diffusion occurs, and what its primary mechanisms and outcomes are. Having introduced the 
concept of diffusion, the chapter then identified three different stages in the diffusion process 
(source selection, transmission, and adoption). For each of the stages, hypotheses about the 
cause-and-effect relationships that influence diffusion outcomes were formulated. Integrated 
into a causal model of diffusion, these hypotheses take the form of intervening variables. 
They intervene in the diffusion process, causing it to produce more or less inclusive 
institutional outcomes. To empirically examine this model, the chapter closed with a 
discussion on methodology and research design. The dependent variable (inclusiveness) was 
operationalised and the rationale behind the case selection and research method was 
explained. For the empirical analysis, three MSIs operating in different agricultural sectors 
were selected. They will be subject to a within-case analysis (process-tracing), followed by a 
cross-case comparison.  
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Chapter 3: The Global Political Economy of Agriculture  
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide the reader with background information about the 
agriculture sector and thus to set the scene for the case study chapters which follow. After a 
brief introduction, the next section sketches the development of the global political economy 
of agriculture from the emergence of agricultural trade in the colonial era to today’s globally 
integrated agro and bioenergy supply chain. The chapter then turns its focus towards the 
major sustainability challenges faced by the sector today, describing how addressing these 
problems is complicated by the industry’s transnational character. Finally, the role of private 
governance, and that of MSIs in particular, is discussed.  
 
The agriculture sector spans a wide range of activities, including crop and livestock farming, 
fishery, and forestry. Its primary purpose is the provision of human food, animal feed, and 
fibre. To this day, the sector continues to be an important aspect of global economic activity. 
It still employs approximately 35 per cent of the global workforce (ILO, 2011: 20) and 
provides the livelihoods for large segments of the world’s population – above all this is true 
for developing countries (IAASTD, 2009: 2). Also, international trade in agricultural 
commodities remains significant. In fact, in recent years, high prices on international markets 
have triggered a boom in the trade in agricultural commodities. According to the trade 
statistics of the World Trade Organization, agricultural trade grew at an annual rate of 14 
percent in the period 2005-2011 (WTO, 2012: 63).  
 
The world agricultural economy is characterised by a multiplicity of production systems. It 
ranges from traditional systems in which food, animal feed, and fibre are produced and 
consumed locally, to transnationally integrated agro-industries. The ETC Group, an 
environmental advocacy group, estimates that about 70 per cent of global agricultural 
production is still produced using traditional systems such as peasant agriculture and hunter-
gathering (ETC Group, 2009: 1). Typically, these modes of production play an important role 
in developing countries, particularly in the least developed countries. Here, a significant 
proportion of the active working population is still engaged in subsistence farming, with an 
average farm size of below two hectares (IAASTD, 2009: 2).  
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Although traditional agriculture remains important, agriculture – like other sectors – has 
undergone a process of globalisation (Higgins & Lawrence, 2005). Industrialisation, the 
lifting of trade barriers, lower transportation costs, and the rise of large processing and retail 
corporations have facilitated the sector’s transnational integration and led to a concentration 
at almost all stages of the agro-supply chain. These developments have had implications for 
the distribution of power within the sector, putting some companies in the position of being 
able to exercise control over prices and the conditions of production (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). 
At the same time, it changed the relationship between companies and public regulators, with 
the latter finding it increasingly difficult to regulate the industry’s transnational production 
networks. However, given the industry’s daunting sustainability challenges, the question of 
regulating global agriculture is growing in urgency. Agricultural activity is a major driver 
behind soil degradation, deforestation, and climate change. In fact, agriculture is considered 
to be the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) of all economic sectors (Clay, 2004). At 
the same time, problems with food security, poor labour standards, and land grabs, as well as 
food safety, remain important issues. Furthermore, the advent of biotechnology and biofuels 
has sparked much debate about the sustainability of the global agrifood system in recent years 
(Clapp, 2012).  
 
Despite the urgency of the matter, implementing effective social and environmental 
regulation remains difficult. In the countries of the South, where most of the social and 
environmental externalities occur, weak administrative capacities are among the main 
obstacles for achieving sustainability goals. And in the North, where states are strong, 
regulators remain constrained by national borders and therefore find it difficult to regulate 
transnational production networks. At the same time, states are as reluctant as ever to confer 
regulatory authority to supranational bodies such as the FAO or the United Nations 
Environment Programme. In this situation, the private sector and civil society have become a 
major source of regulation in the global political economy of agriculture. Initially lagging 
behind other sectors in terms of corporate social responsibility (World Bank, 2004), the 
sector has evolved into one of the most dynamic sites of private sustainability governance in 
recent years. Over the course of the last two decades, a large number of private regulatory 
arrangements have emerged in the industry, among them many MSIs.   
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3.2 The Globalisation of Agricultural Production and Trade 
Like other sectors, agricultural production is increasingly global in nature. This section traces 
this development from the emergence of agricultural trade in the colonial era to today’s 
highly industrialised and transnationally integrated agro-supply chain. 
 
3.2.1 Agricultural Trade in the Colonial Era 
Historically, global markets for agricultural commodities are not a new phenomenon. As 
described by Clapp (2012), throughout history agricultural markets have had an international 
dimension to them. Once-exotic commodities like salt, spices and sugar have been traded 
over long distances for centuries. However, large-scale international trade in agricultural 
products first occurred during the colonial era. During this period, European powers created 
plantations for key crops in their overseas colonies and established international trade routes. 
Much of the colonial trade in agricultural products was organised by private trading 
companies. As a precursor of the modern transnational corporation (TNC), the British East 
India Company, for example, established trading posts and operations throughout India. Until 
its divestiture in 1874, the company controlled much of Britain’s trade with the Asian 
subcontinent. Also, other colonial powers such as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain 
established trading companies during this period (Clapp, 2012: 8, 92). 
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, international trade in agricultural products 
intensified further. The industrialisation of Britain and other European countries enormously 
increased their demand for imported food products, minerals, and organic raw materials. 
These goods were required both to sustain accelerated population growth and as raw 
materials for the quickly expanding manufacturing sectors in these countries (O'Brien, 2004: 
9). During this period, trade volumes increased rapidly and so did the range of products 
traded. Whereas early colonial era trade was largely confined to tropical luxury goods, 
nineteenth century agricultural trade was much broader. Besides exotic products from the 
colonies, it also included trade in temperate agricultural products such as wheat and maize. 
Markets for agricultural products integrated at national levels and were increasingly traded 
intercontinentally. It was these developments in Europe, and later North America, which laid 
the foundation for today’s global agricultural economy. However, it was the emergence and 
spread of industrial agriculture, the reduction of trade barriers, and the rise of large agro-
TNCs which completed this process (Clapp, 2012: 24).  
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3.2.2 The Emergence and Spread of Industrial Agriculture  
The industrialisation of Europe and North America not only increased the demand for 
agricultural products, it also fundamentally changed the way in which agricultural products 
were produced and processed. The industrialisation of agriculture began in the late nineteenth 
century and fully unfolded in the first part of the twentieth century. The process was driven 
by policies in major industrialised countries. The US, Australia, Canada, and the countries of 
the European Community actively promoted the development and adoption of the industrial 
agricultural model. They funded agricultural research, provided farm subsidies and other 
forms of support. These policies were a major driver behind the spread of industrial 
agriculture and the subsequent emergence of export markets for agricultural commodities 
(Clapp, 2012: 11-12). 
 
In the US, the industrial agriculture model was promoted from the mid-1800s. An important 
factor was the establishment of government-led agricultural colleges throughout the country. 
They conducted research on the technical and scientific aspects of agricultural production. 
Major innovations included the mechanisation of planting and harvesting, and mono-
cropping as well as the use of new hybrid seeds and pesticides (Clapp, 2012: 26). While 
industrial agriculture did not become the dominant mode of production until after the Second 
World War, it progressed rapidly in the decades following it. This process is exemplified in 
the case of the US broiler chicken industry. Until the 1950s, broiler production was 
undertaken by a large number of mostly small and medium sized farms, evenly distributed 
over the US territory. But industrialisation fundamentally changed the way in which broilers 
were produced and processed. All stages of the production process (feed production, broiler 
production, and broiler processing) became increasingly concentrated. In the period from 
1950 to 1978, the number of poultry farms decreased from 1,636,705 to 31,743 and much of 
the production capacity was shifted to the south of the USA. During the same period, the 
volume of production increased fifteen-fold from 580 million chickens in 1950 to 8.9 billion 
in 1978 (PEW Environment Group, 2011: 6).  
 
The industrialisation of agriculture was accompanied by policies that heavily subsidised 
farmers and protected them from foreign competition. In the US, the federal government 
introduced price supports, farm credit schemes, and import tariffs as part of the New Deal 
economic policies of the 1930s. Similar policies were implemented in Europe. Following the 
Second World War, war-torn Western Europe was a recipient of large amounts of US food 
88 
 
aid, but quickly rebuilt its agricultural production capacity. In fact, the newly formed 
European Community spent the majority of its budget on its Common Agricultural Policy. 
This policy established a system which combined direct and indirect farm subsidies with a 
range of protectionist measures, many of which are still in place today (Clapp, 2012: 26-27). 
 
In the aggregate, these policies led to large food surpluses. Rich country governments reacted 
by buying large quantities of produce for which there was no market, creating the so-called 
“butter mountains” and “wine lakes” of the 1970s and 1980s. However, excess production 
became increasingly problematic, due to high storage costs and the downward pressure it put 
on prices. But instead of reducing production capacity, governments in Europe and North 
America channelled their food surpluses into food aid programmes and launched export 
promotion schemes. In this way, they hoped to clear domestic markets, while at the same 
time protect the livelihoods of farmers. Besides this economic motive for pursuing an export-
oriented strategy, there were also humanitarian and political motives. After the Second World 
War, many of the newly independent countries in Africa and Asia experienced food shortages 
and large parts of the population suffered from malnutrition and hunger. At the same time, 
the US in particular had strong political motives for providing food aid to developing 
countries. As tensions with the Soviet Union increased during the 1950s, the US government 
was eager to prevent countries in Asia and Africa from becoming communist. The domino 
theory of the time predicted that if one state in a region came under the influence of 
communism, then the surrounding countries would quickly follow in a domino effect. 
Against this background, it was reasoned that supplying developing countries with food aid 
would help to contain Soviet influence. Channelling excess production into food aid 
programmes, however, was not the only way through which North American and European 
countries tried to reduce their food surpluses. Another policy instrument was export 
promotion programmes. Launched in the 1970s and 1980s, these policies included export 
credits and direct subsidies for agricultural exports (Clapp, 2012: 28-33).  
 
Persisting food shortages in large parts of the developing world, however, soon made clear 
that food aid alone would not solve the problem. In this situation, policy-makers in North 
America and Europe came to believe that only extensive agricultural reform could provide a 
durable solution. Through industrialisation, developing countries should fundamentally 
restructure their agricultural sectors. It was hoped that this would reduce developing 
countries’ dependency on foreign, particularly Soviet, food aid. With reference to the Russian 
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Red Revolution, the promotion of industrial agriculture was labelled the Green Revolution. 
Led by the US Agency for International Development, the programme involved assistance to 
mechanise production and adopt modern cropping techniques as well as the provision of 
high-yielding crop varieties and synthetic fertilisers and pesticides. Green Revolution-style 
reforms were first introduced in Mexico in the late 1940s. They then spread rapidly across the 
developing world. The adoption of industrial agriculture strongly increased yields in 
developing countries, although to different degrees. In Asia, cereal production doubled 
between 1970 and 1995. Also, Latin America experienced significant yield increases. In 
contrast, gains were much more modest in Sub-Saharan Africa (IFPRI, 2002).  
 
In sum, the industrialisation of agricultural production and the global diffusion of this model 
laid the foundation of today’s global agricultural economy. Following the Second World 
War, Europe and North America began to donate and export their food surpluses. At the same 
time, the Green Revolution fundamentally transformed developing country agriculture. As a 
result, countries in Latin America and Asia successfully managed the transition from being 
food aid recipients and net importers to becoming major producers and exporters. Notably, 
Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand were able to build large export-oriented 
agro-industries. 
 
3.2.3 The Reduction of Trade Barriers and the Expansion of Export Markets 
International trade in agricultural commodities was, and remains, restricted. Developed and 
developing countries alike shield their domestic markets from foreign competition through 
tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and other barriers to trade. In particular, the EU continues to heavily 
subsidise its agriculture sector. For example, in 2010, the EU still spent around 50 per cent 
(approx. US$ 70 billion) of its budget on its Common Agricultural Policy, of which the lion’s 
share was spent on direct farm subsidies (EU, 2010). Although declining, the level of 
agricultural subsidies continues to be high in other industrialised countries as well. The 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that its 
members spent US$ 265 billion on agricultural subsidies in 2008. Although still high, this 
was the lowest level since the mid-1980s (OECD, 2009: 5). 
 
There are several reasons for the high level of protectionism in the agriculture sector. One is 
that farmers are typically well organised. Agriculture has lost its significance as a major 
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employer in much of the developed world – on average it accounts for less than 3 per cent of 
the total workforce (FAO, 2012a: 118). However, farm lobbies in Europe and the US remain 
powerful and continue to exercise a significant influence over policy-makers (Botterill, 2005; 
Riedl, 2002). Another reason has to do with national security. Industrialised countries 
governments fear that their agricultural sectors would not withstand competition from low-
cost countries. Against this background, it has been argued that this would create 
vulnerabilities and pose a risk to national security (Winters, 1990). These and other factors 
explain why barriers to trade remain relatively high in agriculture when compared to other 
sectors (e.g. manufacturing).  
 
However, with the advent of economic liberalism, agriculture has also seen a reduction in 
barriers to trade. Notably, developments in the 1980s and 1990s led to a partial liberalisation 
of the sector. In the 1980s, a severe debt crisis affected large parts of the developing world. In 
the years preceding the crisis, high inflation rates, easily available credit, and the oil shocks 
of the 1970s led many developing countries to accumulate large external debts. In many 
cases, the creditors were private banks in the US. As interest rates rose sharply in the early 
1980s, many developing countries, in particular in Latin America and Africa, found 
themselves unable to pay their external debts. In 1982, Mexico was the first country to 
publicly declare that it would default on its debt. There was a great risk that other countries 
would follow suit in a domino effect. In order to contain the situation and to prevent further 
countries from defaulting, the international financial institutions (IFIs) (i.e. the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund) began to provide emergency loans to heavily indebted 
countries. These loans, however, came with strings attached. The IFIs made them conditional 
on so-called structural adjustment programmes. Essentially, these structural adjustment 
programmes consisted of a set of neoliberal reform prescriptions, also known as Washington 
Consensus policies. The term Washington Consensus goes back to the US economist John 
Williamson. It describes a neoliberal reform agenda for developing countries which was 
crafted by the Washington-based IFIs and the US Treasury. This reform package comprised 
policies such as fiscal discipline, privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation of trade and 
foreign direct investments (Naím, 2000: 89). In the wake of the foreign debt crisis, 
Washington Consensus policies were adopted widely throughout the developing world. As 
agriculture typically plays an important role in these countries, this had a liberalising effect 
on global agricultural trade. The results of these policies were mixed. In some cases, 
developing country producers benefited from higher world market prices. However, in other 
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cases, the availability of cheap imports became a problem for domestic producers (Clapp, 
2012: 59-63).  
 
The trade negotiations under the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) brought further liberalisation. 
Until then, trade in agriculture commodities was largely exempted from free trade rules. In 
particular, countries with highly subsidised agriculture sectors such as the European 
Community had so far strongly and successfully resisted making agriculture a subject of 
previous trade talks. However, prior to the launch of the Uruguay Round pressure to include 
agriculture as an official agenda item mounted. A major driving force behind this was a 
coalition of countries with large export-oriented agro-industries. The coalition, which 
includes developed and developing countries, first met in the Australian city of Cairns and 
therefore became to be known as the Cairns group.18 Essentially, the members of the Cairns 
group were unwilling to continue to accept the high level of farm subsidies in some countries 
and their trade-distorting effects (The Cairns Group, website). Concerned with the high costs 
of agricultural subsidies, the US government was also supportive of the idea of trade 
liberalisation in this area. Eventually, the pro-free trade coalition was able to build up enough 
pressure and agriculture was made an official agenda item.  After eight years of negotiations, 
the Uruguay Round agreements included an Agreement on Agriculture. The Agreement of 
Agriculture’s central aim was to eliminate certain types of subsidies which were considered 
to be particularly trade-distorting such as price support subsidies or subsidies directly related 
to production quantities. Overall, the Agreement on Agriculture led to a liberalisation of trade 
in agriculture. However, it has been strongly criticised for its various loopholes which allow 
rich country governments to continue many of their trade-distorting policies (Clapp, 2012: 
63-76).  
 
Protectionist barriers continue to be high in agriculture. Nevertheless, the volume of 
agricultural trade has increased significantly during recent decades. In the 1980-2011 period, 
trade in agriculture increased more than five-fold from US$ 299 billion to US$ 1,659 billion, 
with an annual growth rate of 14 per cent over the last five years (WTO, 2012: 66). Although 
the US and the EU remain the largest exporters of agricultural commodities, global trade 
patterns are changing. Emerging market economies such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, 
                                                          
18
 The members of the Cairns group were Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, and Uruguay.  
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Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are rapidly expanding their export-oriented agricultural 
sectors and their global market share is growing (WTO, 2012: 69). In particular, Latin 
American countries have experienced high growth rates. Since 2000, Latin America has 
experienced the largest growth of net trade (exports minus imports) of any region (FAO, 
2012a: 103-104). 
 
3.2.4 Toward a Globally Integrated Agro and Bioenergy Supply Chain 
Local food systems and peasant farming remain an important aspect of agricultural activity. 
According to estimates of the ETC Group about 70 per cent of the world’s cultivated food is 
still produced and consumed locally (ETC Group, 2009: 1). However, a growing share of 
agricultural production enters global markets and is produced and processed within highly 
concentrated and transnationally integrated agro-supply chains.   
 
Corporate concentration and transnational integration are not an entirely new phenomenon in 
the agriculture sector. As mentioned above, the British and the Dutch East India Companies 
had been involved in the international trade with exotic goods centuries ago. Also, some of 
the major agro-commodities companies, which still dominate the industry today, trace their 
origins back to the mid-1800s. In this period, the process of industrialisation, urbanisation, 
and the quickly expanding populations in Europe and the US dramatically increased the 
demand for food, feed, and fibre. This demand could not be satisfied locally and required 
international trade in foodstuffs and animal feed on an unprecedented scale. It was in this 
context that the industry’s large grain trading companies such as Archer Daniels Midland, 
Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus emerged.  
 
Agricultural production has long had a transnational dimension. However, the current degree 
of corporate concentration and transnational integration is historically unparalleled. Similar to 
developments in other sectors, the industry is becoming increasingly globalised. The process 
has its roots in nineteenth and twentieth century technological innovations such as food 
canning, refrigeration, freezing, and the use of chemical preservatives. These techniques 
significantly increased the durability of food products, making it possible to transport them 
over long distances. Advances in information technology, lower transportation costs, and the 
above-discussed reduction of barriers to trade have further accelerated this process in recent 
decades. As a result, agricultural production, processing, and retailing are increasingly 
93 
 
transnational in nature and are dominated by large, horizontally and vertically integrated 
companies (Clapp, 2012: 92-96).  
 
A second trend which is currently transforming the industry is its increasing interlinkage with 
the energy sector. The process is driven by public energy policies in major industrialised 
countries. In the early 2000s, policy-makers in the EU and US started to promote biofuels as 
a means to reach GHG emission reduction targets, foster energy security, and stimulate 
development in rural areas at home and abroad (EPA, website; EU Commission, website). 
These policies created large markets for biofuels, significantly increasing the demand for so-
called energy crops (e.g. maize, oil palm, rapeseed, soy, and sugarcane). For example, over 
the last decade, ethanol production in the US and Brazil grew by 780 per cent and 140 per 
cent respectively. In 2012, it absorbed over 50 per cent of Brazil’s sugarcane crop and 37 per 
cent of the coarse grain crop in the US. In the case of the EU, biodiesel production accounted 
for almost 80 per cent of total vegetable oil production (FAO, 2012a: 102-103). The FAO 
forecasts that the use of food crops for energy purposes will increase further in the future (see 
Table 7). As a result, the agro and energy supply chains are becoming increasingly 
intertwined.  
 
Table 7: World Use of Crops for Biofuels 
Crop  Unit 2005 2030 
Cereals  Million tonnes  65  182  
Percent of total use 3.2 6.7 
Vegetable oils Million tonnes 7  29 
Percent of total use 4.8 12.6 
 
Source: FAO 2012b, p. 92   
 
The agro-supply chain can be divided into five major segments: input provision, production, 
trade and processing, retail, and consumption. Its shape has been repeatedly described as 
resembling that of an hourglass (e.g. Vorley, 2003). A large number of upstream producers 
and end consumers transact with a small number of processing, trading, and retail companies 
which occupy the middle and downstream segments of the agro-supply chain. The hourglass 
analogy only works if agricultural input companies are not considered (see Figure 9). 
However, the more general point is that corporate concentration is highest at certain stages of 
the agro-supply chain and that this has crucial implications for the distribution of power and 
value-extraction within the industry. Large TNCs that occupy key positions in the agro-
supply chain are able to set prices for producers and consumers and to influence the rules 
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under which they operate.19 The following provides a more detailed description of the agro-
supply chain and some of its major corporate players.   
 
Figure 9: The Agro-Supply Chain 
 
      
At the upstream end of the supply-chain are companies producing agricultural inputs such as 
agrochemicals (e.g. pesticides and fertilisers) and seeds. Following the rise of biotechnology 
in the mid-1990s, a wave of mergers and acquisitions has fundamentally restructured this 
industry segment, leading to a very high level of corporate concentration. According to the 
ETC Group, the top five seed companies accounted for 53 per cent of global sales in 2009 
(see Table 8). Many of these companies (e.g. Syngenta, Monsanto, and DuPont) are also 
leading producers of agrochemicals (ETC Group, 2011: 25). The reason for this is that GM 
seeds such as, for example, Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans have been specifically 
designed to be used with certain brands of fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides (Clapp, 2012: 
102-108).  
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 For a detailed discussion see Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark (2011). 
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Table 8: The World’s Top Five Seed Companies 
Company (headquarters) Seed sales 2009 (US$ million) Global Market share (percent) 
Monsanto (USA) 7,297 27 
DuPont (USA) 4,641 17 
Syngenta (Switzerland) 2,564 9 
Groupe Limagrain (France) 1,252 5 
Land O’Lakes/WinField 
Solutions (USA) 
1,100 4 
Total Top 5 16,854 62 
 
Based on ETC Group 2011 
 
Among the various supply chain segments, the production stage is the least concentrated. 
There are plantation companies which grow bananas, coffee, cocoa, sugarcane, soybeans, and 
oil palm on a large scale. For example, the Malaysian-based Sime Darby Plantation has close 
to 900,000 hectares under cultivation, mostly with oil palm (Sime Darby Plantation, website). 
Another example is the Brazilian soy industry which has seen a significant increase in farm 
sizes since the 1980s. Brazil’s largest plantation company, Grupo Andre Maggi, has currently 
more than 150,000 hectares under soybean (Vorley, 2003: 63). However, when compared to 
other segments of the agro-supply chain, corporate concentration remains relatively low at 
the production stage. The bulk of global agricultural output is still produced by individual 
farmers and small and medium sized companies.  
 
However, corporate concentration is again more pronounced in the trade and processing 
stages. For example, the top four grain trading companies (Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, 
Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus) control approximately 75-90 per cent of the world trade in grains 
and oilseeds. Similar high levels of corporate concentration can be observed in the global 
trade in bananas, cocoa, and tea (Clapp, 2012: 98-102). Also, food and beverage processing is 
becoming increasingly concentrated, with TNCs like Nestle, PepsiCo, and Kraft Foods 
holding dominant positions in the market (ETC Group, 2011: 39).  
 
At the downstream end of the agro-supply chain, retail has undergone profound 
transformation. Until a few decades ago, the retail sector in the EU and the US was 
characterised by small, independent shops. By the early 1990s, most of them had given way 
to large, transnationally operating supermarket chains (see Table 9). With over 2 million 
employees and grocery sales of US$ 191 billion Walmart is the world’s largest retail 
company. The company accounts for 10 per cent of the grocery revenues earned by the 
world’s top 100 retailers. Walmart and other industry leaders such as Carrefour and Tesco are 
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also expanding rapidly in emerging market economies such as China, India, Russia, and 
South Africa. Today, Walmart, for example, operates 338 shops in 124 Chinese cities, with 
90,000 employees and annual sales of approximately US$ 7 billion (ETC Group, 2008: 22-
24; 2011: 37-38). 
 
Table 9: The World’s Top Five Retailers 
Company (headquarters)  Grocery sales (US$ million) Number of countries of 
operation  
Walmart (USA) 191,711 15 
Carrefour (France) 104,290 34 
Schwarz Group (Germany) 65,012 23 
Tesco (UK) 63,288 14 
Aldi (Germany) 62,268 15 
 
Based on ETC Group 2011 
 
Furthermore, with the advent of biofuels, energy companies have become major players in 
the agro-supply chain. This includes large fuel distributing companies such as BP, 
ExxonMobil, Petrobas, and Shell as well as companies specialising in the production of 
biofuels. According to Energy Digital, an industry gazette, five of the world’s major biofuel 
companies are Australian Renewable Fuels, Blue Fire Ethanol Fuels, Cosan, and Coskata 
(Energy Digital, 2010). Often, the production and distribution stages are closely integrated. In 
2011, Shell and Cosan, for example, created the joint venture Raízen which will produce and 
sell over 2 billion litres of ethanol from Brazilian sugarcane every year (EcoSeed, 2011). 
Also, many of the “traditional” agro-TNCs are heavily involved in the bioenergy business. 
Archer Daniels Midland and Louis Dreyfus, for example, rank among the world’s largest 
biodiesel producers (Farm Industry News, 2012).  
 
Corporate concentration in certain segments of the agro-supply chain has had implications for 
supply chain governance. It has created power asymmetries, notably between upstream 
producers and the more highly concentrated downstream end of the supply chain. This has 
put large retailers, consumer goods manufacturers, and trading companies in the position to 
be able to influence prices and to determine the conditions of production (cf. Fuchs, 
Kalfaggiani, & Arentsen, 2009). However, corporate concentration and the industry’s 
increasing transnationalisation have not only affected intra-supply chain relationships; they 
have also changed the relationship between industry actors and public regulators. According 
to Higgins and Lawrence (2005: 1), “where, previously, the nation-state exercised 
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considerable control over the regulation of agriculture, the rise of TNCs in the agribusiness 
industries (…) has resulted in a reconfiguration of political power in which the state is no 
longer the predominant actor” (Higgins & Lawrence, 2005: 1). This raises questions about 
how to govern global agriculture, especially in light of the daunting sustainability challenges 
faced by the industry today.  
 
3.3 Sustainability Challenges 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the agriculture sector is confronted by difficult 
challenges. The industrialisation and intensification of agricultural production around the 
world has had severe ecological effects on soils, water, biodiversity, and our climate. At the 
same time, food insecurity, poor labour standards, and land grabs continue to negatively 
affect large parts of the developing world. Furthermore, the advent of biofuels and 
biotechnology has created new environmental and social risks. In the future, these problems 
are likely to intensify due to both an increased demand for agricultural products from a 
growing world population as well as changing diets in key developing countries.  
 
3.3.1 Ecological Impacts  
The intensification of agriculture has had severe ecological effects. One major problem is the 
degradation of soils and water quality. Historically, farmers have managed soil fertility 
through crop rotation and long fallow periods. With the spread of industrial agriculture, 
however, these techniques have largely been abandoned. Instead, industrial agriculture relies 
on mechanisation, mono-cropping, irrigation, and the use of synthetic fertilisers and 
pesticides. Due to industrialisation and intensification, world agricultural production has 
nearly tripled over the last 50 years while the area of cultivated land has only grown by 12 
per cent during the same period (FAO, 2011: 17). However, these production gains have 
come at a high cost. Industrial agriculture has strongly degraded the land and water systems 
upon which it depends. In some areas, the impact is so severe that production and livelihoods 
are compromised. The FAO estimates that approximately 25 per cent of the world’s arable 
land and its associated water systems are now highly degraded (FAO, 2011: 18).  
 
A closely related problem is the loss of biodiversity. Monocropping and the widespread 
adoption of hybrid seeds have significantly reduced crop diversity around the world. As a 
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result of the Green Revolution, diversity loss has been particularly pronounced in the 
developing world. Today, 90 per cent of the wheat, 70 per cent of the rice, and 60 per cent of 
the maize planted in these countries are modern varieties. Besides reducing crop diversity, 
intensive farming methods have resulted in a loss of natural habitats for birds, insects, and 
small animals (Clapp, 2012: 50-51). For example, full-sun monocrop coffee fields in 
Colombia and Mexico have been found to support 90 per cent fewer bird species than shade-
grown coffee systems (Killebrew & Wolff, 2010: 4).  
 
Agriculture is also a major emitter of GHGs and therefore a key driver behind climate 
change. It is estimated that approximately 15 per cent of global GHG emissions result from 
agricultural activity. These include emissions from livestock farming, the burning of biomass, 
and soil management, as well as land use changes. In particular, the large-scale conversion of 
forests, wetlands, and grasslands into arable land has significantly reduced the ability of 
ecosystems to store and sequester carbon (IAASTD, 2009: 41). However, agricultural activity 
is not only a major driver behind climate change; it is also severely affected by this process. 
In particular, this is true for lower latitudes. In these areas, climate change is expected to 
increase the frequency and intensity of droughts and floods. Also, sea level rises are expected 
to pose a threat to deltas and coastal areas (FAO, 2011: 23-24).  
 
3.3.2 Social Impacts and Human Health 
Besides these ecological challenges, food insecurity, poor labour standards, and land grabs 
are major problems, particularly in developing countries. Furthermore, the issue of food 
safety has received much attention in recent years. Food insecurity is “the inability to access 
sufficient amount of safe and nutritious food” (Fuchs & Kalfaggiani, 2010: 1). It was the food 
crisis of 2007/2008 which brought food security back onto the global political agenda. During 
the crisis, sharp price rises on agricultural commodity markets made it difficult for highly 
import-dependent countries, notably in Africa and Asia, to supply their populations with 
basic food staples. According to the FAO, the crisis increased the number of undernourished 
people by 75 million, bringing the total number to 932 million in 2007 (FAO, 2008). Since 
then, food prices have fallen again, but they remain higher than before the crisis and hunger 
and malnourishment continue to affect large parts of the developing world (FAO, website-a). 
Mittal (2009) identifies a range of short-term and long-term causes behind the sharp price 
rises in this period. These include a decline in global stocks of grains, increased demand from 
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emerging economies, the use of food crops for fuel production, and speculation in financial 
markets. As discussed in more detail below, the advent of biofuels in particular has sparked 
much debate about the sustainability of the global food system.  
 
Besides food insecurity, poor labour standards remain a major problem in much of the 
developing world. The International Labour Organization estimates that 60 per cent of the 
world’s child labourers work in agriculture, which is considered to be one of the three most 
dangerous sectors in terms of work-related fatalities, non-fatal accidents, and occupational 
diseases (ILO, website). Also, human trafficking and forced labour continue to be widespread 
in the agriculture sector (ILO, 2005: 52). For example, in 2008, Amnesty International 
reported about hundreds of incidents of forced labour in Brazil’s rapidly growing sugarcane 
industry (Reuters, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, land grabbing has become an issue in recent years. Land grabbing is an activist 
term for large-scale foreign land acquisitions. There are varying estimates about the extent of 
the phenomenon, which range from a low of 45 million hectares (World Bank) to a high of 
227 million hectares (Oxfam). However, it is a well-established fact that foreign land 
acquisitions have increased sharply in recent years. This “scramble” for land is driven by 
corporate investors, governments, and local elites. They take control over large quantities of 
land in order to produce food, feed, fibre, and fuels – often for international markets. In many 
cases, these deals lack transparency and are to the disadvantage of local communities 
(Margulis, McKeon, & Borras, 2013: 2). According to the Land Matrix Partnership, most of 
the land acquired in the period 2006-2010 has been used for biofuel production (40 per cent) 
and is located in Africa. For example, in 2010, Chinese investors acquired 2.8 million 
hectares of land in the Democratic Republic of Congo to grow oil palm for biofuel production 
(ETC Group, 2011: 2; Sassen, 2013: 30).  
 
Whereas problems with food insecurity, poor labour standards, and land grabs are mostly 
confined to the developing world, the issue of food safety has received much attention in 
developed countries. Over the last few decades, a number of high profile food scares such as 
the “mad cow disease” crisis, discoveries of dioxin in food products as well as outbreaks of 
illness due to food-borne pathogens (e.g. salmonella, e-coli, and listeria) have led to growing 
concern among rich country consumers. This has given rise to controversial debates about the 
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industrial mode of agricultural production and its detrimental effects on human health and 
animal welfare (IAASTD, 2009: 34).  
 
3.3.3 Biofuels and Biotechnology 
The advent of biofuels and biotechnology is thought to exacerbate some of the problems 
discussed above. The large-scale production of biofuels has been criticised on various fronts 
(Biofuelwatch, 2007; Friends of the Earth Europe, 2008; Oxfam International, 2008). One 
major issue is their carbon intensity. Biofuels have been promoted as a means of reducing 
GHG emissions and thus to reach climate change reduction targets. However, official figures 
often do not consider emissions emanating from direct and indirect land use change. Direct 
land use change occurs when previously uncultivated land is converted to the production of 
energy crops. Indirect land use change is a process in which biofuels displace other 
agricultural activities to previously uncultivated areas. These processes can result in an 
overall negative GHG balance of biofuels when, for example, forests, peatlands or wetlands 
are cultivated (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011, pp. 32-33). Also, the adverse effect of 
large-scale biofuel production on food security has become a highly contentious issue. 
During the food crisis of 2007/2008, Jean Ziegel, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, even called them a “crime against humanity” and requested a five-year moratorium on 
their production (The Guardian, 2008b). Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that 
biofuel production is a major driving force behind foreign land acquisitions in Africa and 
elsewhere (e.g. Oxfam, 2012). 
 
Like the case of biofuels, the rise of biotechnology has sparked much debate about the 
sustainability of the global food system. Biotechnology is not a new phenomenon. For 
centuries, farmers have used breeding techniques to manipulate and change the genomic 
properties of crops and animals in order to increase their yields. However, modern 
biotechnology goes beyond traditional breeding techniques. Scientific progress in the area of 
genomics has made it possible to transfer genes across species. The results are transgenic 
crops, livestock, and fish which can be genetically engineered to have favourable traits such 
as pest, disease, and drought resistance. However, there is a lot of uncertainty about the long 
term effects of bioengineering on the environment and human health (IAASTD, 2009: 12). 
For example, there is evidence suggesting that the widespread use of GM crops – in 2009 
about 77 percent of the world’s soybean crop was GM (GMO Compass, website-a) – in 
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combination with certain agrochemicals has given rise to so-called superweeds. Superweeds 
are weeds that are increasingly resistant to conventional pesticides such as glyphosate (Adler, 
2011). Furthermore, there are worries that GM crops could pose a risk to biodiversity. By 
means of out-crossing, transgenic plants could pass their superior traits on to wild relatives. 
This could enable them to out-compete other species. Difficult to predict and control, such 
processes could result in an overall loss of biodiversity. Finally, there are concerns that GM 
crops which produce their own pesticides may pose a threat to non-target animal populations 
as well as to human health (GMO Compass, website-b).  
 
3.3.4 Future Challenges  
World population is expected to grow from 6.1 billion in 2000 to 8.9 billion in 2050 (United 
Nations, 2004). Much of this growth will occur in developing countries, which will strongly 
increase their demand for food. At the same time, diets in these countries are changing from 
staple foods to high protein diets. It is projected that as a result of this world meat 
consumption will increase from 37.4 kg/person/year in 2000 to over 52 kg/person/year by 
2050. As meat production requires a high input of cereals in the form of animal feed, this too 
will have a major impact on global food demand (UNEP, 2009: 17). Although production 
growth rates are projected to fall until 2050 when compared to the 1961-2007 period, the 
quantities needed to satisfy global demand will be significant. According to the FAO, by 
2050, world cereal production will increase by 940 million tonnes (+46 percent) and meat 
production by almost 200 million tonnes (+76 percent). Much of the additional cereal 
production is estimated to be used for animal feed. For example, approximately 60 per cent of 
the additional 443 million tons of maize produced by 2050 will be used for that purpose. 
Furthermore, the FAO estimates that developing countries will produce about 90 per cent of 
the projected increase in global agricultural production, raising their share from 67 per cent in 
2005/2007 to 74 per cent in 2050 (FAO, 2012b: 95-96). Most of the production increase (73 
percent) will come from intensification (i.e. increasing crop yields through mechanisation, the 
use of synthetic fertilisers, pesticides, fungicides, and potentially biotechnology). With 21 
percent, the expansion of arable land is another important factor. However, there are strong 
regional differences. Arable land expansion will be significant in Latin America, but almost 
absent in East Asia and North Africa. Furthermore, increases in cropping intensities (i.e. 
multiple cropping and/or shortening of fallow periods) will play a role (see Table 10). 
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Table 10: Sources of Growth in Crop Production 2005-2050 (percent) 
 Arable land 
expansion 
Increases in cropping 
intensity 
Intensification 
All developing 
countries 
21 6 73 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20 6 74 
Near East/North Africa 0 20 80 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
40 7 53 
South Asia 6 12 82 
East Asia  0 15 85 
 
 
Based on FAO 2012b: 93 
 
Another trend in global agriculture is the expansion of international trade (see Figure 10). In 
the period 2010-2022, international trade in key crops such as coarse grains (corn, barley, 
sorghum, rye oats, and millets), soybeans, and wheat is projected to grow by 49 per cent, 34 
per cent, and 19 per cent, respectively.20 According to the United States Department for 
Agriculture, traditional exporters such as Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US will continue 
to play a key role in the global trade in agricultural commodities. However, the department 
estimates that developing countries will be the main source of growth in world agricultural 
trade. Countries like Brazil have made significant investments in their agricultural sectors in 
recent years and they are expected to strongly increase their presence in agricultural export 
markets (USDA, 2012: 17-19).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 These figures have been calculated using trade data provided by the United Stated Department for Agriculture 
(USDA, 2012: 44-50). 
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Figure 10: Global Trade in Soybeans, Wheat, and Coarse Grains 
 
Source: USDA 2012: 19   
 
The intensification and expansion of agricultural production are likely to exacerbate some of 
the problems outlined above. In particular, the sector’s ecological footprint can be expected 
to increase in the future. But also food insecurity, labour standards, and land grabbing as well 
as food safety are likely to remain important issues. In combination with the 
transnationalisation of production and the growing importance of developing countries in 
agricultural export markets, this raises important questions about the design and 
implementation of regulatory standards.  
 
3.4 Regulating Global Agriculture: The Role of Private Standards 
Making global agriculture more sustainable poses difficult challenges for regulators around 
the world. In what could be dubbed old global agricultural governance, states and IGOs were 
the primary, and often only, providers of regulation. Rule-making took place at the national 
level, through international negotiations and within IGOs. Rule implementation and 
enforcement mostly occurred through the state and its agencies as IGOs typically lack direct 
enforcement powers. However, in an increasingly globalised agricultural economy, the 
effectiveness of this system is called into question. In the countries of the South, weak 
administrative capacities are among the main obstacles for achieving sustainability goals. 
And in the North, where states are strong, regulators remain constrained by national borders 
and therefore find it difficult to regulate transnational production networks. At the same time, 
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states are as reluctant as ever to confer authority to supranational bodies, and many 
intergovernmental forums currently experience stalemates as the result of an increasingly 
heterogeneous international system (cf. Abbott & Snidal, 2009a). 
 
Faced with this situation, public regulators, industry, and civil society have turned toward 
private standards as a source of regulation. In contrast to public regulation, private 
sustainability governance is largely unconstrained by national borders and the rules of the 
international trade regime. Instead of relying on the state and its monopoly of force, private 
sustainability schemes harness market forces. Essentially, these systems function as clubs 
(Potoski & Prakash, 2009). Firms striving for membership have to implement the club’s code 
of conduct in their operations and, with the help of private auditing firms, corporate 
compliance is assessed. Compliant operators are then issued with a certificate which they can 
use to signal their sustainability performance to relevant external audiences. Facing pressures 
from regulators, civil society, and consumers to guarantee the safety and sustainability of 
their products, downstream companies in particular possess strong incentives to participate in 
these initiatives. They also play a key role in the implementation of private standards. As 
detailed above, the downstream end of the agro-supply chain is significantly more 
concentrated than the upstream end. A large number of producers interact with a much 
smaller number of traders, processors, and retailers. This puts the latter in the position to be 
able to exercise control over prices, but also to influence the conditions of production. 
Through making their sourcing decisions conditional on meeting certain sustainability 
criteria, they can thus act as “enforcers” and implement private standards in their 
transnational production networks. These qualities of private standards have made them 
important players in the emerging system of global agricultural governance. 
 
Initially lagging behind other sectors, the agriculture sector has now become a dynamic site 
of private sustainability governance (World Bank, 2004: 17-25). Over the course of the last 
two decades, a large number of private standard systems have emerged in the sector. In 
particular, retail corporations have been very active in designing and implementing food 
safety standards, but MSIs have also become an important source of regulation in the sector.  
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3.4.1 Industry Initiatives 
Facing pressures from regulators, civil society, and consumers, retail corporations and big 
brand consumer goods manufacturers have become a major driver behind private 
sustainability governance in the agriculture sector (see Table 11). For example, with its 
Sustainable Living Plan, food giant Unilever commits itself to sourcing all of its agricultural 
raw materials sustainably by 2020 (Unilever, website). Similar sustainability strategies have 
been formulated by other leading companies in the industry such as McDonald’s, PepsiCo, 
Coca-Cola, Starbucks, and Walmart (Dauvergne & Lister, 2012). Most big brand companies 
are also engaged in initiatives at the industry-level. In particular, the consumer-facing retail 
sector has been very active in designing and implementing industry-level food safety 
standards (Fuchs et al., 2011). Following the heated controversy about the sustainability of 
biofuels, there has also been a wave of private biofuel standards in recent years. The table 
below does not provide a complete inventory, but lists some of the major industry initiatives 
in the agriculture sector.  
 
Table 11: Industry Standards in the Agriculture Sector 
Standard System Initiator  Focus  Description  
British Retail 
Consortium Global 
Standard for Food 
Safety (BRC) 
British retail 
industry 
association  
Food safety BRC was created in 1998 in order to evaluate the 
manufacturing of retailers’ own brand products. It 
delineates more than 250 requirements including 
comprehensive norms for food safety and quality as 
well as personal hygiene of personnel. In 2002, a 
Packaging Standard was published, followed by a 
Consumer Products standard in 2003 and finally the 
BRC Standard for Storage and Distribution in 2006.  
International Food 
Standard (IFS) 
German 
retail 
industry 
association   
Food safety IFS is a standard developed by retailers and wholesalers 
to ensure the safety of own-brand products. It was 
initiated in 2002 by a German food retail industry 
association. The development of the current version of 
IFS Food is a collaboration of three retail federations 
from Germany, France and Italy.  
Safe Quality Food 
(SQF) 
US retail 
industry 
consortium  
Food safety SQF is a food safety and quality certification 
programme for primary production (SQF 1000) and for 
food manufacturing and distribution (SQF 2000) owned 
by the Food Marketing Institute. Its membership 
represents three-quarters of all retail food stores in the 
US and 200 companies from over 50 countries. SQF is 
primarily designed as a food safety programme. 
The Global Food 
Safety Initiative 
(GFSI) 
International 
retail 
industry 
consortium 
Food safety GFSI was initiated in 2000 by a group of international 
retailers in order to agree on globally accepted food 
safety standards. The initiative sets baseline 
requirements for food safety standards and intends to 
improve efficiency costs throughout the food chain. 
Currently, four food safety standards have been 
benchmarked against the GFSI standard: BRC, IFS, 
SQF, and the Dutch Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) standard.  
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Global Partnership 
for Good 
Agricultural 
Practices 
(GlobalG.A.P) 
European 
retail 
industry 
consortium 
Food safety  Global G.A.P (known as EurepGap until 2007) was 
developed in 1997 by a group of European retailers. 
While initially only applying to fruits and vegetables, it 
now covers meat products and fish from aquaculture as 
well. The standard focuses on food safety, but also 
includes criteria pertaining to animal welfare and 
environmental sustainability.  
Biofuel Biomass 
Sustainability 
Verification 
System 
(2BSvs) 
French 
agriculture 
industry 
consortium 
Environmental 
sustainability 
of biofuel 
production 
2BSvs was developed by leading organisations and 
associations in the French agriculture and biofuel 
industries. The scheme is being implemented by the 
certification body Bureau Veritas. It mainly covers the 
environmental sustainability standards set out in the 
European Union Renewable Energy Directive (EU 
RED) of 2009.  
REDCert German 
agriculture 
industry 
consortium  
Environmental 
sustainability 
of biofuel 
production 
REDcert was founded in 2010 by leading organisations 
and associations in the German agriculture and biofuel 
industries. It has been approved by the German Federal 
Agency for Agriculture and Food to fulfil the 
requirements of the German Biomass Sustainability 
Ordinance.  
Red Tractor British 
industry 
consortium 
Food safety, 
environmental 
sustainability 
of biofuel 
production 
Launched in 2000, the Red Tractor scheme was 
developed by a consortium of British farmers, food 
producers, and retailers. Its standard covers food safety, 
animal welfare, and environmental protection. Recently, 
the Red Tractor has been supplemented by a standard 
for biofuels.  
Based on Fuchs, Kalfagianni et. al. 2009  
 
Industry food and sustainability standards have been criticised on several grounds. A 
recurrent theme in the literature is their limited effectiveness. It has been argued that, besides 
“greenwashing” corporate reputations, industry self-regulation has so far produced few 
substantial results. For example, in their study of private food governance, Fuchs and 
Kalfagianni (2010) conclude that  industry sustainability initiatives did not fundamentally 
change the environmental behaviour of food retail corporations and that such programmes are 
too few and have too little coverage to have an impact. A second criticism pertains to the 
relationship between private sustainability schemes and developing countries. It has been 
pointed out that farmers, fishermen and civil society actors from the south often have little 
access and influence over private standard-setting processes (Fuchs et al., 2011). According 
to Clapp (2005a), this has led to a situation in which private standards prioritise issues of 
importance to industrialised countries. Furthermore, the distributive consequences of private 
sustainability governance have given rise to criticism as, in many cases, these are believed to 
be detrimental to the interests of producers in developing countries (Fuchs & Kalfaggiani, 
2010; Guthman, 2007). Finally, industry-led initiatives have been criticised for their lack of 
legitimacy. Not formally elected, private standard-setting systems rely on procedural criteria 
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such as process-transparency and inclusiveness to generate legitimacy. However, industry 
initiatives like the BRC, IFS, and SQF lack participatory elements (Fuchs et al., 2011).  
 
3.4.2 Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives 
As discussed in-depth in Chapter 1, the growing importance of private actors in global 
governance has triggered much debate about their democratic legitimacy. In this context, 
concerns have been expressed that outsourcing regulatory functions to private actors will lead 
to “less democracy and accountability around the world” (Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002: 121). 
Others, however, are less pessimistic about the new role played by private actors. On the 
contrary, they believe that public-private partnership and MSIs can counteract the democratic 
deficit of transnational rule-making and enhance the legitimacy of global governance 
institutions. They see the rise of these new modes of governance as part of a deliberative turn 
with the potential to increase the democratic quality of global governance institutions (cf. 
Bäckstrand, Khan, Kronsell, & Lövbrand, 2010b). 
 
In recent years, the agriculture sector has become one of the most dynamic sites of MSI 
diffusion. Over the course of the last decade, a large number of agro-MSIs have been created 
(see Table 12). Their goal is to improve the sustainability of key crops such as cocoa, coffee, 
cotton, palm oil, soy, and sugarcane. Other initiatives focus on aquaculture, meat production, 
and biofuels. These schemes are not necessarily more effective than their industry-led 
counterparts. However, through including civil society actors and producers from the global 
south in their governance and standard-setting activities, they achieve a higher level of 
legitimacy. 
 
Table 12: MSIs in the Agriculture Sector 
MSI Initiator Focus Description 
 4C                                                  German coffee 
industry 
association, 
German 
government 
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
coffee 
production 
Created in 2003, 4C was initiated by the 
German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the 
German Association for Development 
Cooperation (GIZ), and the German 
Coffee Association. In 2006, the 
initiative issued the 4C code of conduct 
which addresses social and 
environmental impacts of coffee 
production.  
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BCI Environmental 
NGO, industry 
consortium 
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
cotton 
production  
The BCI process was initiated in 2004 
by the WWF, Adidas, H&M, and 
IKEA. The initiative involves the 
different supply chain actors 
(producers, processors, retailers) and 
civil society organisations. In 2010-
2011 the first cotton bearing the Better 
Cotton label was harvested.  
BSI/Bonsucro Environmental 
NGO, 
international 
organisation  
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
sugarcane 
production  
Previously known as the Better Sugar 
Initiative (BSI), Bonsucro is a 
roundtable association initiated in 2005 
to reduce the environmental and social 
impact of sugarcane cultivation. Among 
its founding members are the WWF and 
the IFC.  
FLO Social NGO 
 
 
 
 
Fair trade The FLO was established in 1997, in 
order to unite the fair trade initiatives of 
several European countries and North 
America under one umbrella 
organisation. In 2002, FLO launched its 
certification scheme. Through its 
standard and labelling scheme the 
initiative seeks to contribute to greater 
equity in international trade.  
 
FLP Coalition of 
social NGOs 
 
 
 
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
cut flower 
production 
The FLP emerged out of a campaign 
against poor social conditions in the cut 
flower industry. The campaign was 
organized by Brot fuer die Welt and 
FIAN (FoodFirst Informations- und 
Aktionsnetzwerk), and Terre des 
Hommes. In 1999, producers and 
traders, as well as trade unions, joined 
the initiative and jointly launched the 
FLP. 
ICI Coalition of 
social NGOs 
Social 
sustainability of 
cocoa 
production  
The ICI emerged out of a campaign 
against abusive labour practices in the 
cocoa industry. Founded in 2002, it is a 
partnership between civil society 
organisations, trade unions and the 
cocoa industry. ICI activities focus on 
knowledge management and capacity 
building.  
ISCC 
 
German 
government 
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
biofuels 
production 
The ISCC was developed through a 
multi-stakeholder approach, with 
financial support from the German 
Agency for Renewable Resources. In 
2011, the ISCC launched its 
certification system and to date more 
than 1,600 certificates have been issued.  
RTRS 
 
Environmental 
NGO 
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
soy production 
The RTRS was established in 2006 in 
Zurich, with its secretariat now located 
in Buenos Aires. The initiative provides 
a forum for dialogue between various 
actors in the soy supply chain and civil 
society. In 2011, the first RTRS 
certificates were issued.  
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RSB 
 
University Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
biofuel 
production 
The RSB was initiated by the École 
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne in 
2006. The RSB developed a standard 
for sustainable biofuel production and 
issued its first certificates in 2012.  
RSPO 
 
Environmental 
NGO 
Social and 
environmental 
sustainability of 
biofuel 
production 
The RSPO was initiated by the WWF in 
cooperation with Unilever, Migros, and 
the Malaysian Palm Oil Association. 
The scheme was officially launched in 
2004 and completed its standard-setting 
process in 2006. Today, 14 per cent of 
global palm oil production is RSPO 
certified.  
GRSB 
 
Environmental 
NGO  
Environmental 
sustainability of 
beef production 
Still in the process of formation, the 
GRSB is a MSI involving leading 
organisations from the beef industry 
and environmental NGOs. The initiative 
aims to improve the sustainability of the 
global beef value chain.  
UTZ Certified Environmental 
NGO 
Environmental 
and social 
sustainability of 
coffee, cocoa, 
tea and rooibos 
production 
UTZ Certified is a label and programme 
for sustainable farming launched in 
2002. Its standard addresses the social 
and environmental impact of coffee, 
cocoa, tea, and rooibos farming. UTZ 
certified coffee is sold in almost 50 
consuming countries. 
 
Most of the initiatives listed above emerged in the mid-2000s. However, the inventory of 
environmental MSIs conducted in Chapter 1 showed that the diffusion of the MSI 
institutional model has transformed it in key dimensions of organisational design. This is also 
true for the group of agro-MSIs. Whereas some initiatives adopted highly inclusive 
structures, others did not. It is this variation and its implication for the democratic legitimacy 
of multi-stakeholder governance which the following case study chapters will explore in 
more depth.  
 
3.5 Conclusions  
The main purpose of this chapter was to provide the reader with background information 
about the agriculture sector and to serve as an introduction for the case study chapters to 
follow. In a first section, the chapter described the development of an increasingly globalised 
agro-industry with close links to the energy sector. It was pointed out that international trade 
in agricultural commodities is not a new phenomenon. Once-exotic commodities such as 
coffee, spices, and tea have been traded for centuries. However, the chapter revealed that the 
current volume and level of international trade and transnational integration are historically 
unprecedented. At the heart of this transformation is the global spread of industrial 
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agriculture, the reduction of barriers to trade, and the rise of horizontally and vertically 
integrated TNCs at almost all stages of the agro-supply chain.  
 
The second section focused on the various sustainability challenges faced by the agriculture 
sector today. These include ecological impacts such as soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, and 
GHG emissions. Also, food insecurity, poor labour standards, and land grabs, as well as food 
safety, remain important issues. In the future, these problems are likely to intensify. The 
reasons for this are an expanding demand from a growing world population, changing diets in 
key developing countries, and the growing importance of developing countries as producers 
of agricultural commodities. Furthermore, the advent of biofuels and biotechnology together 
with the various social and environmental risks involved were discussed. 
 
In its final section, the chapter turned to the question of regulating global agriculture. In the 
twenty-first century, the regulation of agricultural activities is complicated by the fact that 
production, processing, and retailing are increasingly transnational in nature. This poses 
difficult challenges for public regulators, which remain constrained both by national borders 
and by the rules of the international trade regime. In this context, the role of private standards 
was discussed. In response to growing pressures from consumers, civil society, and public 
regulators, the private sector has become an important source of regulation. In particular, 
retail corporations have been very active in creating and implementing food safety and 
sustainability standards. Besides hosting various industry initiatives, the agriculture sector has 
also become one of the most dynamic sites of multi-stakeholder governance, and agro-MSIs 
have emerged in several of the industry’s subsectors.  
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Chapter 4: The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels21  
 
4.1 Introduction 
After an introduction to the global political economy of agriculture, this is the first of three 
case study chapters. With a focus on the RSB and the biofuels industry, it examines the 
diffusion of private participatory governance in the agriculture sector.  
 
To recapitulate, in Chapter 1, it was described how the field of global sustainability politics is 
currently undergoing a profound transformation from a state-centred model of governance 
toward a system in which governance has multiple loci and levels. It was shown how private 
actors and private regulatory arrangements have come to play an important role in the 
emerging global governance architecture. The rise of private authority in the international 
system has raised pressing questions about its democratic legitimacy. In the transitional realm 
where these schemes operate, no clearly defined demos or self-governing community exists. 
With its focus on elections and representation, the liberal model of democracy is therefore not 
well suited to the reality of transnational rule-making with its multitude of actors, diffuse 
authority, and many levels. As part of a wider turn in the philosophy of democracy, 
deliberative democratic theory has been proposed as an alternative normative basis for 
organising legitimate rule-making at the transnational level. In essence, deliberative 
democrats highlight the importance of participation and dialogue over the liberal ideas of 
representation and formal accountability. Among the various private governance 
arrangements that have emerged in recent years, MSIs are believed to come closest to the 
deliberative ideal. They try to organise legitimate transnational rule-making through 
participatory elements and procedural transparency. These design features directly follow 
from the two core procedural principles of deliberative democratic theory: inclusiveness and 
unconstrained dialogue.  
 
As a mode of global governance, MSIs first emerged in the forestry and apparel sectors in the 
early 1990s and from there spread rapidly and widely in the global economy. A good fit with 
prevailing social structures, social movement pressure, and the entrepreneurial activities of 
NGOs, foundations, and progressive firms have been identified as the main drivers behind 
                                                          
21
 Recently, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels changed its name to Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials.  
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this process. However, as shown in Chapter 1, this process of institutional diffusion has not 
spread a universal model of private participatory governance. Instead, real-world MSIs 
exhibit significant variation in their institutional designs, notably their level of inclusiveness.  
 
In order to explore the causes of this variation in more depth, this and the following two case 
study chapters trace the diffusion of private participatory governance in the agriculture sector, 
the most dynamic site of MSI diffusion in recent years. To this end, the empirical analysis 
will be guided by the diffusion model developed in Chapter 2. The model distinguishes three 
stages in the diffusion process – source selection, transmission, and adoption – and identifies 
as set of testable hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships that influence 
institutional outcomes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In a first step, some case context and 
background is provided. Then, the institutional development of the RSB is described, from 
the scheme’s inception to the launch of the formal organisation and the finalisation of the 
standard-setting process. As part of this, a more detailed analysis of the inclusiveness of the 
scheme’s decision-making and rule-making arrangements is provided. In a final step, the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 is used for explaining the institutional outcome 
for the case at hand. 
 
4.2 Case Context and Background 
The biofuel sector is a relatively young global industry. Although industrial biofuel 
production has existed in countries like Brazil and the USA since the 1970s, the emergence of 
a global biofuel supply chain and market is a rather recent phenomenon. Over the last decade, 
biofuel production, consumption, and trade have expanded strongly as major industrial 
countries around the world have adopted blending mandates for biofuels (Global Renewable 
Fuels Alliance, website). One important example is the EU RED 2009. Enacted in 2009,  the 
EU RED established a blending mandate for biofuels in the transport sector of 10 percent to 
be achieved by 2020 (European Union, 2009). This and supporting policies at the member 
state level created one of the world’s largest biofuel markets with an estimated volume of 
currently 14 billion litres or 4.65 percent of total transport fuels (USDA, 2013). As a result of 
EU RED and similar policies elsewhere, world biofuel production increased six-fold during 
2000-2011 from 315 to 1898 thousand barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information 
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Administration, website). Strong growth rates are projected to continue in the future. In this 
regard, the FAO estimates that global biofuel production will almost double in size by 2021 
(OECD-FAO, 2012: 88). Today, the world’s top five biofuel producing countries are: USA, 
Brazil, EU-27, Argentina, and China (see Table 13).  
 
Table 13: Top 5 Producers of Biofuels in 2011 
Country Production (thousand barrels per day) 
USA 971.729 
Brazil 438.058 
EU-27 250.450 
Argentina 50.340 
China 46.800 
 
 Source: U.S Energy Information Administration  
 
Also, the global trade in biofuels is set to increase strongly, from 4.5 billion litres annually in 
the previous decade to 12 billion litres by 2021. Currently, the world largest exporters of 
biofuels are the USA and Brazil, followed by the two major palm oil producing countries, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (OECD-FAO, 2012: 95).  
 
The strong expansion of biofuel production, trade, and consumption over the last two decades 
has contributed to a surge in global demand for food commodities.  The FAO estimates that 
this trend will continue in the future (see Table 14).  
 
Table 14: World Use of Crops for Biofuels 
Crop  Unit 2005 2030 
Cereals  Million tonnes  65  182  
Percent of total use 3.2 6.7 
Vegetable oils Million tonnes 7  29 
Percent of total use 4.8 12.6 
 Source: FAO 2012  
 
This development has triggered much debate about the sustainability of biofuels. In 
particular, environmental and human rights groups in Europe have strongly criticised the 
massive expansion of what they call “agrofuels” (Biofuelwatch, 2007; Friends of the Earth 
Europe, 2008; Oxfam International, 2008).  
 
One major issue raised by these groups relates to the carbon intensity of biofuels. Often, 
biofuels are promoted as a means to reduce GHG emissions and thus to reach climate change 
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reduction targets. But official figures often do not consider emissions emanating from direct 
and indirect land use change. Direct land use change occurs when previously uncultivated 
land is converted to the production of energy crops. One the other hand, indirect land use 
change is a process in which biofuels displace other agricultural activities to previously 
uncultivated areas. Direct and indirect land use changes are problematic as they can result in 
an overall negative GHG balance of biofuels. This is the case when, for example, forests, 
peatlands, or wetlands are cultivated (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011, pp. 32-33).  
 
Also, the social impact of biofuels has become a highly contentious issue. Besides poor 
labour standards in producer countries and problems with land grabbing, it was particularly 
the food crisis of 2007/2008 which sparked much debate about biofuels. As food prices 
increased sharply during this period, Jean Ziegler, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, even called them a “crime against humanity” and requested a five year moratorium on 
their production (The Guardian, 2008b). The debate was further fuelled by the release of the 
Gallagher Review in July 2008. Commissioned by the British Secretary of State for 
Transport, the review concluded that without safeguards biofuel policies in the EU and 
elsewhere will: (1) reduce biodiversity; (2) may cause GHG emissions rather than savings; 
and (3) that increasing demand for biofuels contributes to rising prices for some food 
commodities such as oil seeds (Renewable Fuels Agency, 2008, pp. 7-15). 
 
To address this situation, several private governance arrangements were created to mitigate 
the social and environmental impact of biofuel production. The growth of private governance 
in the biofuel sector was further spurred by the EU’s decision to rely on private certification 
schemes for implementing the EU RED. In addition to a blending mandate, the EU RED 
included a mandatory sustainability scheme which all biofuels produced or imported to the 
EU must meet. The emerging system of private governance in the biofuel sector includes 
firm-level self-regulation, industry-level initiatives, and MSIs. These arrangements are now a 
major source of environmental and social regulation in the industry (Schleifer, 2013). One of 
the most important private schemes in terms of visibility and membership is the RSB.  
 
4.3 The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels 
Launched in 2006, the RSB is a private standard-setting and certification body, created to 
mitigate the social and environmental impact of global biofuel production. In a multi-
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stakeholder process, it defined principles and criteria for “sustainable” biofuel production 
and, via certification, provides market incentives for their implementation. This section traces 
the institutional development of the RSB form its inception to the launch of the formal 
organisation. With a focus on the design of the RSB’s standard-setting and decision-making 
arrangements an assessment of the scheme’s inclusiveness is provided.  
 
4.3.1 Inception 
An important stepping stone for the RSB was a conference on sustainable bioenergy in Bonn 
in October 2006. Organised by the German NGO Forum on Environment and Development 
and the UN Foundation (two of the founding members of the RSB), the conference brought 
together a diverse group of stakeholders, including representatives from NGOs, industry, 
governments, IGOs, and academia. In a communique, the conference participants described a 
profound transformation of the energy production system and identified bioenergy as “one of 
the most promising sources of energy and crucial part of the new energy paradigm” (German 
NGO Forum on Environment and Development, 2006a). At the same time, the environmental 
and social impacts of bioenergy were a key concern at the conference. In particular, issues 
like deforestation, soil depletion, food security, and land grabbing were discussed in detail 
and how they could be mitigated through a private standard-setting and certification 
mechanism (German NGO Forum on Environment and Development, 2006b).  
 
Simultaneously, a group of people at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) 
Energy Center started discussing the possibility of developing sustainability criteria for 
biofuel production. In November 2006, the EPFL Energy Center published a white paper on 
“the need for biofuel certification” (EPFL, 2006) and, shortly after, hosted a Sustainable 
Biofuels Stakeholder Meeting. The meeting was attended by a diverse group of stakeholders 
from civil society, industry, the public sector, and academia. Participants analysed the various 
problems associated with commercial biofuel production, discussed existing regulation, and 
“investigated the potential for developing an internationally accepted and implementable 
standard for sustainable biofuels” (RSB, 2006). The most important outcome of the meeting 
was the decision to create a Founding Steering Board (FSB), charged with launching a multi-
stakeholder standard-setting process (RSB, 2006). Furthermore, a small secretariat was 
established, based at the EPFL Energy Center. 
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4.3.2 Formation Phase 
Holding its first meeting in May 2007, the FSB consisted of an ad hoc group of people who 
had volunteered at the Lausanne workshop in November 2006. Over the course of the next 
two years, these individuals, representing organisations from civil society and industry, met 
several times per year in-person or via teleconference to launch the standard-setting process 
and to create the organisational structures of the RSB. The composition of the FSB varied 
greatly during the time of its existence (May 2007 – January 2009). As the initiative evolved, 
new organisations joined the FSB, whereas others left or scaled back their involvement. 
There were no formal stakeholder categories, but available documentation suggests an overall 
balanced representation of the four key stakeholder groups (civil society north, civil society 
south, economic north, and economic south). Towards the end of the formation period, the 
FSB had some twenty members. Civil society members included: the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, the National Wildlife Federation, Amigos da Terra (a Brazilian environmental NGO), 
the Energy Resource Institute (an Indian environmental NGO), and the Mali Folkecenter (an 
environmental NGO from Mali). From the industry side there was Shell, BP, Bunge, Toyota, 
Petrobas, the Federation of Swiss Oil Companies, and UNICA (the leading Brazilian 
Sugarcane Industry Association). Furthermore, several academics and representatives from 
government agencies and international organisations participated in the meetings of the FSB 
(RSB, 2011e). During 2007 and 2009, the members of the FSB met about 10 times. The 
meetings mostly revolved around questions of organisational development (e.g. recruitment 
of new members, creation a formal governance structure, launch of the certification system, 
etc.) and the standard-setting process. To reach decisions on these issues the members of the 
FSB strived to reach consensus. However, a voting procedure existed in the event of 
deadlock. In such cases, a decision could be reached by a two-third majority of the votes 
(RSB, 2007f).  
 
One of the most important milestones during the formation period was the launch of the 
standard-setting process. In June 2007, the FSB, with help of the Secretariat, created four 
working groups (WGs) on environmental impacts, social impacts, GHGs, and 
implementation. Their task was to draft the principles and criteria of the RSB standard. 
Decisions on the draft standard were reached by consensus or by simple majority in the case 
of deadlock (RSB, 2008a). Participation in the groups was free of charge and open to all 
interested parties. Regarding their composition, there was no formal balance between sectors 
or regions. However, the RSB Secretariat aimed to maintain an overall balance in order to 
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prevent single interest groups from capturing the process (interview with several members of 
the RSB Secretariat). 
 
The more in-depth analysis of the standard-setting process revealed that the single WGs had 
memberships of 77 (WG Environmental Impacts), 64 (WG GHG), 70 (WG Social Impacts), 
and 71 (WG Implementation), respectively (RSB, 2007a, 2007d). Information giving a more 
detailed breakdown of the WGs could be obtained for the WG Environmental and WG Social 
Impacts (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Composition of the RSB’s Standard-Setting Bodies (percent) 
 
 
Based on RSB 2007a, 2007b  
 
Unfortunately, the available data does not allow for an exact breakdown of the WG members’ 
geographical origin. One document mentions that  organisations from 45 countries 
participated in the work of the WGs (RSB, 2011e). Information obtained from the interviews 
suggests that, despite a bias toward organisations from the global north, there was 
nevertheless substantial participation from organisations from the global south. 
 
Communication among the members of the WGs took place via teleconferences and through 
a so-called Bioenergy Wiki. Openly accessible to the public, the Bioenergy Wiki is a website 
which contains detailed documentation of the standard-setting process in the RSB, including 
meeting minutes of the WGs as well as background documents (Bioenergy Wiki, website).  
 
Taken together, the process leading to Version Zero of the RSB Principles and Criteria 
involved more than 50 WG teleconferences and four stakeholder outreach meetings in Brazil, 
30%
25%
45%
23%
35%
42%
civil society
economic
others
Social Impacts 
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China, South Africa, and India (RSB, 2008a). In August 2008, the twelve principles and 
related criteria of Version Zero were formally adopted by the FSB. Following the guidelines 
of the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance, 
an association defining standards of good practices for private standard-setting organisations, 
the standard was then made available for public scrutiny and comments (RSB, 2009). During 
the consultations, the RSB Secretariat organised 15 stakeholder outreach meetings around the 
globe and received comments via phone and its website. Furthermore, the Kluyver Centre for 
Genomics of Industrial Fermentation in Delft, Netherlands was commissioned to conduct an 
expert workshop to review the RSB standard (Kluyver Centre, 2008). Documentation about 
stakeholder engagement during this period provides evidence that nearly 900 individuals and 
organisations from over 40 countries participated in the feedback process to improve Version 
Zero of the RSB standard (RSB, 2009). 
 
4.3.3 The Formal Organisation  
In January 2009, the RSB was launched as a membership organisation with a formal 
governance structure. The FSB and the four WGs were dissolved and replaced by a formally 
elected SB and a corresponding chamber system. Later, three expert groups on genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), GHGs, and indirect impacts were formed to work out the 
technical details of the RSB Principles and Criteria. Initially, the chamber system consisted of 
eleven stakeholder chambers. The private sector was represented by four chambers and 
environmental and social groups by a further six. The eleventh chamber, comprising 
government agencies, IOs, consultancy firms, academics and certification agencies, was set 
up as a non-voting chamber. Early in 2010, a decision was made to reduce the number of 
stakeholder chambers from eleven to seven. The revised chamber structure consisted of three 
industry chambers, three civil society chambers, and the former chamber 11 as a non-voting 
chamber (see Figure 12) (RSB, 2011e: 3f.). 
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Figure 12: Organisational Chart of the RSB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the four key stakeholder groups (civil society north, civil society south, industry north, 
and industry south) identified in Chapter 2, Figure 13 provides a detailed breakdown of the 
RSB SB. It shows that it maintained a careful balance between industry and civil society 
actors as well as organisations from both the global north and south. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSB Stakeholder Chambers 
Eleven Chamber System (January 2009 – April 2010) 
1. Farmers and growers of biofuel feedstocks  
2. Industrial biofuel producers  
3. Retailers/blenders and the transportation industry  
4. Banks/investors  
5. Rights-based NGOs 
6. Rural development and food security organisations  
7. Environment and conservation organisations  
8. Climate change and policy organisations  
9. Trade unions  
10. Smallholder and indigenous peoples’ organisations  
11. IGOs, governments, standard-setters, specialist advisory 
agencies, certification agencies, and consultants (non-voting 
chamber) 
 
Seven Chamber System (since April 2010) 
1. Farmers and growers of biofuel feedstocks  
2. Industrial biofuel producers  
3. Retailers/blenders, the transportation industry, 
banks/investors  
4. Rights-based NGOs and trade unions  
5. Rural development, food security organisations, 
smallholder farmer organisations, indigenous 
peoples' organisations and community-based civil 
society organisations  
6. Environmental NGOs, climate change and policy 
organisations 
7. IGOs, governments, standard-setters, specialist advisory 
agencies, certification agencies, and consultants (non-voting 
chamber)  
RSB Steering Board 
Primary decision-making body, comprises 
up to two representatives from each 
chamber + RSB Executive Secretary 
RSB Secretariat 
-  Based at EPFL Energy  
    Center 
- Day-to-day management 
 
 
 
  
 Expert Groups  
- GMOs  
- GHGs 
- Indirect impacts 
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Figure 13: Composition of the RSB’s Primary Decision-Making Body (percent)22 
 
In the formal organisation, decision-making proceeds in two stages. In a first stage, a decision 
about an agenda item is reached at the chamber-level. All members of the RSB belong to one 
of the seven stakeholder chambers. In January 2014, the RSB had 102 members. See Figure 
14 for a detailed breakdown of the composition of the RSB membership.  
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 This figure has been composed from the meeting minutes of the RSB SB. To this end, members have been 
identified as either belonging to one of the following categories: Industry, civil society, or others. Then, the 
location of their home institution’s headquarter has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north 
or global south).   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2008
(FSB)
2009
(SB)
2010
(SB)
2011
(SB)
civil society north
civil society south
economic north
economic south
others
121 
 
Figure 14: Composition of the Membership of the RSB (percent)23 
 
Chamber meetings are held via teleconference or in person and have a quorum if at least 25 
percent of its membership or three members, whichever is highest, participate. Chambers 
reach their decisions by consensus. However, if in a third consecutive meeting no consensus 
can be reached regarding a particular agenda item, then decisions may be reached by a vote 
of two-thirds of the members present (RSB, 2010i). In a second stage, the agenda item is 
passed on to the SB. The composition of the SB follows from the chamber structure. Each 
chamber elects up to two representatives, known as co-chairs, who represent the chamber at 
the SB-level. Like the FSB before it, the SB meets several times a year via teleconference or 
in person and is deemed to be quorate if at least 60 percent of its members are present. 
Similar to decision-making in the chambers, the SB strives to reach consensus. However, in 
the case of deadlock (i.e. no consensus in a third consecutive meeting) a decision can be 
reached by a vote of two-thirds of the voting members present (RSB, 2010i). 
 
Throughout 2009 and 2010, the RSB continued its standard-setting activities and stakeholders 
amended and refined the RSB Principles and Criteria Version Zero in various chamber 
teleconferences. In November 2009, Version 1.0 of the RSB Principles and Criteria was 
formally adopted by the SB and field-tested in projects in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The 
lessons learned from the pilot projects and the feedback from a second public consultation 
                                                          
23
 This figure has been composed from the membership list provided on the RSB website 
(http://rsb.org/about/organization/rsb-members/, January 2014). To this end, members have been identified as 
either belonging to one of the following categories: economic, civil society, or others. Then, the location of their 
home institution’s headquarter has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north or global south).   
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period were then worked into the standard (RSB, 2011d). In November 2010, Version 2.0 of 
the RSB Principles and Criteria were formally adopted. Shortly after, in March 2011, the 
RSB launched its certification system. See Figure 15 for an overview of the institutional 
development of the RSB.  
 
Figure 15: Institutional Development of the RSB (2006-2011) 
 
 
4.3.4 Assessing Inclusiveness  
Using the qualitative indicators developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1), this section assesses 
the inclusiveness of the RSB’s standard-setting and decision-making arrangements. To this 
end, their openness, composition, and the design of their constitutive rules are examined.  
 
Standard-setting in the RSB was initially organised in four WGs on environmental impacts, 
social impacts, GHGs, and implementation. The WGs were formed in mid-2007 and over the 
course of the next year drafted the principles and criteria of the RSB standard. Access to the 
standard-setting process was open to all interested parties and some 282 organisations and 
individuals participated in the formulation of the RSB Principles and Criteria Version Zero. 
At a later stage, standard-setting took place in a carefully balanced chamber system, 
involving all members of the RSB. In addition, three expert groups were formed to work out 
the technical details of the standard. After Version Zero of the standard was completed the 
RSB followed the guidelines of the ISEAL Alliance and opened its standard for two public 
consultation periods. Furthermore, a global outreach programme was conducted. This 
consultation process exposed the standard to a wider group of stakeholders, providing them 
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with the opportunity to give feedback and to provide comments. However, there were no 
clear guidelines as to how and to what extent the RSB SB had to incorporate this input. 
 
Decisions about the standard and other organisational matters were initially reached by the 
FSB, an ad hoc group of people who had volunteered at the organisation’s foundational 
meeting. Then, when the RSB became a formal organisation in January 2009, the FSB was 
replaced by a formally elected SB and a corresponding chamber system. The above analysis 
of the compositions of these bodies showed that they maintained a careful balance between 
industry and civil society actors as well as organisations from the global north and the global 
south. Also, the collective choice rules of the RSB are designed in a way that ensures that 
economic actors cannot capture the process. In this regard, the two-third majority rule for 
decisions at the SB-level give civil society actors a blocking minority.  
 
Overall, the RSB can be characterised as a private governance institution with a highly 
inclusive design. Its standard-setting and decision-making arrangements are open and 
balanced. Furthermore, its collective choice rules protect the rule-setting process against the 
possibility of regulatory capture. See Table 15 for a summary of the inclusiveness of the 
RSB.   
 
Table 15: Inclusiveness of the RSB (Overview) 
Standard-setting 
arrangement 
Working Groups  
Membership rules Open  
Composition Balanced 
Consultation mechanism  Yes 
Primary Decision-making 
arrangement  
 
Steering Board (Founding Steering Board) 
Membership rules Restricted to members  
Composition Balanced 
Collective choice rules Protection against regulatory capture  
(civil society actors possess a blocking minority) 
Secondary Decision-making 
arrangement 
 
Stakeholder Chambers 
Membership rules Open  
(membership fees depending on size and stakeholder 
category) 
Composition Balanced 
Collective choice rules Protection against regulatory capture (via their 
representatives civil society chambers can block decisions at 
the SB-level) 
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4.4 Tracing the Diffusion Process  
Why has the RSB adopted highly inclusive structures, whereas other MSIs in the agriculture 
sector are significantly less participatory? To explain this variation in diffusion outcomes, 
this section traces the diffusion of the MSI institutional model to the biofuels sector.  
 
Diffusion is the study of why and how norms, ideas, and practices spread across time and 
space. According to common wisdom, diffusion processes lead to institutional isomorphism 
or convergence. States and organisations become more similar over time as they imitate and 
learn from those whom they know and perceive as successful. While diffusion often does 
have an isomorphic effect, there are numerous studies that have shown that it is not a 
“neutral” process of transmitting ideas from a point of origin to a point of adoption.24 For 
example, Börzel and Risse (2011) find that the diffusion of the European Union (EU) model 
has led to significant variation in institutional and behavioural outcomes among adopters. In a 
similar way, the works of Falkner and Gupta (2009) and Radaelli (2005) point to diffusion 
processes that led to only limited degrees of convergence. In sum, these studies suggest that 
diffusion often transforms the elements that are being transmitted.  
 
In order to investigate the institutional diffusion and variation of private participatory 
governance, Chapter 2 developed a framework that distinguishes three stages in the diffusion 
process: source selection, transmission, and adoption (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4). For each 
of these stages, hypotheses were formulated about the cause-and-effect relationships that 
make diffusion outcomes vary. The starting point for the analysis is the assumption that the 
designers of the RSB did not create their organisation from scratch. Instead, uncertain about 
legitimate forms and trying to save time and resources, they turned toward existing MSIs in 
other fields in order to imitate their structures and to learn from their experiences. The 
analysis proceeds by explaining the specific diffusion outcome for this case through an in-
depth analysis of the diffusion process, namely the selection of target institutions, the 
transmission process, and the adoption process (institutional bargaining and environmental 
pressures).   
 
To this end, the empirical analysis can draw on 18 semi-structured interviews conducted with 
members and observers of the RSB process. Furthermore, a complete set of meeting minutes 
                                                          
24
 See Klinger Vidra and Schleifer (forthcoming) for a detailed overview.  
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of the FSB/SB is available for the years 2007-2011. Meeting minutes are also available from 
the meetings of the stakeholder chambers held during 2009-2011.  
 
4.4.1 Causes  
Consistent with the underlying diffusion model, the creators of the RSB did not design their 
organisation from scratch. Instead, they turned to already-established initiatives in other 
fields for inspiration and to learn from their experiences. Also consistent with diffusion 
“theory”, the interview material and meeting minutes suggest two sets of motives for 
imitating the institutional design of other schemes. Firstly, the creators of the RSB hoped to 
thus save time and resources. For example, the meeting minutes of the RSB stakeholder 
workshop held in Lausanne in November 2006 mention the need to “[b]uild on pre-existing 
initiatives [to] make sure we don’t reinvent the wheel” (RSB, 2006: 5). This motive was also 
reflected in several of the interviews conducted with members of the FSB. In this regard, one 
FSB member stated:  
 
“There were others who had done similar things before us and we wanted to get off 
the ground as quick as possible. Obviously, we drew on their experiences” (interview 
with a member of the FSB). 
 
However, saving time and resources was not the only motive for engaging in 
interorganisational imitation and learning. There was also uncertainty among the creators of 
the RSB about what constitutes a “good” design and fears of making the wrong institutional 
design choices. In this regard, the meetings minutes of the RSB foundational workshop 
describe the need to avoid governance mistakes at the beginning of the process which could 
compromise its legitimacy at later stages (RSB, 2006: 2). Providing further evidence for 
uncertainty being an important driver behind processes of institutional diffusion in the RSB, 
one of the interviewees explained:  
 
“We couldn't really assume that we knew the best way by our own so we were trying 
to learn as much as possible from the experience of the ones that came before us” 
(interview with a member of the FSB). 
 
Consistent with the institutional diffusion path, these motives led the founders of the RSB to 
imitate and learn from the experience of familiar and prestigious MSIs in other fields.  
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4.4.2 Source Selection 
The selection of a target institution or source marks the beginning of the diffusion process. A 
choice has to be made about whom to imitate, learn from, etc. Standard diffusion models 
assume the existence of a single central source. Often, however, multiple sources exist. When 
multiple sources are available institutional variation can occur as designers select different 
source models for imitation. These choices depend on factors such as familiarity, spatial 
proximity, and perceptions about the prestige of the target institution. Against this 
background, it was hypothesised that:  
 
H1: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if the primary target 
institution exhibits a high (low) level of inclusiveness.  
 
To empirically examine this claim, interviews and primary documents will be used in order to 
establish which organisations served new adopters as a primary source model. 
 
For the case at hand, very close network ties could be detected between the founding 
members of the RSB and the FSC. Established in the early 1990s in the forestry sector, the 
FSC is one of the oldest and best-established environmental MSIs. The scheme is widely 
known for its highly participatory structures. Its board is divided into a social, an 
environmental, and an economic chamber and strikes a careful balance between organisations 
from the global north and south. Furthermore, the scheme features a quasi-parliamentary 
assembly of all its members which convenes annually (FSC, website).  
 
Through the interviews and a review of the board meeting minutes, five members of the FSB 
could be identified who had close connections to the FSC (interviews with various members 
of the FSB). At some point in their careers, these individuals had either sat on the board of 
the FSC or otherwise been closely involved with the forestry initiative. Among them was the 
former Director General of FSC International, who participated in the FSB from its first 
meeting in May 2007 (RSB, 2007e). The interviews and meeting minutes revealed that he 
played an important role in advising the other members of the FSB in questions of 
governance and standard-setting. For example, in 2008, he became a member of a 
“governance committee” charged with developing a formal governance structure for the RSB 
(RSB, 2008b).  
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Besides close network ties, there was also a strong perception among the members of the FSB 
that the FSC was a successful institution. In this regard, the founding head of the RSB 
Secretariat stated in an interview that “the FSC was seen as the most successful standards 
initiative with the biggest market share, global reach, and respected among industry, NGOs, 
and governments. It also was the oldest, so it had the longest track record in terms of the 
lessons that we could draw from it”. In a similar vein, a member of the FSB explained that 
“the FSC clearly was a key driver for the RSB. We had many people with experience with the 
FSC who knew that this was a robust system that works. We agreed that we wanted to go in 
this direction” (interview with a member of the FSB). 
 
Although the FSC was the primary target institution for the RSB, it was not the only one. Its 
designers also looked at the RSPO and its design. Network ties to the RSPO were less strong 
when compared to the FSC, only one individual could be identified with direct links to the 
palm oil roundtable. However, this individual was also a member of the above-mentioned 
governance committee which played a key role in launching the RSB as a formal 
organisation. Also, there is evidence of direct contacts between the secretariats of the two 
organisations (RSB, 2008c: 3). As diffusion theory would predict (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz 
& Wasserman, 1989; Haunschild, 1993), these close network ties between the RSB and the 
FSC and RSPO facilitated a process of institutional diffusion between the three organisations. 
In this regard, the analysis of meeting minutes of the RSB SB revealed some twenty passages 
in which references were made to the FSC in discussions about institutional design and 
standards (e.g.  RSB, 2006: 4; 2007c; RSB, 2008b: 18,19; 2008d: 2, 3; 2008e: 3). References 
were also made to the RSPO and its design but these were less frequent (e.g. RSB, 2007e: 2; 
2008b: 6; 2008c: 3). The importance of the FSC and RSPO as target institutions was 
confirmed by the founding head of the RSB Secretariat. In an interview she explained that the 
RSB was “built on other certification systems such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil” (Volans, 2010). 
 
In sum, the process analysis revealed that the founders of the RSB had very close network 
ties to the FSC and somewhat looser ties to the RSPO. In particular, the forestry initiative 
served them as an important reference institution in discussions about institutional design and 
standards. Thus, in support of Hypothesis 1 (the selection of the primary target institution 
influences the diffusion outcome), a correlation could be established between the high level 
of inclusiveness of the FSC and the RSB. 
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4.4.3 Transmission 
Once a target institution, or institutions, is selected, a diffusion mechanism transmits 
information about the source model to the point of adoption. In Chapter 2, different types of 
diffusion mechanisms were discussed. It was argued that when imitation is the primary 
diffusion mechanism, then a close replication of the source model is the expected outcome. In 
contrast, learning can introduce variation. Variation occurs as adopters draw lessons from 
their experiences and the experiences of others. In doing so, they may find that some aspects 
of the source model are suboptimal for their purposes and make modifications accordingly 
(selective imitation). Also, they may combine the lessons learned at different places and thus 
synthesise new practices. The outcomes of learning processes are inherently difficult to 
predict a priori. They depend on a range of factors which are often case specific. They are 
likely to depend on the past experiences, information available, and interpretations of the 
adopter, as well as the situation and context in which the learning process takes place. 
Although difficult to predict, learning processes leave empirical “traces” (e.g. reflections 
about the pros and cons of a model) which can be examined through interviews and primary 
documents (e.g. meeting minutes, project proposals). Against this background it was 
hypothesised that:  
 
H2: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if adopters learn that 
inclusiveness was good (bad) for the success of prior adopters. 
 
The process analysis revealed that the founders of the RSB drew lessons from the experience 
of the FSC and other MSIs when creating the organisational structures of the biofuels 
roundtable. The dominant interpretation among the group of adopters was that the FSC’s 
inclusiveness was one of the main reasons behind its organisational success. They perceived 
the forestry initiative as a credible and robust system and traced this back to the scheme’s 
highly participatory approach. For example, in the interviews it was described how in the 
FSC conflicts among stakeholders were mostly solved internally, whereas other schemes had 
done less well in crisis situations. In this context several interviewees mentioned the MSC 
(interviews with members of the FSB). The MSC came out of a bilateral partnership between 
Unilever and the WWF and was heavily criticised for not involving other stakeholder groups. 
The ensuing conflict between the MSC, fishermen, and civil society groups brought the 
scheme to the brink of failure, something the founders of the RSB wanted to avoid. Against 
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this background, one interviewee, who was a member of the above-mentioned governance 
committee, stated: 
 
“We knew stakeholder engagement would happen, either within the context of an 
organised platform or on the title page of the New York Times. (…) There are several 
initiatives that have tried to find a shortcut, but there is no shortcut” (interview with 
members of the FSB). 
 
Notably, the composition of the RSB’s decision-making arrangements, with their careful 
balance between industry and civil society groups as well as organisations from the global 
north and global south can be traced back to the forestry initiative. For example, during a 
meeting of the SB in June 2008, the FSC and its design were discussed in detail. In the 
discussion, the FSC’s participatory approach in particular was identified as an essential 
feature.   
 
“In the FSC, participatory governance was extremely important. This does not mean 
you have to have equal balance in all decisions, but you can't marginalize a group just 
because they are not in the room” (RSB, 2008b: 19). 
 
However, the members of the FSB did not simply replicate the FSC for the biofuels sector. 
For example, the RSB does not feature a quasi-parliamentary assembly like the FSC. The 
interview material suggests that resource constraints (organising an annual meeting of all 
members involves considerable costs) were the main reason behind this design decision 
(interview with the Director of the EPFL Energy Center). Also, as evidenced by the meeting 
minutes, they learned from the FSC experience that is was important to distinguish between 
firms occupying different positions in the supply.  
 
“FSC's industry members felt that they should separate out their different interests - 
there is a wide diversity of opinions amongst producers, buyers, regions, etc.” (RSB, 
2008d: 3). 
 
To learn about alternatives, contact was established with the secretariat of the RSPO (RSB, 
2008c). In contrast to the FSC, with its three-chamber system (environmental, social, and 
economic), the RSPO features seven stakeholder chambers (oil palm growers, palm oil 
processors/traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, banks/investors, environmental 
NGOs, and social NGOs) (RSPO, website-b). To advise the RSB, a member of the RSPO 
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secretariat participated in several meetings of the SB during 2008 and helped the founding 
group to design a governance structure for the RSB (RSB, 2008b). The idea of separating out 
stakeholder groups was taken up by the first governance committee. To define stakeholder 
categories, a survey was conducted among the members of the RSB WGs. In the 
questionnaire WG members had to provide details about their organisations and specify their 
interest and engagement in the biofuel sector. On that basis, the members of the governance 
committee distinguished eleven stakeholder groups which became the basis for the eleven 
chamber system (interview with a member of the governance committee). 
 
In sum, providing support for Hypothesis 2 (learning can influence the diffusion outcome), 
traces of a learning process could be uncovered. Looking at the FSC and its experience, the 
founders of the RSB came to believe that the scheme’s highly participatory approach was 
essential for its overall success. However, in other areas they diverged from the forestry 
initiative. In this regard, they learned that it was necessary to distinguish between firms 
occupying different positions in the supply chain and, in search of alternatives, turned toward 
the RSPO and its design.  
 
4.4.4 Adoption 
The adoption of the diffusion item marks the end of the diffusion process. In the broader 
diffusion literature this process is often described in a somewhat mechanistic way in which 
potential adopters make a decision to either accept or reject a diffusion item (Rogers, 1995: 
364). However, a closer consideration of the issue suggests that adoption is not simply a ‘yes 
or no’ decision.  
 
Institutional Bargaining 
Multi-stakeholder processes are political arenas in which struggles over influence and 
diverging interests take place. When firms and NGOs collaborate to create new MSIs they 
typically differ sharply over the structure and governance of these schemes and the scope and 
content of their standards and procedures. As the primary targets of private regulation, 
corporate actors in particular will try to maximise their control over the regulatory process. 
Against this background, it was hypothesised that: 
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H3: the diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if corporate actors are in weak 
(strong) bargaining position.  
 
To examine this claim, the empirical analysis identifies and describes processes of 
institutional bargaining during the adoption phase. Then, the distribution of bargaining power 
in these situations is examined. 
 
For the case at hand, the process analysis uncovered how stakeholder groups in the RSB 
bargained fiercely over the structure and governance of the scheme and the scope and content 
of its standards. These conflicts were found to be rooted in deep-seated differences over 
regulatory outcomes. In particular, big differences existed between civil society actors on the 
one hand and producer groups from the global south on the other.  
 
As the primary targets of regulation, producer groups in the RSB were strongly concerned 
about the costs of private sustainability standards. Repeatedly, they complained about the 
complexity and stringency of the RSB Principle and Criteria and demanded that changes 
should be made. As evidenced by the meeting minutes, dissatisfaction with the RSB and its 
standard was particularly high among biofuel producers (Chamber 2). Members of this group 
complained that “the standard should be changed in a way that it works in the real world and 
that it can make a difference in the world” (RSB, 2010b: 3). Others considered any extra 
costs arising from sustainability certification as not acceptable and as posing an unacceptable 
risk to their businesses (RSB, 2010b: 4). Similar issues were raised during meetings of 
Chamber 1 (feedstock growers) (RSB, 2010a). On various occasions, these upstream firms 
tried to push back on standards and aired concerns about the regulatory process. This is not 
surprising, given that these firms bear the majority of costs arising from private sustainability 
certification. They have to pay membership and auditing fees and often face considerable 
indirect costs as they have to bring their operations into compliance with the standard. 
 
On the other hand, civil society actors in the RSB pushed for higher standards. Different 
NGOs prioritised different issues. For example, social NGOs pushed for labour standards and 
wanted to see the rights of local communities protected, whereas environmental NGOs were 
more concerned with issues such as pesticide use and indirect land use change (interviews 
with NGO representatives). However, for the most part, civil society actors in the RSB were 
united in their demand for a comprehensive and stringent standard and repeatedly clashed 
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with producer groups from the global south over these questions (RSB, 2010g: 3-4). 
Downstream firms (economic north) in the RSB positioned themselves somewhere in 
between the two camps. Depending on the issue at stake, they would either support the NGO 
position or that of the producer groups. The interview material suggests several reasons for 
this. Firstly, as corporate consumers, downstream firms are not certified by the RSB and 
therefore do not face any direct costs. Secondly, large multinational companies like BP and 
Shell can use their market power to force upstream producers to absorb most of the costs 
arising from private sustainability certification. Thirdly, highly visible downstream 
companies have a strong interest in the level of assurance and reputational protection a 
private governance arrangement is able to provide. MSIs with stringent standards and strong 
participation from NGOs can provide higher reputational benefits than lenient schemes 
(interview with an industry representative). However, at the same time, these companies are 
for-profit actors and do not have an interest in overly strict regulation. 
 
These differences over regulatory outcomes translated into concerns about the design of the 
RSB’s standard-setting and decision-making arrangements. In particular, the group of 
biofuels producers felt that the existing governance structure was to their disadvantage. In an 
interview, one of the co-chairs of Chamber 2 expressed particular concerns about bloc voting 
behaviour among civil society chambers. She explained that “often, we have chambers which 
are voting on items that they do not understand, but they decide to vote with other chambers 
from which they believe that they share similar views”. Driven by these concerns about NGO 
influence, producer groups challenged the institutional status quo in the RSB. Interestingly, 
however, bargaining over questions of governance only occurred after a formal structure had 
been put place. In contrast, the initial design process was found to be largely uncontentious. 
 
It was in late 2007 when discussions in the RSB first turned toward the issue of governance. 
Until then, the RSB had been governed by the FSB, an ad hoc group of people who had 
volunteered at the initiative’s foundational meeting in November 2006. As the organisation 
evolved and the standard-setting process was launched, the members of the FSB began 
discussing the necessity of providing the RSB with a formal governance structure.  
 
“[T]he more we communicate, the more people who ask on whose behalf we are 
communicating, and request some clear governance structure” (RSB, 2007b: 8).  
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The issue received further attention during subsequent board meetings. Whereas some felt 
that it was important to quickly formalise the RSB, others feared that “roundtables are very 
slow when they start with governance” (RSB, 2007b: 8). However, most FSB members 
agreed that a formal structure and procedures were needed and at a meeting in June 2008 a 
decision was made to move forward with the issue. To this end, a governance committee was 
formed and charged with developing a proposal for a formal governance structure. 
Participation in the governance committee was open to all members of the FSB, but those 
who volunteered were mostly people with previous experience of multi-stakeholder 
regulation. In fact, only one industry representative volunteered to serve on the committee 
(RSB, 2008b). In the following months, the committee conducted a survey among the 
members of the RSB WGs which was used to identify stakeholder categories and to develop 
a chamber system for the RSB (interview with members of the governance committee). In 
October 2008, the governance committee presented its proposal to the FSB which approved it 
unanimously (RSB, 2008d). In its final version, the governance committee’s proposal 
recommended the creation of eleven stakeholder chambers: six civil society chambers, four 
industry chambers, and one non-voting chamber for government agencies, IGOs, consultancy 
firms, academics, and certification agencies (see Figure 12). The composition of the newly 
created SB followed from the chamber structure. Each chamber elected up to two 
representatives, called co-chairs, who represented the chamber at the SB-level. 
 
In January 2009, the eleven chamber system came into effect and the RSB was launched as a 
formal membership organisation. It was also during 2009 when the RSB membership base 
increased rapidly. In particular, feedstock growers and biofuel producers joined the initiative. 
They soon became the largest constituency groups, with Chamber 1 and 2 soon counting 
more than 30 members (interview with one of co-chairs of Chamber 2). These companies 
joined the RSB at a time in which the organisation’s governance structure had already been 
formalised, putting civil society actors in a strong position (they controlled six out of the ten 
voting chambers). Worried about the level of NGO influence, and that the resulting standard 
would turn out to be too demanding and costly to implement, upstream industry actors began 
to challenge the institutional status quo in the RSB. In autumn 2009, Chamber 2 wrote a letter 
to the SB, requesting that the eleven chamber system be revised. Their position was that 
voting power in the RSB should more strongly reflect actual participation. In this regard, it 
was argued that many of the civil society chambers had only very few members and that they 
often failed to reach a quorum during their meetings. In an interview, one of the co-chairs of 
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Chamber 2 stated that “we did not think it was fair that a chamber with thirty members had 
the same vote, which is one vote, as a chamber with four members”. Not surprisingly, the 
group of civil society organisations strongly disagreed with the biofuel producers’ demand 
for more influence over the decision-making process. They pointed out that many NGOs are 
umbrella organisations, representing many members:  
 
“[J]ust having more members isn’t a fair measure either, since a single organization 
may represent more stakeholders in the field than another entire chamber has 
members. For example this is the case for some member–based NGOs, representing 
several hundreds of villagers over broad geographic areas” (RSB, 2010f: 3). 
 
The conflict over governance dominated much of the internal debate in 2010 and at some 
point a decision was made to put the RSB’s other activities on hold until a solution was found 
(RSB, 2010f). During the often heated discussions at the SB-level, the group of biofuel 
producers threatened that “if the governance in the RSB is not changed to its satisfaction, 
some members of Chamber 2 will get out” (RSB, 2010f: 3). In fact, several members of 
Chamber 2, among them the European Biodiesel Board and the European Bioethanol 
Association, announced their resignation during this period and left the RSB (Biofuel Digest, 
2010; European Biodiesel Board, 2010).  
 
In an attempt to overcome the crisis, a second governance committee was established. This 
time a careful balance was maintained between industry and civil society actors as well as 
organisations from the global north and south (RSB, 2010f). In its reform proposal, the 
committee recommenced reducing the number of stakeholder chambers from eleven to seven. 
The new structure would consist of three civil society chambers, three industry chambers, and 
the former Chamber 11 as a non-voting chamber. However, the seven chamber system also 
did not find support among the biofuel producers. Instead, they proposed to merge civil 
society Chamber 4 (land, water, human and labour rights NGOs, and trade unions) and 5 
(rural development, food security, and community-based organisations), arguing that these 
chambers had very few members. Again, the group of NGOs, supported by many of the 
downstream firms in the RSB, opposed the idea. In a statement, the representatives of 
Chamber 4 and 5 criticised that they “see the proposal as a step backward for their 
constituencies returning to the ‘top-down’ approach, which denies the rights of small-scale 
and vulnerable stakeholders” (RSB, 2010d: 21).  
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At a meeting of the SB in November 2010, Chamber 2 made a last attempt to renegotiate the 
constitutional rules of the RSB. It proposed to merge all existing chambers into a unique 
private sector chamber, a unique civil society chamber, and a third non-voting chamber for 
government agencies, IGOs, consultancy firms, academics, and certification agencies. 
Furthermore, the proposal included a method for resolving deadlocks through a two-thirds 
majority vote of all voting members present (RSB, 2010e). But again, NGOs and many of the 
downstream industry actors in the RSB opposed the idea of a three chamber system. They 
argued that “reducing stakeholders to 3 total and only 2 voting chambers would impact the 
‘roundtable’ spirit of the RSB by effectively making it a ‘triangle’ discussion, with a 
consequent polarization of discussions and members” (RSB, 2010d: 21). Furthermore, 
concerns were expressed that “the deadlock breaking method would turn RSB decision-
making into a numbers game – the group mustering the most members would win. That is 
contrary to the spirit of multi-stakeholder roundtables, where all voices are entitled to 
consideration regardless of their numbers” (RSB, 2010d: 21). Eventually, Chamber 2’s 
proposal was voted down at the SB-level and the seven chamber system was confirmed as the 
new structure of the RSB (RSB, 2010e).  
 
Unsuccessful in renegotiating the control rules, upstream industry actors in the RSB began to 
directly challenge the content and design of the RSB’s certification system. In November 
2010, the standard-setting process was nearing completion and discussion in the RSB turned 
toward the rolling out of the certification system. In this context, a proposal was made to 
introduce a two-tiered certification scheme. The first tier should consist of a less 
comprehensive, entry-level version and the second tier of the full RSB standard. The 
rationale behind the two-tiered certification system was to increase the RSB’s 
competitiveness on the European biofuel certification market. At the time, other biofuel 
certification schemes were already operational and it was feared that the more demanding 
RSB standard would deter economic operators from becoming RSB certified (RSB, 2010e: 
12).  
 
Over the following months, the discussion about the two-tiered certification system 
developed into a more general debate about the RSB and its standard. On one side of the 
debate, feedstock growers and biofuel producers were strongly in favour of the two-tiered 
certification system (interviews with members of Chamber 1 and 2). However, they opposed 
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the idea of a mandatory transition mechanism which would have obliged them to transition to 
tier two (the full RSB standard) after a period of three years. It was argued that the full 
standard was too demanding and that there was no market demand for RSB certified 
products. In this regard, a representative of a large Argentinian farmers association stated 
during a chamber conference call that “if RSB asks farmers to commit to adoption of RSB 
full standard (Tier 2) after three years, then most farmers will not sign it” (RSB, 2010a: 2). 
Others argued that“[c]ivil society knew that by signing up, they would have to work with 
industry, and if they stick to ‘you must comply with the full RSB standard,’ participation will 
be nearly non-existent. (…) There is no market in the world today for an RSB certified 
product. (…) It will not be possible to sell the RSB to industry players when there are other 
lower cost options (…)” (RSB, 2010c: 3-4). Overall, the meeting minutes provide evidence 
for the confrontational nature of the discussions during this period: 
 
“It is less important to get consensus with other Chambers than to get the Standard 
right. There was a problem with representation of Chambers in the RSB all along” 
(RSB, 2010b: 3).  
 
On the other side of the debate, civil society actors were concerned that the two-tier 
certification system would effectively result in a watering down of the RSB standard. They 
also feared that the introduction of tier one would create reputational risks for the RSB and 
themselves (interview with NGO representatives). Against this background, strong 
reservations and criticism were expressed against both the two-tier certification system and 
industry’s opposition against a mandatory transition mechanism: 
 
“A few months ago there was no Tier 1, only people that wanted to join the RSB. It 
seems strange that we are going to revise our structure for a whole cadre of producers 
that were not even interested in joining the RSB system a few months ago. (…) If 
companies are not willing to come on board to the full RSB system, even after 3 
years, then perhaps RSB should not exist” (RSB, 2010g: 3-4).  
 
Despite these concerns, civil society actors eventually agreed to the two-tier certification 
system under the condition that a set of “incurable” issues was included. In an interview, a 
member of the RSB Secretariat explained that an issue was considered incurable, if non-
compliance with that issue was irreversible. For example, this is the case when forests are 
137 
 
cleared or basic human rights are violated (interview with a member of the RSB Secretariat). 
Furthermore, civil society actors insisted that a transition to tier two had to be mandatory.  
 
The design and content of the two-tiered certification system remained at the centre of 
discussions throughout 2011. A working group was established to define the details of the 
transition process and several chamber and SB meetings were held to further discuss and 
negotiate the issue. However, there was little room for compromise between the two groups. 
Civil society actors regarded most of the content of the full standard as incurable. In this 
regard, social rights NGOs insisted on the inclusion of human and labour rights and others 
regarded food security and sustainable livelihoods as indispensable (RSB, 2010d). As a 
result, the final proposal for the content of tier one still included eleven out of the twelve 
principles of the full RSB standard (RSB, 2011b: 5). This was not acceptable for the group of 
biofuel producers which continued to oppose a mandatory transition mechanism and any 
extra costs resulting from certification:  
 
“Chamber Two considers any economic disadvantage in the fuel market originating 
form sustainability certification as an incurable. Participating Operators should not be 
demanded to transition to Tier 2 if at the end of the transitional period there is no 
market demand for a product complying with all 12 P&C [Principles and Criteria]. 
Doing so would mean an added cost to producers which they will not be able to 
recover. This is considered by industrial producers as an incurable issue” (RSB, 
2011a: 4). 
 
Eventually, bargaining broke down as no agreement seemed to be possible between the two 
groups. At a SB meeting in June 2011, a decision was made to not further pursue the issue. 
The meeting minutes read that “there is no real interest from potential users in a Tier One that 
imposes limited claims but is not significantly easier to comply with” (RSB, 2011c: 13).  
 
The process analysis uncovered several rounds of institutional bargaining in the RSB. 
Stakeholders bargained over the design of the scheme’s decision-making arrangements and 
the scope and content of its standard. However, bargaining was found to occur relatively late 
in the process, at a time when a formal governance structure was already in place. In other 
words, it was not the dominant mechanism of institutional choice. Only as the standard-
setting process was nearing completion and the costs of certification became more apparent 
did upstream industry actors (biofuel producers and feedstock growers) challenge the 
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institutional status quo in the RSB. However, for the most part, their efforts were 
unsuccessful and did not result in major changes. Still, these conflicts had an effect on 
stakeholder participation in the RSB. In this regard, several producer organisations were 
found to have left the biofuel roundtable.  Why have they decided to exit the RSB instead of 
trying to influence the regulatory outcome from within? The analysis of bargaining power 
and its distribution among stakeholder groups in the RSB helps to shed some light on the 
issue. 
 
In the rational design literature, bargaining power is thought to be an important intervening 
variable which can tilt a design choice in one direction or another. Essentially, its distribution 
determines whose preferences prevail and which institutional outcome is selected (cf. Abbott 
& Snidal, 2009a; Thompson, 2010). Abbott and Snidal (2009a: 72-82) describe how, in the 
context of multi-actor schemes, bargaining power manifests itself in two forms: GIAP and 
“inclusion power”. GIAP refers to the ability of actors to unilaterally meet some or all of their 
goals. For example, a NGO possesses GIAP when it can draw on its normative authority, 
expertise, and independence to unilaterally design a standard that becomes the focal point in a 
particular issue area. In a similar way, firms can use their resources to create self-regulatory 
schemes that deflect criticism but exclude non-business stakeholders. Thus, GIAP creates an 
“outside option” for independent action. On the other hand, as the term implies, inclusion 
power creates an “inside option” for participation in collaborative schemes. Actors have 
inclusion power when they possess competencies or resources which others need in order to 
achieve their objectives. For example, business actors may find it necessary to include a NGO 
in their scheme because they need its independence and normative authority to legitimise 
their activities. Similarly, NGOs may find it necessary to include a firm in their scheme 
because of its market share and expertise. 
 
In the case at hand, it can be assumed that producer groups possessed a significant amount of 
GIAP (or more accurately go-with-others-power). In this regard, the RSB was not the only 
certification scheme operating in the biofuel industry at the time. Around 2011, when 
bargaining peaked in the RSB, there were several more industry-friendly schemes like the 
ISCC available to them (Ponte, 2013). The existence of these “institutional alternatives” 
created viable outside options for producer groups in the RSB. When their attempts to 
renegotiate the RSB’s governance structure and standard were met with resistance, many of 
them opted for these cheaper alternatives as evidenced by the RSB’s slow market uptake 
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(Schleifer, 2013). In this regard, one member of the producer constituency stated in an 
interview: 
 
“You know, the world moves on and we move on without you if you do not keep up 
with us. There is almost an industry of certifications schemes out there.” 
 
Also, and not anticipated by Abbot’s and Sindal’s model, the bargaining position of producer 
groups in the RSB was constrained by the set of collective choice rules already in place when 
bargaining began. In this regard, civil society actors controlled six out of the then ten voting 
chambers which gave them sufficient “blocking power” to fend off any challenges to the 
institutional status quo. To a large extent, this explains the institutional resilience of the RSB 
despite strong internal challenges.  
 
In sum, the analysis of the adoption process uncovered several rounds of institutional 
bargaining in the RSB. However, institutional bargaining only occurred at a later stage of 
organisational development, when a formal governance structure was already in place. In 
other words, it was not an important mechanism of initial institutional choice. Also, it did not 
result in any major changes to the institutional design of the RSB. This could be explained 
through the blocking power of NGOs and a high level of GIAP of southern producer groups. 
Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that processes of institutional bargaining had a 
significant influence on the institutional design of the RSB.  
 
Coercive Pressures 
The previous sections discovered close network ties between the founders of the RSB and the 
FSC and RSPO. It was described how they used these initiatives as templates when creating 
their organisation and how they learned from their experiences. Also, processes of 
institutional bargaining were examined and how producers groups – worried about the level 
of NGO influence – challenged the institutional status quo in the RSB. However, the RSB 
and its design cannot be fully understood without considering the wider institutional 
environment in which the scheme was initiated.  
 
In Chapter 2, a distinction was made between normative and coercive environmental 
pressures. It was argued that the group of late adopters are likely to be subject to the same 
normative pressures and that this can have an isomorphic effect on them. On the other hand, 
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there is reason to believe that coercive pressures may well vary across industry sectors and 
schemes. With a focus on transnational activist campaigns, it was argued that strong coercive 
pressures will lead to a more inclusive diffusion outcome. This is because in these 
environments business actors are likely to be more willing to engage with civil society actors 
in the context of MSIs. Also, advocacy groups may put pressure on the founders of new MSIs 
to adopt a more inclusive approach. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
 
H4: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if coercive pressures at the 
point of adoption are strong (weak). 
 
To examine this hypothesis, a background analysis about the environmental conditions during 
the adoption process will be conducted. Therefore, the empirical analysis will draw on media 
reports, NGO reports, and secondary literature. Furthermore, interviews and primary 
documents (e.g. meeting minutes) will be used to examine how adopters perceived their 
institutional environment and how they responded to it. 
 
Through the interviews and a background analysis a strong coercive pressures in the biofuels 
sector could be identified as an important environmental factor influencing institutional 
design choices in the RSB. Having launched their initiative in the midst of the global food 
crisis, the founders of the RSB came to believe that the contentious nature of the biofuels 
debate required an inclusive process in order for such a process to be robust and to produce 
meaningful results.  
 
The launch of the RSB at the end of 2006 coincided with increasing controversy surrounding 
industrial biofuel production and the policies promoting it. In the EU, the first significant step 
to promote biofuels was Directive 2003/30 on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other 
renewable fuels for transport (European Union, 2003). The directive set an indicative, non-
mandatory blending target of 5.75 percent to be reached by 2010. To further promote the 
cause of biofuels, the Commission formulated an EU Strategy for Biofuels in 2006 and in 
2007 published the Renewable Energy Road Map (EU Commission, 2006, 2007). The latter 
proposed a binding target for the use of biofuels in the transport sector of 10 percent, to be 
reached by all member states by 2020. In January 2008, the Commission presented a draft 
directive to the Council and the European Parliament which was formally adopted as 
Directive 2009/28, also known as the EU RED, the following year (European Union, 2009). 
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Enacted in 2009,  the EU RED established a blending mandate for biofuels in the transport 
sector of 10 percent, to be achieved by 2020 (European Union, 2009). This and supporting 
policies at the member state level created one of the world’s largest biofuel markets, with an 
estimated volume of currently 14 billion litres or 4.65 percent of total transport fuels (USDA, 
2013). A similar policy, the Renewables Fuels Standard, had been implemented in the USA a 
year earlier (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, website). 
 
From the beginning, the EU’s and USA’s biofuel policies were highly controversial. When 
scientific evidence emerged that using food crops for biofuels was inefficient and potentially 
damaging for the environment (Nature, 2006), more and more critical news reports about 
biofuels and their impacts appeared in the mainstream media (BBC, 2006; National 
Geographic, 2006; The Guardian, 2005). Around the same time, environmental and social 
NGOs started mobilising against biofuels and the governments and firms promoting their 
production. For example, in 2006, about 100 NGOs published an open letter in which they 
called upon the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to 
“immediately suspend all subsidies and other forms of inequitable support for the import and 
export of biofuels” (Resilience, 2006). Then, public criticism of biofuels increased sharply 
during the global food crisis of 2007/2008, as many blamed biofuels as one of the key drivers 
behind the price hikes occurring in this period (Clapp & Cohen, 2009). As mentioned above, 
at the height of the crisis, Jean Ziegler, then the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
even called biofuels a “crime against humanity” and requested a five-year moratorium on 
their production (The Guardian, 2008b). 
 
Given the EU’s ambitious biofuel targets, public criticism and NGO campaigning activities 
were particularly strong in Europe. Here, a collation of environmental and human rights 
groups, comprising Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, ActionAid, Greenpeace as well as many 
smaller NGOs like Biofuelwatch, Action Against Agrofuels, Agrofools, and Campaign 
Against Climate Change, began campaigning against biofuels (interview with a biofuels 
campaigner). Their activities took various forms. On the one hand, NGO campaigners tried to 
shift the public discourse on biofuels by linking them to the global food crisis, land grabs in 
Africa, and the destruction of rainforests in Latin America and South Asia. To this end, many 
of the more resource-strong groups like Oxfam and Friends of the Earth published reports and 
conducted studies on biofuels and their impact on people and the planet. One example is 
Oxfam’s Another Inconvenient Truth: How Biofuel Policies Are Deepening Poverty and 
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Accelerating Climate Change and its central claim that rich countries’ biofuel policies would 
push 30 million people into poverty (Oxfam International, 2008). The report was widely cited 
and referred to in the mainstream media, including, The Guardian, BBC, and Der Spiegel. 
Also, NGOs were very active in lobbying the EU Commission to reduce its biofuels blending 
mandate and, in particular, to limit the proportion of food-based biofuels. For example, in 
2007, an open letter was sent to the EU Commission protesting against its plans to import 
palm oil based biofuels from Indonesia and Malaysia (World Rainforest Movement, website). 
Furthermore, anti-biofuel activists engaged in direct action against governments and 
companies. For example, in 2008 campaigners from Friends of the Earth, the Campaign 
Against Climate Change, and Biofuelwatch demonstrated outside Downing Street to protest 
against the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation, a policy which introduced a blending 
mandate for biofuels in Britain (Campaign Against Climate Change, website). In the same 
year, the European Biofuels Expo in Nottinghamshire (UK) and the World Biofuels Market 
in Brussels were disrupted as NGO activists blocked entrances, set off rape alarms inside the 
buildings, and displayed protest banners (ASEED, website; The Guardian, 2008a). 
Furthermore, there are press and NGO reports about public shaming activities against single 
companies, including Cargill, Virgin Airlines, Blue NG, and Vopak (Biofuelwatch, website).  
 
It was in this environment that the founders of the RSB held their initial meetings. The 
meeting minutes and interview material allow insights into their thinking at the time, and how 
they interpreted and responded to the situation in the biofuel sector. On the one hand, they 
saw the many problems associated with biofuel production as an important reason to create 
an initiative like the RSB in the first place. On the other hand, they believed that, given the 
highly contentious nature of biofuels, it needed an inclusive process in order for such a 
mechanism to be successful.  
 
In their analysis, the turn toward bioenergy would “transform agriculture and forestry 
worldwide more profoundly than any development since the Green Revolution” (German 
NGO Forum on Environment and Development, 2006c) and at the Bonn Bioenergy 
Conference the “[e]nvironmental and social impacts of bioenergy were a key concern (…). 
Issues such as deforestation, soil depletion, food security, and displacement of populations 
were all discussed” (German NGO Forum on Environment and Development, 2006b). In a 
white paper, which laid out the rationale for creating a sustainability standard and 
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certification programme in the biofuels sector, the EPFL provided a detailed analysis of the 
risks involved:  
 
“An increased demand for biofuels is triggering the expansion of agricultural land, 
with potentially devastating results in some areas. The clearing of land in south-east 
Asia (e.g. Malaysia) for palm oil production is one of the leading causes of rain forest 
destruction in the region. (…) Another often-quoted issue is the competition with food 
agriculture in the case of a significant scale-up of the biofuels production. Making 
biofuels from plants already in demand for food, such as sugar beet, sugar cane, soy, 
corn, and canola/rapeseed, raises the prices of the food versions and reduces available 
supplies” (EPFL, 2006). 
 
In their perception, these risks and the transnational nature of biofuel production required 
“the major stakeholders in business, government and civil society at large to agree on: a 
shared vision, principles to follow, minimum criteria to observe, and the instruments of 
implementation” (German NGO Forum on Environment and Development, 2006c). In other 
words, it required a multi-stakeholder process and certification mechanism which the group 
of people that first met in November 2006 at the EPFL Energy Center agreed to initiate. As 
described in the previous section, the founding members of the RSB had extensive experience 
with multi-stakeholder governance in other sectors. Several members of the founding group 
had been involved in the FSC and RSPO and these initiatives served them as important 
reference points. From the FSC they learned that in the forestry sector stakeholder inclusion 
had proven essential, especially during crisis situations, and it was shown how this lesson had 
informed their institutional design choices. Clearly, however, this learning process cannot be 
considered independently of the context in which the RSB was conceived and initiated. As 
shown below, it is very likely that the designers of the RSB became interested in topics like 
crisis management and the robustness of multi-stakeholder processes because of the highly 
politicised nature of the environment in which they were operating.  
 
In this regard, the interview material reveals how the members of the founding group 
perceived the situation in the biofuels sector and how it affected their thinking about 
launching a multi-stakeholder process in this arena. Asked about the situation in the biofuels 
sector, one of the principal initiators of the RSB at the EPFL Energy Center elaborated on the 
high level of political conflict and ambiguity in the biofuel sector and how it was 
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fundamentally different from his previous experience with multi-stakeholder governance in 
the anti-corruption area.   
 
“In biofuels there was so much polemic and criticism. Take, for example, Jean Ziegler 
and his statements. The situation was so explosive and created the necessity for a 
broad process. (…) In the anti-corruption area it was different. Here, you made a little 
progress and everybody said it was good. Black and white was much clearer defined. 
Biofuels were different. You can have the same information, but very different 
opinions. If there is so much ambiguity, you need a much broader process. Ambiguity 
defines the efficiency of the process you can build. That is why the RSB needed to be 
inclusive. (…) If you try a quick shot, it is likely to be a shot in the foot and you have 
achieved nothing” (interview with a member of the EPFL Energy Center). 
 
Another member of the FSB explained that “the complexity of biofuels made it necessary to 
have a range of different voices at the table. This was in a sense trying to get ahead of some 
of the criticism of biofuels by getting in place a framework that would diffuse concerns about 
the competition with food” (interview with a member of the FSB). Very similar statements 
were made by other individuals involved in the early stages of the RSB process:  
 
“Biofuels cover so many different kinds of feed stocks, are produced in so many 
different kinds countries, and there was so much controversy surrounding it. Having 
something narrow was not useful in our thinking. It would not have had any 
credibility or legitimacy” (interview with a member of the FSB). 
  
The evidence laid out above allowed insights in the thinking of the founders of the RSB. 
Providing support for Hypothesis 4, it was shown how they perceived the highly politicised 
nature of the biofuels sector as a defining environmental factor. They reasoned that only a 
broad process involving all key stakeholder groups would have a chance of success in this 
environment and therefore opted for an inclusive approach, similar to that of the FSC.  
 
Normative Pressures 
Besides a high level of political conflict in the biofuels sector, transnational norms of good 
private governance practices could be identified as an environmental factor influencing the 
institutional trajectory of the RSB. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, these norms are 
being developed by the ISEAL Alliance. Created in 2002, ISEAL is an association of leading 
private standard-setting systems. Among its founding members are the FSC, the IFOAM, the 
145 
 
FLO, and the MSC (ISEAL, website-a). Probably the most important normative document 
developed by ISEAL, is its Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental 
Standards (ISEAL, 2012). First released in 2004, the code lays out principles and criteria for 
how to create credible private standard systems. One of the most important procedural 
requirements of the ISEAL code is stakeholder inclusion in the decision-making and 
standard-setting process.  In this regard, the code stipulates that (ISEAL, 2012: 8):  
 
• Standard-setting shall be open to all interested parties  
• Participation and decision-making needs to reflect a balance of interests (subject 
matter and geographic scope)  
• Participants shall include stakeholders with an expertise relevant to the subject, those 
that are materially affected by the standard, and those that could influence the 
implementation of the standard. 
 
The normative framework created by ISEAL has become an important reference point for 
private sustainability initiatives – also for the founders of the RSB. The in-depth analysis 
revealed that ISEAL and its code was already discussed at the scheme’s foundational meeting 
in 2006.  
 
“Discuss with ISEAL to ensure that we don’t make governance mistakes at the 
beginning that compromise legitimacy later (RSB, 2006) 
 
Then, in November 2007, the RSB Secretariat started to explore with ISEAL the possibility 
of becoming a formal member and, about a year later, the SB made a decision to formally 
“adopt the ISEAL Code of Good Practice of Standard-Setting for RSB activities” (RSB, 
2008b: 2). Shortly after, the RSB became an associate member of ISEAL and a full member 
in 2011 (interview with a member of the RSB Secretariat). The meeting minutes and 
interview material confirm that the ISEAL norms played an important role in the design 
process of the RSB. Often in discussions about the scheme’s decision-making and standard-
setting arrangements, references were made to ISEAL and its code of good practice (RSB, 
2010h). Notably, the RSB’s decision to open its standards for public consultations could be 
traced back to the ISEAL Alliance and its framework (ISEAL, 2012: 9). 
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4.5 Summary of Findings 
This was the first of three case study chapters. It examined the diffusion of private 
participatory governance to the biofuels sector. After providing some case context and 
background information, the institutional development of the RSB from its inception to the 
launch of the formal organisation was described. As part of this, a detailed analysis of the 
scheme’s rule-making and decision-making arrangements was conducted. They were found 
to be open and balanced, confirming the RSB to be a highly inclusive governance 
arrangement. In order to explain this outcome, the process of institutional diffusion was 
traced. The process-analysis was guided by the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. 
This framework distinguishes three stages in the diffusion process – source selection, 
transmission, and adoption – and specifies a set of testable hypotheses about the cause-and-
effect relationships that influence institutional outcomes (see Table 20, Section 4.4).  
 
Consistent with the underlying diffusion model, the empirical analysis revealed how the 
founders of the RSB did not design their organisation from scratch. Instead, they turned 
toward already-established MSIs in other fields in order to learn from their experiences and to 
imitate their structures. The interviews and primary documents suggest two main causes of 
institutional diffusion for this case. Firstly, the founders of the RSB hoped to save time and 
resources by learning from the experiences of others; and, secondly, they were uncertain 
about what constitutes a good design and wanted to avoid making mistakes.  
 
Close network ties to the FSC led them to select the forestry initiative as a primary target 
institution. It was shown how the scheme served them as an important reference institution 
during discussions about institutional design and standards. Finding support for Hypothesis 1, 
a correlation could be established between the highly participatory approach of the FSC and 
the diffusion outcome. However, the FSC was not the only source model considered by the 
founders of the RSB. In this regard, it was found that they looked also at the design of the 
RSPO – one of the first MSIs in the agriculture sector.  
 
Examining the transmission of ideas, the within-case analysis uncovered traces of a learning 
process. In this regard, the founders of the RSB did not simply imitate the forestry or palm oil 
schemes, but drew lessons from their experiences. Providing support for Hypothesis 2, they 
came to believe that the FSC’s highly participatory approach was essential for its 
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organisational success. However, in other areas they diverged from the FSC model. For 
example, learning about the importance of distinguishing between firms that occupy different 
positions in the supply chain, they turned toward the RSPO with its more differentiated 
chamber structure.  
 
Moving on toward the adoption stage of the model, the process analysis revealed how, 
worried about the level of NGO influence, producer groups from the global south challenged 
the institutional status quo in the RSB. However, it was found that institutional bargaining 
only occurred at a later stage of organisational development, when a formal governance 
structure was already in place. In other words, bargaining was not an important mechanism of 
initial institutional choice. Also, it did not result in any major changes to the institutional 
design of the RSB. This could be explained by the blocking power of the NGOs and a high 
level of GIAP of the group of southern producers. Thus, overall the case study produced little 
evidence that institutional bargaining had a significant effect on the diffusion outcome 
(Hypothesis 3).  
 
Finally, the nature and strength of environmental pressures at the point of adoption were 
examined. In support of Hypothesis 4, it was found that strong coercive pressures in the 
biofuels arena influenced the diffusion outcome. Having launched their initiative in the midst 
of the global food crisis, the founders of the RSB came to believe that the contentious nature 
of the biofuels debate required an inclusive process in order for such a process to be robust 
and to produce meaningful results. Furthermore, the process analysis revealed how emerging 
transnational norms of good private governance exercised normative pressures on the 
founders of the RSB to adopt a participatory approach.  
 
In order to allow for a comparative analysis, the next two chapters will analyse the 
institutional diffusion of private participatory governance to the soy and sugarcane sectors.  
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Chapter 5: The Roundtable on Responsible Soy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the diffusion of private participatory governance to the biofuels 
sector. It established a correlation between the highly participatory approach of the source 
model (FSC) and the diffusion outcome (RSB). Furthermore, by examining the exchange of 
ideas between the two organisations, traces of a learning process were uncovered. The 
founders of the RSB came to believe that the FSC’s highly participatory approach had been 
essential for its success as a private standard institution and certification scheme. Also, it was 
found that strong coercive pressures in the institutional environment of the RSB influenced 
the diffusion outcome. In the form of a transnational advocacy campaign against biofuels, 
these pressures pushed the founders of the RSB to engage a wide range of stakeholders in 
their standard-setting activities. They believed that a narrow process would have little 
chances of succeeding in such an environment. It was this confluence of factors which 
explains why the founders of the RSB adopted a highly inclusive approach. On the other 
hand, although institutional bargaining could be observed, the case study produced little 
evidence to suggest that it had a significant effect on the diffusion outcome.  
 
 In order to create a baseline for comparison, this and the next case study chapter trace the 
diffusion of private participatory governance to the soy (RTRS) and the sugarcane sectors 
(BSI/Bonsucro). In the inventory of MSIs conducted in Chapter 1, these schemes were found 
to exhibit a medium and low level of inclusiveness, respectively. As in the previous chapter, 
the empirical analysis will be guided by the diffusion model developed in Chapter 2. The 
model distinguishes three stages in the diffusion process – source selection, transmission, and 
adoption – and identifies a set of testable hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships 
that may influence institutional outcomes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in a first step, some case context and 
background is provided. Then, the institutional development of the RTRS is described, from 
the scheme’s inception to the launch of the formal organisation and the finalisation of the 
standard-setting process. As part of this, a more detailed analysis of the scheme’s decision-
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making and rule-making arrangements is provided. In a final step, the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 2 is used to explain the institutional outcome for the case at hand. 
 
5.2 Case Context and Background  
Soybeans have been cultivated by mankind for millennia. In China, during the Zhou Dynasty 
(1046 to 256 BC) and the Qin Dynasty (221 to 206 B.C.), soybeans became one of the main 
food crops in the Yellow River Valley. By the time of the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644 B.C.), 
soybean cultivation had spread throughout the country (Clay, 2004: 174). Today, soy is 
grown around the world and has become one of the most important commodities for the 
production of food, feed, and fuel.  
 
The soybean is often referred to as the “king of the beans”. The dry seed contains 38 percent 
protein – more than any other food crop and twice as much as pork. Furthermore, it contains 
18 percent unsaturated fats. These qualities make soy a key crop for food and feed 
production. About 85 percent of global soybean production is processed into soybean meal 
and oil. The oil fraction is mostly used for human consumption in the form of edible oils. Of 
the soybean meal fraction, approximately 98 percent is processed into high-protein animal 
feed. More recently, soybeans have also become a feedstock for biodiesel production. 
However, only a small percentage (< 5 percent) of the world’s soybean oil is used in this way 
(Marketsandmarkets.com, 2013).  
 
The world’s largest soybean producers are: the USA, Brazil, Argentina, China, and India (see 
Table 16). It is also the USA, Brazil, and Argentina which dominate the global soybean trade, 
with China and the EU being the world’s largest importers (FAO, website-b). 
 
Table 16: Top 5 Producers of Soybeans 2012 
Country Production (million tonnes)  
USA 82.1 
Brazil 65.7 
Argentina 51.5 
China 12.8 
India 11.5 
 
  Source: FAO STAT  
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Soy is the fastest expanding crop in the world. Driven by a growing world population, 
changing diets in developing countries (notably in Asia), and a ban on feeding animal 
proteins to ruminants in the EU, the total land area under soy has almost doubled in size over 
the course of the last two decades (see Figure 16). According to FAO statistics, the total land 
area under soybeans increased from 56 million hectares in 1992 to about 106 million hectares 
in 2012 (FAO, website-b). For comparison, this is about twice the size of the UK.  
 
Figure 16: Global Land Area under Soybeans (million hectares) 
 
  Source: FAO STAT  
 
The expansion of soybean fields is predicted to continue in future. Using FAO data, Masuda 
and Goldsmith (2009: 153) estimate that by 2030 the total land area under soy will reach 140 
million hectares. Most of this growth will occur in Latin America, with Brazil expected to 
soon overtake the USA as the world’s largest producer of soybeans (Agrimoney.com, 2013).  
 
The so-called soy boom of the 1990s and 2000s has sparked much debate about the 
environmental and social impacts of soy production. One of the major issues raised in this 
debate is deforestation, notably the destruction of rainforests in Latin America. The majority 
of soy expansion has taken place in Argentina and Brazil, which between 1992 and 2012 
increased their total land area under soy by 14.5 million hectares and 15.5 million hectares, 
respectively (FAO, website-b). This accounts for about 60 percent of global soy expansion 
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during this period. Environmental groups argue that via processes of direct and indirect land 
use change25 soybean cultivation is a major driver behind the destruction of the Amazon 
rainforest. Related to this, soybean expansion is also often associated with climate change, 
biodiversity loss, and land grabs in the global south (BBC, 2011; The Guardian, 2010; 
Urioste, 2013).  
 
Another highly controversial issue surrounding soy production is the widespread use of 
GMOs. Today, close to 80 percent of the global soybean harvest is GM (GMO Compass, 
website-a). This has led to a number of environmental, social, and human health related 
concerns. One important issue in this debate is that the widespread use of pesticide-resistant 
GM soy has not reduced but instead increased the amount of agrochemicals used. In this 
context, concerns have been raised that the intensive and concentrated use of agrochemicals 
such as glyphosate poses a risk to human health, non-target animal species (e.g. birds), and 
the natural environment (e.g. soils and water). Others have warned against so called 
superweeds – that is, weeds that are resistant to conventional pesticides such as glyphosate – 
or that GM crops could pass their modified traits on to wild relatives via processes of out-
crossing (Adler, 2011; Earth Open Source, 2012; GMWatch, 2013). Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that GM crops are creating new dependencies for farmers in the global south. 
These dependencies arise as local seed systems and traditional farming methods are replaced 
by patented seeds and other expensive agrochemical inputs (UN General Assembly, 2009).  
 
In absence of effective public regulation, and given the industry’s multiple challenges, private 
governance arrangements have become an important part of the global soy regime. The 
evolving system of private governance in the soy sector includes firm- and industry-level 
self-regulation as well as multi-stakeholder schemes (see Table 17).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Direct land use change occurs when previously uncultivated land is converted to the production of soy. 
Indirect land use change is a process in which the expansion of soy displaces other agricultural activities to 
previously uncultivated areas. 
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Table 17: Private Regulation in the Soy Industry 
Scheme Initiator Geographical 
focus 
Focus of standard 
Basel Criteria for 
Responsible Soy 
Production 
NGO initiative  Global Social and environmental 
impacts (no GM soy) 
ProTerra 
Foundation  
Auditing firm Global Social and environmental 
impacts (no GM soy) 
Roundtable on 
Responsible Soy 
Multi-stakeholder Global Social and environmental 
impacts of mainstream  soy 
production 
Soja Plus Program Industry consortium Brazil Social environmental 
impacts of mainstream soy 
production 
 
Today, these arrangements are an important source of environmental and social regulation in 
the soy industry. They define standards for pesticide use, land-use change, labour rights, etc. 
and often rely on incentive-based mechanisms for their implementation. One of the most 
significant private schemes in the soy sector in terms of visibility, membership, and volume is 
the RTRS. 
 
5.3 The Roundtable on Responsible Soy 
Launched in 2004, the RTRS is a private standard-setting and certification body, created to 
mitigate the social and environmental impact of global soy production. In a multi-stakeholder 
process, it defines principles and criteria for “responsible” soy production and via 
certification provides market incentives for their implementation. This section traces the 
institutional development of the RTRS from its inception to the launch of the formal 
organisation. With a focus on the design of the RTRS’s rule-making and decision-making 
arrangements an assessment of the scheme’s inclusiveness is provided.  
 
5.3.1 Inception 
The RTRS evolved out of the Forest Conversion Initiative (FCI) of the WWF. Starting in 
1998, a team at WWF Switzerland began exploring the problem of forest conversion in the 
global south. They quickly identified agricultural-induced land use change as one of the key 
drivers behind deforestation in the tropics (interview with the former Director and 
International Coordinator of the WWF FCI). Because of their high expansion rates oil palm 
and soybeans in particular were singled out as being highly problematic from a forest 
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conversion perspective. The expansion of soy was threatening the Amazon rainforest and oil 
palm expansion the rainforests in Indonesia and Malaysia: 
 
“Palm oil and soy constitute the largest raw material base for the rapidly expanding 
edible oil market (…). This growing demand globally for palm oil and soy and the 
subsequent expansion of these crops is a key driving force behind forest and habitat 
loss” (WWF, website-a).  
 
As it stood at the time, the WWF had no strategy or instruments in place to deal with the 
problem of agricultural-induced land use change. Until then, the WWF’s forest conservation 
efforts had been exclusively focused on the forestry sector and the FSC as the main forum 
and instrument to promote sustainable forestry practices. In contrast, agricultural activities 
were not included in its forest conservation strategy: 
 
“WWF did not have a very good response to that because being an environmental 
organisation it did not have the know-how to deal with agricultural issues and there 
was a lot of debate whether we should deal with these issues at all” (interview with 
the former Director of the FCI). 
 
Against this background, WWF Switzerland pushed for including agricultural-induced land 
use change in the WWF’s overall forest conservation strategy. After overcoming initial 
resistance from other parts of the network, these efforts led to the creation of the FCI in 2001. 
Initially hosted and led by WWF Switzerland, the FCI’s main goal is to reduce the conversion 
rate of so called high conservation value forests to palm oil plantations and soy fields. To this 
end, the FCI initiated two MSIs, the RSPO and the RTRS (WWF, 2005b).  
 
Organised by the FCI, the RTRS’ foundational workshop (Moving towards Sustainable Soy 
Production: A Global Multi-Stakeholder Effort) was held in London in May 2004. The 
central goal of the workshop was to “have an open exchange of information and discussions 
about a successful process to more sustainable mainstream soy production” (WWF, 2004a). 
The workshop was attended by about 25 participants from civil society, industry, and 
producer groups. Representatives from IGOs or state agencies did not participate. At the 
meeting, the different stakeholder groups discussed the major impacts of soy production, 
existing sustainability initiatives in the agriculture sector, and the possibility of creating a set 
of global principles and criteria for sustainable soy production. The most important outcome 
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of the meeting was the decision to form an Organising Committee (OC), charged with 
organising a first roundtable conference of the major soy stakeholders in 2005 (WWF, 
2004a).   
 
5.3.2 Formation Phase 
Like the RSB, the RTRS was initially governed by an ad hoc group of people who had 
volunteered at the scheme’s founding workshop in London in May 2004. In principle, 
participation in the OC was open to all interested parties with a stake in the soy industry. 
However, OC members had to pay a membership fee of US$ 10,000 which was used to fund 
the activities of the group (WWF, 2004a). Over the course of the next two and a half years, 
the members of the OC did much of the institutional creation work. The group met several 
times a year via teleconference or in person. During 2004 and 2007, a total of 35 such 
meetings were held. As in the case of the RSB FSB, the membership of the OC varied greatly 
during the time of its existence. As the initiative evolved, new members joined the OC, 
whereas others left or scaled back their involvement. Towards the end of the formation period 
the OC counted had 11 members. Industry members included: ABIOVE (Brazilian Oilseed 
Processors Association), ABN AMRO Group, APPRESID (Argentinian No Till Farmers 
Association), Grupo André Maggi (Brazil’s largest producer of soy) Coop Switzerland, and 
Unilever. Among the civil society members were IPAM (Amazon Environmental Research 
Institute), Guyra Paraguay, Solidaridad, and WWF.  
 
Important milestones during the formation phase included the organisation of the first 
roundtable conference in March 2005 in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil. Bringing together 
stakeholders from across the industry, the event served the OC as a forum to promote the 
initiative and to launch a broader discussion about responsible soy production (interviews 
with various members of the OC). Following the conference, the OC decided to organise an 
expert workshop to further explore the technical side of sustainability criteria for mainstream 
soy production. Held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in April 2006, the workshop was attended 
by more than 50 participants from industry, civil society, and producer groups. They 
discussed the social and environmental impacts of soy production and ways to mitigate them 
through better management practices. Providing the basis of the later standard-setting 
process, the workshop identified what participants perceived to be the key environmental and 
social impacts of soy production: (1) habitat conversion and biodiversity loss; (2) soil 
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degradation and erosion; (3) contamination and health effects of agrochemicals on man and 
environment; (4) qualitative and quantitative hydrological changes; (5) infrastructure; (6) 
workers’ rights; (7) loss of livelihoods for small-scale land use systems; (8) migration (rural 
to urban areas and rural to forest ecosystems); and (9) land rights conflicts (illegal 
acquisition, land use rights violations, and indigenous land rights) (RTRS, 2006a).  
 
Then, in August 2006, a second roundtable conference was organised. At the conference, in 
Asunción, Paraguay, its 200 participants made a commitment to responsible soy production 
and announced the establishment of “a legally registered organization with a governance 
structure, and a plan for developing and implementing globally applicable criteria and 
indicators for defining responsible soy” (RTRS, 2006a). 
 
5.3.3 The Formal Organisation  
In November 2006, the OC met in Rolle, Switzerland, to launch the RTRS as a foundation 
under Swiss law (RTRS, 2006c). The OC was replaced by an Executive Board (EB), 
supported by a newly created secretariat based in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Furthermore, a 
GA of all members of the RTRS and a so-called Principles Criteria Verification Development 
Group (PCVDG) were established. The GA is organised in three stakeholder chambers (civil 
society, industry/trade/finance, and producers) plus a group of observers (e.g. government 
agencies and IGOs) with no voting rights. Also, the PCVDG, the RTRS’ primary standard-
setting body, features the three chamber structure. See Figure 17 for an overview of the 
organisational structure of the RTRS.  
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Figure 17: Organisational Chart of the RTRS 
 
 
The GA held its first meeting in May 2007 in São Paulo, Brazil (RTRS, 2007b). According to 
the Statutes of the RTRS, the GA is the organisation’s highest decision-making body. It has a 
quorum if more than 50 percent of the members of each constituency group are present. In 
the GA, each of the three stakeholder chambers holds veto power. By a simple majority vote 
of their participating members, chambers can exercise their right to veto and thus prevent a 
decision from being passed. Among the GA’s most important powers is the election of the 
EB. Therefore, each constituency group elects up to five representatives which represent the 
chamber at the EB-level. Furthermore, the GA approves the standard and budget of the RTRS 
(RTRS, 2007c). Currently, the RTRS has 156 members. Figure 18 provides a detailed 
breakdown of the composition of the RTRS’ membership.  
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Figure 18: Composition of the Membership of the RTRS (percent)26 
 
The Statutes of the RTRS identify the GA as the organisation’s highest decision-making 
body. However, in practice most decision-making in the RTRS takes place in the EB 
(interview with a member of the RTRS Secretariat). Its members convene several times a 
year to discuss and reach decisions concerning the RTRS and its standard. Also, the EB 
appoints, directs, and controls the RTRS Secretariat. The meetings of the EB are quorate if 
more than 50 percent of its members, representing all constituencies, are present. Decisions 
are reached by consensus. If no consensus can be reached on a particular agenda item, then 
each board member has one vote within his/her constituency. As in the GA, each 
constituency takes its decisions by a simple majority of votes. In order for a decision to be 
passed successfully the positive vote of all three constituencies is required (RTRS, 2007c). 
Using the four key stakeholder groups (civil society north, civil society south, economic 
north, and economic south) defined in Chapter 2, Figure 19 provides a detailed breakdown of 
the composition of the RTRS EB during 2007-2010.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 This figure has been composed from the membership list provided on the RTRS website 
(http://www.responsiblesoy.org/, January 2014). To this end, members have been identified as either belonging 
to one of the following categories: Industry, civil society, or others. Then, the location of their home institution’s 
headquarter has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north or global south).   
4
8
4322
23
civil society north
civil society south
economic north
economic south
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Figure 19: Composition of the RTRS’ Primary Decision-Making Body (percent)27 
 
Shortly after the GA had convened for its first meeting in May 2007, the PCVDG began its 
work. Facilitated by Proforest, a UK-based consultancy firm, the rationale behind the 
PCVDG was to bring together a group of stakeholders that was “large enough to encompass 
the different parts of the soy supply chain but small enough to be workable” (RTRS, 2007a: 
16). Appointed by the EB, its membership reflected the organisation’s three chamber 
structure, with each stakeholder group being represented by 9 members (Proforest, 2009).  
Although the available data does not allow for an exact breakdown of the PCVDG members’ 
geographical origin, there is evidence for a balanced representation. In this regard, a 
document by Proforest specifies the geographical origin of the PCVDG members as follows: 
civil society (Argentina, Brazil, China, and Netherlands),  industry/trade/finance (Argentina, 
Belgium, Brazil, Netherlands, Switzerland, and USA), and producers (Argentina, Brazil, 
India, and Paraguay) (Proforest, 2009).  
 
In the PCVDG, decisions on draft principles and criteria were reached by consensus, which 
its terms of reference define as “general agreement, without sustained opposition on 
substantial issues” (RTRS, 2007d: 3). However, a voting procedure existed in the event that 
                                                          
27
 This figure has been composed from the meeting minutes of the RTRS EB. To this end, board members have 
been identified to either belong to one of the following categories: Industry or civil society. Then, the location of 
their home institution’s headquarter has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north or global 
south).   
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no consensus could be reached. For regular decision-making, at least 50 percent of the voting 
members needed to be present in each of the three constituencies. Decisions were then 
reached by simple majority of the whole group and a simple majority within each of the three 
constituencies. For approval of the principles and criteria as a whole, the quorum was 
increased to two-thirds of the voting members in each of the three constituencies. 
Furthermore, specific to the civil society constituency, support from two-thirds of each of the 
social and environmental sub constituencies was required (RTRS, 2007d). 
 
The process leading to Version 1.0 of the RTRS Principles and Criteria, involved five in-
person meetings of the PCVDG during 2007 and 2009. Facilitated by Proforest, the meetings 
were held in turn in Brazil and Argentina, two of the world’s largest soy producing countries 
(Proforest, 2009). Furthermore, following the guidelines of the ISEAL Alliance28, the 
standard was opened for three public consultation periods during which external parties could 
comment on it (RTRS, website). During the first round of public consultations (March-May 
2008), the PCVDG received 774 separate comments from 40 respondents. Furthermore, 
Proforest organised a feedback session during the third RTRS Roundtable Conference on 
Responsible Soy in April 2008 in Buenos Aires in which over 150 people took part 
(Proforest, 2008). The feedback from the three public consultation rounds was worked back 
into the standard, leading to the RTRS Principles and Criteria Field Testing Version in April 
2009 (RTRS, 2009d). After field-testing the standard, an International Technical Group was 
convened in March 2010. For the group, the RTRS Secretariat recruited 12-18 people, with 
equal representation of each of the three constituency groups (RTRS, 2009a). After the 
International Technical Group had reviewed the RTRS Principles and Criteria Version 1.0, it 
was sent to the EB and GA for formal approval (RTRS, website). Shortly after, in June 2011, 
the RTRS issued its first certificates. See Figure 20 for an overview of the institutional 
development of the RTRS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 ISEAL is the leading umbrella organisation in the field of private sustainability governance. One of its 
primary functions is that of a meta-standard setter. In this regard,  its standard-setting code defines best practices 
for setting social and environmental standards (ISEAL, website-b).  
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Figure 20: Institutional Development of the RTRS (2004-2011) 
 
 
5.3.4 Assessing Inclusiveness 
Using the qualitative indicators developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1), this section assesses 
the inclusiveness of the RTRS’ standard-setting and decision-making arrangements. To this 
end, their openness, composition, and constitutive rules are examined.  
 
Standard-setting in the RTRS was organised in the PCVDG. The PCVDG was formed in 
October 2007 and over the course of the next three years defined and operationalised the 
RTRS Principles and Criteria. But unlike the RSB, the RTRS restricted access to its standard-
setting body. In this regard, the EB appointed a small group of experts to define the draft 
principles and criteria. However, the composition of this group was found to be balanced. 
There was equal participation from producers, industry, and civil society as well as a balance 
between organisations from both the global north and the south. Furthermore, following the 
guidelines of the ISEAL Alliance, the RTRS opened its standard for three public consultation 
periods during which external stakeholders could provide comments and feedback on the 
standard. As noted above, during the first round of public consultations (March-May 2008), 
the PCVDG received 774 separate comments from 40 respondents. 
 
With regard to decision-making, the RTRS was initially governed by the OC, an ad hoc 
group of people who had volunteered at the organisation’s foundational workshop. Then, 
when the RTRS became a formal organisation in 2006, the OC was replaced by a formally 
elected EB and an annual GA of its members. In both decision-making bodies, industry actors 
outnumber civil society actors. However, a right of veto for the civil society chamber protects 
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the organisation against regulatory capture. With regard to geographical representation, the 
composition of the EB reveals a strong participation from the global south in the RTRS’ 
primary decision-making body.  
 
Overall, the inclusiveness of the RTRS ranges between medium and high. In this regard, the 
scheme restricts access to its standard-setting body, but maintains a careful balance between 
the key stakeholder groups. With regard to decision-making, the RTRS’ central decision-
making body is mostly balanced and a veto position for civil society actors protects the 
organisation against the possibility of regulatory capture. See Table 18 for a detailed 
overview of the inclusiveness of the RTRS.  
 
Table 18: Inclusiveness of the RTRS (Overview) 
Standard-setting 
arrangement 
Principle Criteria Verification Development Group 
Membership rules Restricted (members appointed by Executive Committee) 
Composition Balanced 
Consultation mechanism  Yes 
Primary Decision-making 
arrangement  
Executive Committee (Organising Committee) 
Membership rules Restricted to members (Fee of US$ 10,000 to join Organising 
Committee) 
Composition Balanced 
Collective choice rules Protection against regulatory capture (civil society actors 
possess a formal right of veto) 
Secondary Decision-making 
arrangement 
General Assembly 
Membership rules Open 
(membership fees depending on size and stakeholder category) 
Composition Unbalanced 
Collective choice rules Protection against regulatory capture (civil society actors 
possess a formal right of veto) 
 
5.4 Tracing the Diffusion Process  
In Chapter 2, diffusion was defined as a causal process in which a diffusion practice is 
transmitted from a point of origin to a point of adoption. One of the main arguments of this 
literature is that processes of diffusion lead to institutional isomorphism or convergence. 
States and organisations are thought to converge on a common model as they mimic the 
structures of those whom they know and perceive as successful. In fact, the notion of 
increasing similarities between prior and later adopters is inherent to the concept of diffusion 
as it is frequently used in the literature (Elkins and Simmons, 2005: 2, Ovodenko and 
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Keohane, 2012: 524). On the other hand, however, there are numerous studies that have 
shown that practices often vary as they diffuse (Klingler-Vidra & Schleifer, 2014). One 
example is Börzel’s and Risse’s (2011) study of the diffusion of the European Union (EU) 
model. They find that this process has led to significant variation in institutional and 
behavioural outcomes among adopters. In a similar way, Falkner and Gupta (2009) and 
Radaelli (2005) show how processes of institutional diffusion have led to only limited 
degrees of convergence.  
 
With a focus on the agriculture sector, this dissertation traces the diffusion of private 
participatory governance in the agriculture sector. In the previous chapter, the case of the 
RSB in the biofuels sector was investigated in-depth. Continuing the empirical analysis, this 
chapter now examines the diffusion of the MSI institutional model to the soy sector with the 
objective to explain why the RTRS has taken the form described above. Therefore, as in the 
case of the RSB, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 is applied. This framework 
disaggregates the diffusion process in three phases: source selection, transmission, and 
adoption (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4). With a focus on these different stages four 
hypotheses were formulated. These hypotheses take the form of intervening factors and may 
help us shed some light on the question why multi-stakeholder institutions vary in their level 
of inclusiveness as they diffuse in the global economy. In order to explain the institutional 
outcome for the case at hand, this model is now applied to the case of the RTRS. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis can draw on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with members 
and observers of the RTRS process. Furthermore, a complete set of minutes of the OC/EB 
and GA meetings is available for the years 2004-2011.  
 
5.4.1 Causes  
Consistent with the underlying diffusion model, the founders of the RTRS did not design 
their organisation from scratch. Instead, they turned to already established initiatives in other 
fields for inspiration and to learn from their experiences. Also consistent with diffusion 
“theory”, the interview material and meeting minutes suggest two sets of motives for 
imitating the design of other schemes. On the one hand, the creators of the RTRS hoped to 
save time and resources. On the other, they wanted to learn from the experiences of others in 
order to avoid making mistakes.  
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The available documentation reveals that a decision to engage in imitation and learning was 
made early on in the process. In this regard, at the RTRS’ foundational meeting, participants 
formed several working groups to look at various aspects of sustainability in relation to 
global soy production. One of the working groups was charged with making a compilation of 
existing efforts in the area of sustainable agriculture. After discussions, there was consensus 
among the members of the working group “regarding the need to tap into existing work and 
efforts being carried out in different countries on various issues related to sustainability in the 
field of agriculture”. It was pointed out that “the Roundtable needs to build upon past 
achievements and on-going efforts as opposed to reinventing the wheel”. Furthermore, it was 
argued that “[c]opying existing models will provide opportunities to learn from mistakes and 
speed-up the process” (WWF, 2004a: 3). As observed in the case of the RSB and consistent 
with the underlying institutional diffusion model, these motives led the founders of the RTRS 
to turn to familiar and prestigious MSIs in other fields. 
 
5.4.2 Source Selection 
The selection of a target institution or source marks the beginning of the diffusion process. A 
choice has to be made about whom to imitate, learn from, etc. Standard diffusion models 
assume the existence of a single central source. Often, however, multiple sources exist. When 
multiple sources are available institutional variation can occur as designers select different 
source models for imitation. These choices depend on factors such as familiarity, spatial 
proximity, and perceptions about the prestige of the target institution. Against this 
background, it was hypothesised that:  
 
H1: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if the primary target 
institution exhibits a high (low) level of inclusiveness.  
 
To empirically examine this claim, interviews and primary documents will be used in order to 
establish which organisations served new adopters as a primary source model. 
 
The RTRS was one of two agricultural commodity roundtables which came out of the 
WWF’s FCI. The RTRS was launched in 2004 two years after the RSPO had been initiated. 
Not surprisingly, the RSPO served the founders of the RTRS as an important point of 
164 
 
reference. Several people involved in the early stages of the RTRS had been, or were still, 
working with the palm oil roundtable. Through the interviews at least four individuals could 
be identified who had participated in board meetings of both organisations (interviews with 
various members of the OC). As diffusion theory would predict (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz 
& Wasserman, 1989; Haunschild, 1993), these interlocking boards (network ties) led to a 
close exchange of information between the RTRS and the RSPO. The role of the RSPO as the 
primary target institution for the RTRS was also confirmed through documentation and the 
interview material. For instance, a background document on governance options which 
shortly preceded the launch of the RTRS as a formal organisation identified the RSPO as 
being of “particular relevance in view of the similar nature of the commodity involved (palm 
oil), similar challenges (difficulty in differentiating streams of produce traded globally), and 
the similar circumstances under which both RSPO and RTRS were set up” (RTRS, 2006b). 
Furthermore, the former International Coordinator of the WWF’s FCI stated in an interview:  
 
“It was the idea from the beginning that we would learn from palm oil for soy. Also, 
the actors were more or less the same. For example, Unilever was very active in the 
RSPO as well as the RTRS” (interview with a member of the OC).  
 
Interestingly, the RSPO in turn had been modelled on the FSC as interviews with WWF 
officials in charge of the FCI revealed (interviews with the former Director and the 
International Coordinator of the FCI). In this regard, the RTRS and its design are partly the 
outcome of what in Chapter 2 has been discussed as chain mode diffusion. In contrast to 
“standard diffusion”, where diffusion is focused on a single, central source, chain mode 
diffusion involves the passing on of a diffusion practice (here institutional design elements) 
from one adopter to the next. Often, processes of chain mode diffusion facilitate the 
emergence of institutional variation. The reason for this is that at each step of the chain 
modifications are made as designers engage in learning from past experiences and adapt the 
model to the situation at hand (see sections on transmission and adoptions, below). A quick 
glance at the three organisations illustrates the type and degree of variation for the three 
cases.  
 
The FSC is widely known for its highly participatory approach. Its board is divided into a 
social, an environmental, and an economic chamber and provides civil society actors with a 
strong position – they hold six out of nine board seats (FSC, website). In contrast, the 
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inventory of 16 environmental MSIs conducted in Chapter 1 identified the RSPO as a scheme 
with a medium level of inclusiveness. It features a more differentiated (business-oriented) 
chamber structure, distinguishing between seven stakeholder groups: (1) oil palm growers; 
(2) palm oil processors and traders; (3) consumer goods manufacturers; (4) retailers; (5) 
banks and investors; (6) environmental NGOs; and (7) social NGOs. The higher level of 
corporate influence is also apparent at the board-level  where business actors hold twelve out 
of sixteen seats (RSPO, website-b). In comparison, the RTRS appears to strike a middle 
ground between the RSPO and FSC. The scheme has moved back to the three chamber 
system of the FSC. However, its creators reversed the composition of stakeholder chambers 
from two civil society and one economic chamber to one civil society and two economic 
chambers. Also occupying the middle ground between the FSC and the RSPO, civil society 
actors in the RTRS hold five out of fifteen board seats.  
 
In sum, the RSPO, which in turn had been modelled after the FSC, served the designers of the 
RTRS as the primary target institution. Providing some support for hypothesis 1 (the primary 
target institution influences the diffusion outcome), the RTRS resembles the RSPO and FSC 
in many ways. However, the soy scheme is neither a replication of the palm oil roundtable 
nor the forestry initiative as a comparison of their institutional designs revealed. In the 
following the transmission stage is examined and how learning processes may have 
influenced the diffusion outcome.  
  
5.4.3 Transmission  
Once a target institution, or institutions, is selected, a diffusion mechanism transmits 
information about the source model to the point of adoption. In Chapter 2, different types of 
diffusion mechanisms were discussed. It was argued that when imitation is the primary 
diffusion mechanism, then a close replication of the source model is the expected outcome. In 
contrast, learning can introduce variation. Variation occurs as adopters draw lessons from 
their experiences and the experiences of others. In doing so, they may find that some aspects 
of the source model are suboptimal for their purposes and make modifications accordingly 
(selective imitation). Also, they may combine the lessons learned at different places and thus 
synthesise new practices. The outcomes of learning processes are inherently difficult to 
predict a priori. They depend on a range of factors which are often case specific. They are 
likely to depend on the past experiences, information available, and interpretations of the 
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adopter, as well as the situation and context in which the learning process takes place. 
Although difficult to predict, learning processes leave empirical “traces” (e.g. reflections 
about the pros and cons of a model) which can be examined through interviews and primary 
documents (e.g. meeting minutes, project proposals). Against this background it was 
hypothesised that:  
 
H2: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if adopters learn that 
inclusiveness was good (bad) for the success of prior adopters. 
 
When beginning their work on the palm oil and soy sectors in the early 2000s people in the 
WWF soon realised that these commodities were different in important ways from the 
forestry sector. Typically, forestry products are visible to the end consumer. They are used to 
produce timber, wood products, paper, etc. In contrast, palm oil and soy are what one 
interviewee referred to as “hidden commodities”. In this regard, most cosmetic and many 
food products contain palm oil, but consumers are often not aware of it. In the case of soy, a 
very small percentage of global production is directly consumed by humans, whereas about 
98 percent of the soybean meal fraction is used for producing high protein animal feed 
(interviews with the former Director and International Coordinator of the WWF FCI).  
 
Against this background, it was reasoned that the consumer oriented approach of the FSC 
was not suitable for the palm oil and soy sectors. Similar to the fair trade label and other 
certification schemes, the FSC operates a consumer oriented label, displayed on wood and 
timber products which have undergone FSC certification. At least in theory, firms can use the 
FSC label to signal their sustainability performance to consumers and thus reap reputational 
benefits and tap so called “markets of virtue” (Vogel, 2006). However, due to the hidden 
nature of palm oil and soy, this model seemed less suitable for the RSPO and RTRS. Trying 
to find an alternative, the designers of the RSPO and RTRS experimented with the idea of 
creating a business-to-business platform (interviews with the former Director and 
International Coordinator of the WWF FCI). In this approach, there is no visible label or 
certificate involved. Instead, the scheme functions through business-to-business transactions 
only.  
 
The background to this is that in response to pressures from consumers, NGOs and 
regulators, many of the big retailers and consumer goods manufactures have formulated 
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sustainable sourcing targets (cf. Dauvergne & Lister, 2012). For example, as part of its 
Sustainable Living Plan, Unilever has pledged to source 100 percent of its raw materials 
sustainably by 2020 (Unilever, website). However, sitting on top of the agro-supply chain, 
these “corporate consumers” often face difficulties in implementing and credibly 
demonstrating compliance with their sustainability plans to external audiences. On the other 
hand, producer groups have to assure buyers about the sustainability of their products and 
practices. One possible way to overcome these signalling problems is to rely on third-party 
certification schemes. In this regard, in the business-to-business approach, MSIs mainly 
function as assurance mechanisms between corporate actors, whereas they remain largely 
invisible to the end consumer.  
 
For the founders of the RSPO and RTRS, the decision to adopt a business-to-business 
approach instead of a consumer oriented label had several implications for the institutional 
design of their initiatives. Firstly, they felt the need to differentiate more clearly between 
firms occupying different positions in the agro-supply chain. At a minimum, the business-to-
business approach made it necessary to distinguish between corporate consumers and 
producers (interview with a member of the OC). Secondly, it was reasoned that the business-
to-business model would require more business ownership and allow for a more ‘streamlined’ 
approach.  
 
The rationale behind the institutional design of the RTRS is elaborated in more detail in a 
report of a consultancy firm hired by the OC to help it design a governance structure for the 
soy roundtable. In its the report, Pi Environmental Consulting elaborates on the relationship 
between inclusiveness and effectiveness, arguing that “[u]nder a certain level of 
inclusiveness, sufficient legitimacy will not be reached, thus making it impossible for the 
initiative to deliver, or to be effective. As inclusiveness increases, so does legitimacy. (…) 
But with the increase of inclusiveness, the speed of the process slows down (…). At some 
stage, the inclusiveness can become so cumbersome that no decision can be taken anymore, 
thus making it again impossible for the initiative to be effective”. They concluded that 
“[s]omewhere in the middle lies a situation where the initiative is efficient, i.e. it can deliver 
objectives well and fast. This ‘somewhere’ will depend on the objectives of the initiative. 
(…) [I]t is likely that a scheme designed for B2B [business-to-business] declarations will 
need less inclusiveness to be effective than a schemes designed to provide a consumer 
oriented label” (Pi Environmental Consulting, 2005: 4-5). The available documentation 
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suggests that this line of thinking was adopted by the members of the OC and informed their 
institutional design choices. In this regard, the official project proposal for the RTRS which 
shortly preceded its launch as a formal organisation in May 2007 reads: 
 
“The viability of the RTRS is also dependent on its capacity to deliver its objectives, 
i.e. its effectiveness. With increased legitimacy, often the speed of the process is 
reduced. Somewhere in the middle, there is a combination of the two where the RTRS 
will be both inclusive and efficient” (RTRS, 2007a: 3-4). 
 
Providing some support for hypothesis 2 (learning can influence the diffusion outcome), the 
empirical analysis revealed how the creators of the RSPO and RTRS reflected upon the FSC 
and its consumer-oriented, participatory model. They came to believe that the palm oil and 
soy sectors required a more business-driven approach. This explains why the RSPO and 
RTRS came out stronger on the business side when compared to the FSC. However, it does 
not explain why the founders of the RTRS seem to have back-pedalled a bit, positioning their 
initiative somewhere in between the FSC and RSPO with regard to participation from civil 
society actors. To further investigate the matter, the next sections look at the adoption of the 
diffusion practice.  
 
5.3.4 Adoption  
The adoption of the diffusion item marks the end of the diffusion process. In the broader 
diffusion literature this process is often described in a somewhat mechanistic way in which 
potential adopters make a decision to either accept or reject a diffusion item (Rogers, 1995: 
364). However, a closer consideration of the issue suggests that adoption is not simply a ‘yes 
or no’ decision.  
 
Institutional Bargaining 
Multi-stakeholder processes are political arenas in which struggles over influence and 
diverging interests take place. When firms and NGOs collaborate to create new MSIs they 
typically differ sharply over the structure and governance of these schemes and the scope and 
content of their standards and procedures. As the primary targets of private regulation, 
corporate actors in particular will try to maximise their control over the regulatory process. 
Against this background, it was hypothesised that: 
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H3: the diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if corporate actors are in weak 
(strong) bargaining position.  
 
To examine this claim, the empirical analysis identifies and describes processes of 
institutional bargaining during the adoption phase. Then, the distribution of bargaining power 
in these situations is examined. 
 
In the case at hand, the empirical analysis uncovered several episodes of institutional 
bargaining in and surrounding the RTRS. These conflicts were rooted in differences over 
regulatory outcomes. Similar to the interest constellation in the RSB, strong differences 
existed between economic actors from the global south and civil society actors. However, 
there were also differences within each stakeholder category, and the within-case analysis 
revealed how preference coalitions shifted across issue areas.  
  
Like in the RSB, producer groups (economic south) in the RTRS were strongly concerned 
about the cost of certification. It was a widely held view among the members of this group 
that the RTRS Principles and Criteria were too strict. It was argued that many producers 
would not be able to comply with the standard. Furthermore, there were concerns about 
whether a market for responsible soy existed and that RTRS certification would put them at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors (interview with a producer member). On the other 
hand, NGOs in the RTRS pushed for high standards. Notably, they insisted on strict standards 
with regard to deforestation practices. This is not surprising as the RTRS had its origin in the 
WWF’s FCI which had been initiated to tackle the problem of deforestation in the tropics. 
Also similar to the RSB, downstream industry actors (economic north) in the RTRS often 
positioned themselves somewhere in between the two camps. Depending on the issue at 
stake, they would either support the NGO position or that of the producer groups. 
 
The within-case analysis furthermore revealed how preference coalitions shifted across issue 
areas. More specific to the soy sector, one issue which strongly divided stakeholders in the 
RTRS was the initiative’s scope, notably whether or not to include GM soy under its scheme. 
Whereas industry actors in the RTRS were largely pro GM soy, the group of civil society 
actors was deeply divided over the issue (interviews with various members of the OC and 
EB). On the one hand, the WWF’s and Solidaridad’s (two large northern NGOs) position was 
to make the RTRS a “technological neutral” platform. The rationale behind this was the 
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RTRS’ background in the FCI. As described above, the FCI was the outcome of a change in 
strategy in the WWF’s forest conservation activities. Under the FCI, the WWF moved away 
from its exclusive focus on the forestry sector towards including agricultural-induced forest 
conversion, notably soy- and oil palm-driven land use change. For this strategy to be 
effective, it needed a change in practices of the mainstream producers in the oil palm and 
soybean sectors. However, in the case of soy, about 60 percent of global production was 
already GM by the time the RTRS was initiated and the proportion of GM soy was projected 
to increase further in the future (GMO Compass, website-a). Against this background, 
excluding GM soy from the RTRS would have led to the exclusion of the majority of soy 
producers and therefore to a failure of the RTRS as a mainstream platform (interviews with 
NGO representatives). In contrast, many other NGOs inside (e.g. Cordaid) and outside (e.g. 
Friends of the Earth) the RTRS were strongly opposed to GM soy. They pointed to the 
various dangers associated with GMOs (see Chapter 3) and argued that certifying GM soy as 
“responsible” would further legitimise the use and spread of this technology (interviews with 
NGO representatives). 
 
These differences over regulatory outcomes resulted in various episodes of institutional 
bargaining in the RTRS. These bargains were largely focused on the scope and content of the 
RTRS’ standard. Unlike in the RSB, the empirical analysis produced little evidence for 
explicit bargaining over the design of governance structures and standard-setting procedures. 
This means that, for the case at hand, bargaining did not lead to any major modification to the 
MSI institutional model. Still, institutional bargaining was found to have had a more indirect 
effect on the inclusiveness of the RTRS as several stakeholders decided to leave the 
organisation. 
 
As mentioned above, one major issue encountered by the founding members of the RTRS 
was the question whether or not to include GM soy under the scheme. On one side of the 
debate, the WWF, Unilever, Coop, and Grupo André Maggi (Brazil’s largest soy producer) 
took the position that the RTRS needed to be “technology neutral” in order to be effective. 
They argued that excluding GMOs from the RTRS would make it a niche label and that such 
a scheme would not be able to significantly reduce the industry’s impact. On the other side of 
the debate, notably Cordaid (a Dutch development NGO) and Fetraf-Sul (an Argentinian 
smallholders association), strongly opposed the idea of certifying GM soy as “responsible” 
(interviews with a member of the OC). 
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The debate about the RTRS’ position on GMOs started in October 2004 when Syngenta, a 
large multinational company specialising in the production GM seeds and pesticides, 
expressed interest in joining the RTRS. At the time, no decision could be reached and the 
GMO issue continued to dominate discussion in the OC for several months (RTRS, 2004). As 
finding a workable compromise proved to be extremely difficult, WWF, Unilever, Coop, and 
Grupo André Maggi eventually decided to move forward with the issue and to actively seek 
the participation of GM soy producers. Not surprisingly, the decision was not well received 
by Cordaid and Fetraf-Sul. As a consequence, they announced they were reconsidering their 
membership and subsequently left the RTRS in early 2005 (RTRS, 2005a). Over the 
following months, the remaining members tried to expand the OC and to a find replacement 
for Cordaid and Fetraf-Sul. However, getting new NGOs involved proved to be difficult. In 
the process, several NGOs such Oxfam and Fundapaz (an Argentinian development and 
social justice NGO) were approached but declined the invitation to participate due to the 
RTRS’ position on GMOs (RTRS, 2005b). Eventually, Solidaridad (a Dutch development 
NGO) and Guyra Paraguay (a conservation group from Paraguay) joined the OC. The 
members of the new OC continued to differ in their assessments of the desirability and 
dangers of GM soy, but agreed that the RTRS should be “technology neutral”. As reflected in 
the Common Basis for the RTRS this view became the official position of the RTRS in 2006:  
 
“Genetically modified soy is currently being cultivated in major growing areas such 
as Argentina, many parts of Brazil, Paraguay and the USA. Opinions on the benefits 
and risks of biotechnology and the GM trend vary greatly. Individual Organizing 
Committee members have different standpoints on genetically modified soy. The 
Round Table process will not promote the production, processing or trading of either 
genetically modified or non-genetically modified soy" (RTRS, 2006d: 3). 
 
After it became clear that the RTRS would certify GM soy, organisations that were critical of 
GMOs decided to leave the process.  As a result, political conflict intensified in the scheme’s 
institutional environment (see section on political pressures, below).  
 
The available documentation and interview material provide evidence for a second episode of 
institutional bargaining in the RTRS. Similar to developments in the RSB, producer groups 
became increasingly discontent with the complexity of the RTRS standard as the organisation 
evolved. Furthermore, they perceived the criticism and controversy surrounding the RTRS as 
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a problem. In particular, the Brazilian vegetable oil industry association, ABIOVE, expressed 
its dissatisfaction with the RTRS on several occasions.  
 
“[W]e are very disappointed in the last international conference in Buenos Aires, the 
negative propaganda about soy in Brazil. ABIOVE also feels the list of criteria is 
becoming too long and too difficult to comply with. We should have 4 or 5 criteria, 
not more” (RTRS, 2008).  
 
In early 2009, tensions between producer groups, on the one hand, and NGOs and 
downstream industry actors, on the other, intensified over the RTRS’ position on 
deforestation. The latter demanded a prohibition of deforestation under the RTRS scheme, 
whereas producer groups did not want to go further than making a statement of intent. At a 
meeting of the EB in May 2009 the conflict escalated as the two major Brazilian producer 
associations (ABIOVE and Aprosoja) openly clashed with the other members of the EB over 
the inclusion of a cut-off date in the RTRS Principles and Criteria. On one side of the debate, 
notably the WWF, Unilever, and Coop demanded the inclusion of a cut-off date which would 
prohibit deforestation for soybean cultivation after a certain date. They argued that without it 
the RTRS would lose credibility and ultimately fail: 
 
“It is necessary that the standard includes the objectives derived from implementing 
non deforestation practices, otherwise, we would fail” (RTRS, 2009b: 4).  
 
On the other side of the debate, the representatives from Aprosoja and ABIOVE expressed 
strong concerns about the cost of certification and that many of their members would not be 
able to meet the RTRS standard.  
 
“We acknowledge that certification implies costs. (…) ABIOVE central concern is to 
establish conditions that a large number of producers from different countries can 
meet and not just a minority” (RTRS, 2009b: 2). 
 
Furthermore, they argued that the RTRS could not forbid something which was legal under 
Brazilian law and that, if producers would have to comply with requirements which went 
beyond the law, they had to be compensated:   
 
“[P]roducers are legally entitled to deforest because their level of compliance goes 
beyond the quota required by law. RTRS should not forbid something that is 
permitted by Brazilian law. Producers must not sign it” (RTRS, 2009b: 3).  
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At the meeting, board members voted for the inclusion of a cut-off date in the RTRS 
Principles and Criteria. A new criterion, Criterion 4.4, was added to the standard which 
prohibited the clearing of forests for soybean cultivation after May 2009. An exception only 
existed if producers were able present scientific evidence prepared by a professional third 
party that no primary forests, other high conservation value areas, or land belonging to local 
communities were affected. ABIOVE and Aprosoja, however, remained opposed to Criterion 
4.4 and the representative from Aprosoja announced that his organisation may have to leave 
the RTRS because of it (RTRS, 2009b: 6). The issue of the cut-off date also dominated the 
meeting of the RTRS GA held the same month. At the meeting, Aprosoja, supported by 
Abiove, made a request to remove Criterion 4.4 from the standard, arguing that it was not 
agreed on in the PCVDG. However, the proposal was voted down by the GA and even failed 
to win a majority in the producers’ chamber. Unsuccessful with its proposal, Aprosoja and 
Abiove announced their resignation from the EB and retreat from the RTRS (RTRS, 2009c). 
About a year later, in April 2010, the two Brazilian industry associations played a leading 
role in launching the Soja Plus Program (SPP). SPP is an industry scheme to promote 
sustainable soybean production in Brazil (Soja Plus, website). Today, the scheme has become 
a major competitor of the RTRS on the Brazilian soy certification market, suggesting that 
institutional bargaining surrounding the RTRS has become more implicit (interview with a 
member of the RTRS secretariat). 
 
In sum, differences over regulatory outcomes resulted in several episodes of institutional 
bargaining in the RTRS. However, unlike the RSB, there was no explicit bargaining over the 
design of governance structures. Instead, bargaining was focused on the scope of the RTRS 
and the content of its standard. Still, these conflicts had an effect on the inclusiveness of the 
RTRS as several stakeholders decided to abandon the scheme. In case of the GMO issue, 
GMO-critical NGOs left the RTRS and have not returned to the table to this day. This means 
that an important position in the discourse about what constitutes sustainable or responsible 
soy has disappeared from the RTRS. In case of the conflict about the cut-off date for 
deforestation, two major Brazilian producer associations, representing a significant 
proportion of global production, left the organisation. Why have these stakeholders decided 
to exit the RTRS instead of trying to influence the regulatory outcome from within? The 
analysis of interest and power constellations in the RTRS helps to shed some light on the 
issue. 
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GMO-critical organisations in the RTRS are likely to have had some inclusion power. The 
GMO issue emerged as a major topic in the soy arena and there was an interest among the 
founding members of the RTRS to integrate these organisations in the process in order not to 
compromise its legitimacy. This is evidenced by the fact that various attempts were made to 
retain Cordaid and Fetraf-Sul as members of the OC (interviews with various members of the 
OC). Also, as described above, it proved to be quite difficult to find replacements for these 
organisations. In this regard, various NGOs (e.g. Oxfam and Fundapaz) declined the 
invitation to join the OC due to the scheme’s position on GMOs. But for many members of 
the RTRS (civil society and industry) the GMO issue was non-negotiable. From the very 
beginning, the RTRS was meant to be a mainstream platform (WWF, 2004a). However, not 
allowing GM soy under the scheme would have meant excluding the majority of global 
production, thereby making the RTRS a niche label. In other words, the GM issue was 
directly linked to the core preferences of important actors within the RTRS. Also, although it 
proved to be difficult, the remaining members of the OC were eventually able to recruit 
several more GMO friendly NGOs to replace Cordaid and Fetraf-Sul. That is probably why 
their inclusion power and the pressure exercised by groups outside the RTRS were not 
sufficient to change the RTRS’ position on GMOs. At the same time, it was unconceivable 
for Cordaid and Fetraf-Sul to further participate in an organisation that would certify GM soy 
as responsible and they therefore decided to leave the scheme.  
 
In contrast to the limited inclusion power of GMO-critical organisations in the RTRS, the 
Brazilian producer associations Abiove and Aprosoja possessed significant inclusion power 
as well as GIAP. With its origin in the WWF’s FCI, the main rationale behind creating the 
RTRS was to halt deforestation in the Amazon rainforest. Against this background, getting 
Brazilian producers to sign up for the scheme was a key objective. Now, Aprosoja is Brazil’s 
largest soybean growers association and Abiove (the Brazilian vegetable oil manufacturers 
association) represents about 72 percent of the country’s soy processing volume (Abiove, 
website; Aprosoja, website). Therefore, their participation was essential for the scheme’s 
overall success. Given their high level of inclusion power, it is therefore puzzling why the 
other members of the RTRS did not do more to prevent them from leaving the initiative. The 
within-case analysis points to two reasons: Firstly, there was little room for compromise 
between Brazilian producers, on the one hand, and civil society groups in the RTRS, on the 
other. For Abiove and Aprosoja, a strict cut-off date for deforestation directly interfered with 
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their economic interests as it posed an obstacle to future soy expansion (interviews with 
producer representatives). In a similar way, for civil society actors in the RTRS, removing or 
softening the cut-off date would have undermined their core objective of protecting the 
Amazon rainforest (interviews with NGO representatives). Secondly, the interviews and 
background analysis point to an increase in Abiove’s and Aprosoja’s GIAP as a determining 
factor. The circumstance to this is that beginning in the late 1990s Chinese demand for 
soybeans grew exponentially and by the mid-2000s China replaced the EU as the world’s 
largest import market for soy (see Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21: Soybean Imports by China and the EU (million tonnes) 
 
        Source: FAO STAT 
 
As explained by a member of the RTRS secretariat29, this shift in trade patterns reduced 
pressures on Brazilian producers to engage in meaningful sustainability regulation. This is 
because Chinese companies and consumers are significantly less concerned about 
sustainability issues than their European counterparts. Thus, when Abiove and Aprosoja 
found themselves unable to prevent the RTRS from adopting a cut-off date for deforestation 
practices, they decided to leave the euro-centric soy roundtable (interviews with several 
members of the EB).   
 
                                                          
29
 Interview with Ben Zeehandelaar. 
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Summing up the above discussion, the analysis of the adoption process uncovered several 
rounds of institutional bargaining in the RTRS. However, unlike the RSB, there was no 
bargaining over the design of governance structures. Thus, overall the case study produced 
little evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 (institutional bargaining and the distribution of 
bargaining power influence the diffusion outcome). On the other hand, the within-case 
analysis revealed how important stakeholders (NGOs and firms) left the RTRS due to 
conflicts over the scheme’s scope and the content of its standard. These conflicts and their 
outcomes could be explained with the constellation of interests and bargaining power in the 
RTRS. Whereas patterns of participation are different from institutional design (the focus of 
this project), the issue is closely related to the deeper research question studied in this project: 
the inclusiveness of private governance institutions (see discussion in Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.1). 
 
Coercive Pressures 
The previous sections discovered close network ties between the founders of the RTRS and 
the RSPO, which in turn had been modelled on the basis of the FSC. It was described how 
they used these initiatives as templates when creating their organisation and how they learned 
from their experiences when importing the MSI institutional model to the soy sector. Also, 
processes of institutional bargaining were examined. It was revealed how producer groups 
and NGOs clashed over the scope and content of the RTRS’ standard and how several 
stakeholders left the initiative as a result. However, the RTRS and its design cannot be fully 
understood without considering the wider institutional environment in which the scheme was 
initiated.  
 
In Chapter 2, a distinction was made between normative and coercive environmental 
pressures. It was argued that the group of late adopters are likely to be subject to the same 
normative pressures and that this can have an isomorphic effect on them. On the other hand, 
there is reason to believe that coercive pressures may well vary across industry sectors and 
schemes. With a focus on transnational activist campaigns, it was argued that strong coercive 
pressures will lead to a more inclusive diffusion outcome. This is because in these 
environments business actors are likely to be more willing to engage with civil society actors 
in the context of MSIs. Also, advocacy groups may put pressure on the founders of new MSIs 
to adopt a more inclusive approach. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
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H4: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if coercive pressures at the 
point of adoption are strong (weak). 
 
To examine this hypothesis, a background analysis about the environmental conditions during 
the adoption process will be conducted. Therefore, the empirical analysis will draw on media 
reports, NGO reports, and secondary literature. Furthermore, interviews and primary 
documents (e.g. meeting minutes) will be used to examine how adopters perceived their 
institutional environment and how they responded to it. 
 
Through the interviews and a background analysis it was discovered that the RTRS was 
subject to strong coercive institutional pressures during its formation phase. The rapid 
expansion of soybean fields in Latin America and elsewhere had attracted much attention 
form NGOs and the media. Furthermore, the widespread use of GM technology in the soy 
sector became an important issue with environmental NGOs.  
 
From the beginning, the rise of GM technology in the 1990s was met with much scepticism 
and criticism. In a similar way to nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s, GMOs mobilised 
protests by development and environmental NGOs around the world. They argued that 
GMOs were associated with a wide range of human health, animal health, and environmental 
risks (see Chapter 3 for details). Starting in the late 1990s, an international coalition of NGOs 
began campaigning against the use of transgenic crops. This coalition consisted of large 
NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth as well as many smaller issue-specific 
advocacy groups like GM Freeze and GM Watch. With its heavy reliance on GM technology, 
the soy industry became a notable focal point of transnational activism against biotechnology 
(interview with a GMO campaigner).  
 
Civil society activism in the soy arena began to intensify in the early 2000s and has been 
strong ever since. In one of the most visible campaigns, Greenpeace directly targeted some of 
the major players in the soy supply chain, among them the world’s largest producer of GM 
seeds – Monsanto. Since 1996, the company has held a patent on GM soy, also known as 
Roundup Ready Soy. The glyphosate-resistant Roundup Ready soybean is widely used by 
farmers around the world. For example, in Brazil in the 2009/2010 growing season, Roundup 
Ready Soy accounted for 67 percent of the total land area under soybeans (Soybean and Corn 
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Advisor, 2009). In collaboration with other NGOs, Greenpeace has challenged Monsanto’s 
patent on all GM soybean varieties (Organic Consumer Association, 2003). This litigation 
strategy was accompanied by ‘naming and shaming’ activities in which Monsanto has been 
publicly criticised for its business model, which is built around GM technology and 
agrochemicals (Greenpeace, 2003, 2006, 2007).   
 
It was in this environment of intensifying controversy surrounding the soy industry in that the 
members of the OC launched the RTRS process. With growing visibility, soon their initiative 
had also become a target of criticism and controversy. Notably, the decision to allow GM soy 
to be certified under the scheme, which led GMO-critical organisations to leave the OC, 
triggered political activism against the roundtable initiative. In this regard, the first soy 
roundtable conference held in March 2005 in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, already became a highly 
politicised event. Parallel to the roundtable meeting, a coalition of GMO-critical NGOs 
organised a counter-conference in the same city. In a statement, they pointed to the 
irreconcilability of GMOs and monoculture with sustainability and heavily criticised the 
RTRS for its plans to certify GM soy as responsible. The second soy roundtable conference 
in August 2006 in Asunción, Paraguay, was also accompanied by protests. A coalition of 
NGOs organised a protest march and published a declaration opposing “responsible soy”. 
Similar protest activities surrounded the third and fourth RTRS roundtable conferences 
(ASEED, 2008; Corporate Europe Observatory, 2009). The WWF, too, became a direct target 
of NGO activism for its involvement in the RTRS. In 2009, WWF Netherland’s headquarters 
in Amsterdam were visited by a group of activists in panda costumes, demanding the WWF’s 
retreat from the soy roundtable (The Ecologist, 2009). The same year, a coalition of over 
sixty NGOs published an open “letter of critical opposition to the Roundtable on Responsible 
Soy” (Rainforest Rescue, 2009). Protests against the RTRS and its position on GM soy 
continue to this day as evidenced by NGO reports and news coverage (Corporate Europe 
Observatory, 2012; GMWatch, 2013; The Telegraph, 2011). 
 
The interviews and available documentation show how these strong (direct) coercive 
pressures were perceived by the members of the founding group and how it affected their 
institutional design choices and thus the diffusion outcome. In this regard, the members of the 
OC discussed the situation in the soy sector and the activities against their initiative. Like the 
founders of the RSB, they reasoned that the high level of controversy surrounding their 
project required a more participatory approach. In the case of the RTRS, which unlike the 
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biofuels roundtable had been the target of direct NGO activism, this can also be interpreted as 
a strategy to shield the organisation from further criticism.  
 
The interviews and available documentation shows how the members of the OC perceived 
and responded to their institutional pressures in their environments. Importing the MSI model 
form the palm oil to the soy sector, they drew comparisons between the two environments. In 
this regard, the former chairperson of the RSPO and founding member of the RTRS 
explained in an interview: 
 
“The most important difference between the two [palm oil and soy] is the GMO 
discussion. GMO is dominant in soy especially with civil society, not so much with 
producers, and GMO is absent from the palm oil discussion” (interview with a 
member of the OC).  
 
There was also a perception among the members of the founding group that the political 
conflict and controversy surrounding GM soy made the soy sector a very difficult 
environment for launching a multi-stakeholder process. In this regard, the International 
Coordinator of the WWF FCI stated in an interview that they were aware of the fact that they 
were “sticking their head in anthill” and that it was a “really though environment”. Her 
interpretation of the situation was seconded by the former Director of the WWF FCI:   
 
“Compared to palm oil, it was a much more politicised environment. There was the 
GMO issue. It was much more difficult to setup.”  
 
As evidenced by the meeting minutes, the protest activities and criticism surrounding the 
RTRS process were discussed in detail among the members of the OC. After the first 
roundtable conference was held in March 2005, there was a general agreement that they had 
underestimated the political nature of the issue (RTRS, 2005c). When preparing the launch of 
the formal organisation, they turned toward Pi Environmental Consulting, a Swiss 
consultancy firm, for advice. Analysing the political situation in the soy sector, its report to 
the OC reads:  
 
“Who will be affected, who can affect the RSS [Roundtable on Sustainable Soy]30 and 
the level of impact are key guides in determining who should participate and to what 
                                                          
30
 During the first year, the RTRS was called the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy (RSS).  
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extent. Because stakeholders are also those who oppose to an initiative, the higher the 
controversy around a project, the more SH [Stakeholders] must be closely involved 
with decision-making” (Pi Environmental Consulting, 2005: 23). 
 
The interviews with several members of the OC confirmed that the high level of political 
conflict surrounding the RTRS was one of the main reasons for adopting a more participatory 
approach. In a way, this can also be interpreted as a strategy to shield the organisation from 
further criticism, as a comment of one of the interviewees suggests:  
 
“We were under very close scrutiny from the NGOs because of the GMO issue. 
Everything we were doing was watched closely and we did not want to give them 
another pretext to criticise us on governance” (interview with a member of the OC). 
 
Confirming the findings from the previous case study chapter, the evidence laid out above 
showed how strong coercive pressures in form of transnational activism against GM soy 
pushed the founders of the RTRS to adopt a more inclusive approach. Like their counterparts 
in the RSB, they reasoned that a narrow approach would have little chance to succeed in such 
an environment. Furthermore, being the target of direct NGO activism, there is evidence to 
suggest that this was also a strategy to protect the RTRS against further criticism.  
 
Normative Pressures 
Like in the previous case, the within-case analysis revealed how the ISEAL Alliance and its 
standard-setting code exercised normative pressures on the designers of the RTRS. To 
recapitulate, created in 2002, ISEAL is an association of leading private standard-setting 
systems. Among its founding members are the FSC, the IFOAM, the FLO, and the MSC 
(ISEAL, website-a). Probably the most important normative document developed by ISEAL, 
is its Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards (ISEAL, 2012). 
First released in 2004, the code lays out principles and criteria for how to create credible 
private standard systems. One of the most important procedural requirements of the ISEAL 
code is stakeholder inclusion in the decision-making and standard-setting process. In this 
regard, the code stipulates that (ISEAL, 2012: 8):  
 
• Standard-setting shall be open to all interested parties  
• Participation and decision-making needs to reflect a balance of interests (subject 
matter and geographic scope)  
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• Participants shall include stakeholders with an expertise relevant to the subject, those 
that are materially affected by the standard, and those that could influence the 
implementation of the standard. 
 
The normative framework created by ISEAL has become an important reference point for 
private sustainability initiatives – including the founders of the RTRS. Although the RTRS 
never became a formal member of ISEAL, there is strong evidence suggesting that its 
standard-setting norms served the members of the OC as an important point of reference. In 
this regard, in many of the documents related to standard-setting references are made to 
ISEAL and its standard-setting code (RTRS, 2007a, 2007d). The importance of ISEAL for 
the RTRS could also be confirmed in an interview with the coordinator of the PCVDG who 
states that she followed the methodology of ISEAL when setting up the standard-setting 
process (interview with the coordinator of the PCVDG). Notably, as in the case of the RSB, 
the decision to open the RTRS Principles and Criteria for public comments periods could be 
traced back to the ISEAL norms.  
 
5.5 Summary of Findings  
This was the second of three case study chapters. It examined the diffusion of private 
participatory governance to the soy sector. After providing some case context and 
background information, the institutional development of the RTRS from its inception to the 
launch of the formal organisation was described. As part of this, a detailed analysis of the 
scheme’s rule-making and decision-making arrangements was conducted, identifying the 
scheme as an MSI with a medium level of inclusiveness. In order to explain this outcome, the 
process of institutional diffusion was traced. The process-analysis was guided by the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. This framework distinguishes three stages in 
the diffusion process – source selection, transmission, and adoption – and specifies a set of 
testable hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships that influence institutional 
outcomes (see Table 20, Section 5.4).  
 
Consistent with the underlying diffusion model, the empirical analysis revealed how the 
founders of the RTRS did not design their organisation from scratch. Instead, they turned 
toward already established MSIs in other fields in order to learn from their experiences and to 
imitate their structures. Mirroring the findings from the previous case study chapter, inquiries 
182 
 
into the causes of institutional diffusion suggest two main motives: costs savings (time and 
resources) and risk reduction (avoidance of making mistakes).  
 
Close network ties to the RSPO (both initiatives had their origin in the FCI of the WWF) led 
the founders of the RTRS to select the palm oil roundtable as its primary target institution. 
Furthermore, it was discovered that the RSPO had, in turn, been modelled after the FSC 
(chain mode diffusion). Providing some support for Hypothesis 1 (the primary target 
institution influences the diffusion outcome), the RTRS resembles the RSPO and the FSC in 
many ways. However, the founders of the soy roundtable did not simply replicate the 
institutional design of the palm oil roundtable or the forestry initiative as a comparison 
between the three organisations revealed.  
 
Examining the transmission of ideas between the three organisations, the process analysis 
revealed how the people behind the RSPO and RTRS learned from the FSC experience. 
However, unlike the founders of the RSB, they concluded that the FSC’s participatory 
approach was less suited to their purposes. They reasoned that the “hidden commodities” soy 
and palm oil required amore business-oriented approach and less involvement from civil 
society actors. Providing support for Hypothesis 2 (learning can influence the diffusion 
outcome), this learning process explains why the RSPO and RTRS came out stronger on the 
business side when compared to the FSC. However, it does not explain why the RTRS 
positioned itself somewhere in between the RSPO and FSC in terms of inclusiveness.   
 
Moving toward the adoption stage of the model, the process analysis uncovered several 
rounds of institutional bargaining among the founders of the RTRS. However, unlike the 
RSB, there were no attempts from industry groups to re-negotiate the institutional design of 
the scheme. On the other hand, several stakeholders (NGOs and firms) were found to have 
left the RTRS due to conflicts over the scheme’s scope and the content of its standard. These 
conflicts and their outcomes could be explained by the constellation of interests and 
bargaining power in the RTRS. However, overall the case study produced little evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 3 (institutional bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power 
influences the diffusion outcome).  
 
Finally, the nature and strength of environmental pressures at the point of adoption were 
examined. Confirming the findings from the previous case study chapter, it was shown how 
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strong coercive pressures in the soy arena influenced the diffusion outcome (Hypothesis 4). 
These pressures took the form of transnational NGO activism against GM soy and the RTRS 
and pushed its founders to adopt a more inclusive approach. Like their counterparts in the 
RSB, they reasoned that a narrow approach would have little chance of succeeding in such a 
contentious and politicised environment. Also, being the target of direct NGO campaigning 
activities, there is evidence to suggest that adopting a more inclusive governance structure 
was a strategy to protect the RTRS against further criticism. Next to coercive pressures, 
emerging transnational norms of good private governance were found to have influenced the 
diffusion outcome toward a more participatory approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
Chapter 6: The Better Sugarcane Initiative (Bonsucro) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous two chapters traced the diffusion of private participatory governance to the 
biofuels and soy sectors. The process analysis revealed similarities as well as differences 
across the two cases. In both cases, adopters’ network ties determined the selection of 
primary target institutions which closely linked them to the FSC and RSPO. However, there 
were differences with regard to the lessons learned from prior adopters. Whereas the founders 
of the RSB came to believe that the FSC’s highly participatory approach was essential for its 
success as a private standards organisation, the founders of the RTRS reasoned that the FSC 
model was less suited for their purposes and opted for a more business-oriented approach 
instead. But in examining the adoption process in the biofuels and soy sectors, it was found 
that strong coercive institutional pressures in these arenas led the two initiatives to converge 
toward a higher level of inclusiveness. Creating their institutions in these contested 
environments, the founders of the RSB and RTRS came to believe that a narrow approach 
would have little chances of success. In the case of the RTRS, which became the target of 
direct NGO activism, adopting a more inclusive design was also a strategy to shield the 
organisation from further criticism.  
 
In order to create a baseline for comparison, this chapter traces the diffusion of private 
participatory governance to the sugarcane sector (BSI/Bonsucro). In the inventory of MSIs 
conducted in Chapter 1, this scheme was found to exhibit a low level of inclusiveness. As in 
the other case study chapters, the empirical analysis will be guided by the diffusion model 
developed in Chapter 2. The model distinguishes three stages in the diffusion process – 
source selection, transmission, and adoption – and identifies a set of testable hypotheses 
about the cause-and-effect relationships that influence institutional outcomes.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in a first step, some case context and 
background is provided. Then, the institutional development of BSI/Bonsucro is described, 
from the scheme’s inception to the launch of the formal organisation and the finalisation of 
the standard-setting process. As part of this, a more detailed analysis of the scheme’s 
decision-making and rule-making arrangements is provided. In a final step, the analytical 
185 
 
framework developed in Chapter 2 is used to explain the institutional outcome for the case at 
hand. 
 
6.2 Case Context and Background  
Sugarcane is a perennial crop that is grown between the latitudes 36.7° north and 31.0° south 
of the equator (i.e. in tropical to subtropical zones). It is mainly processed into sugar and 
accounts for about 70 percent of the world’s sugar production, while the remaining 30 
percent is derived from sugar beet (Plant Cultures, website). Only a very small fraction of the 
world’s sugar production is directly sold to the end consumer. Most of it is used as a 
sweetener in a large variety of food products and beverages. Increasingly, sugarcane is also 
used as a feedstock for biofuel production (bioethanol). The FAO estimates that currently 
about 24 percent of the global sugarcane harvest is used for this purpose. For 2020, this share 
is set to increase to about 32 percent of global production (OECD/FAO, 2011: 132).  
 
Today, sugarcane is grown in more than 100 countries. According to the FAO, the total land 
area under sugarcane was 25.8 million hectares in 2012 and total production was 1.77 billion 
tonnes (FAO, website-b). The world’s top five sugarcane producing countries are: Brazil, 
India, China, Thailand, and Pakistan (see Table 19).  
 
Table 19: Top 5 Producers of Sugarcane 2012 
Country Production (million tonnes)  
Brazil 670.8 
India 348.9 
China 124.2 
Thailand 96.5 
Pakistan 58 
 
Source: FAO STAT  
 
As the world’s largest producer, Brazil also dominates the global trade in sugar. In 2010, the 
country accounted for 62.5 percent of world sugar exports, followed by Australia (8.4 
percent) and Thailand (6.2 percent) (FAO, website-b). Brazil is also the largest exporter of 
sugarcane ethanol, of which it exported some 500 million gallons in 2010 (USDA, 2011). 
Whereas sugar exports are highly concentrated, the group of importing countries is more 
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diversified. Currently, the major importer is the EU, closely followed by the USA. Other 
important sugar importing countries are Korea and Japan (OECD/FAO, 2011: 126). 
 
Driven by public biofuel policies around the world and a growing world population, global 
demand for sugarcane is increasing. However, the sector has not seen a global boom 
comparable to that of the soy sector. Instead, sugarcane expansion has been more gradual and 
significantly smaller in scale (see Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: Global Land Area under Sugarcane and Soy (million hectares) 
 
      Source: FAO STAT  
 
Nevertheless, in some regions sugarcane expansion has been significant. In Brazil, for 
example, the total land area under sugarcane increased from 4.2 million hectares in 1992 to 
9.4 million hectares in 2012. This is an increase of 124 percent. The FAO’s Agricultural 
Outlook 2011-2020 predicts that sugarcane expansion will continue. Major drivers are a 
growing demand for sugar from emerging market economies –  notably China – as well as a 
growing global demand for sugarcane ethanol (OECD/FAO, 2011: 119-132). 
 
The strong expansion of sugarcane in countries like Brazil has led to concerns about the 
detrimental environmental and social impacts of sugarcane production. The controversy 
surrounding sugarcane intensified with the advent of biofuels. Sugarcane is an important 
feedstock for ethanol production and, according to the FAO’s projections, the proportion of 
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world sugarcane production used for ethanol is set to increase from 24 percent currently to 
about 32 percent in 2020 (OECD/FAO, 2011: 132). This has led to concerns about sugarcane-
induced land use change becoming a major driver behind deforestation in the Amazon. In this 
context, sugarcane production has been discussed as causing climate change and a loss of 
biodiversity (BBC, 2009; Friends of the Earth, 2010). Furthermore, the water-intensity of 
sugarcane production has been an issue (WWF, 2004c).  
 
With regard to the social impacts of sugarcane expansion, NGOs have raised concerns that 
land grabs have led to a loss of local communities’ livelihoods communities (Ethical Sugar, 
2012). Another, issue in the sugarcane sector is poor labour standards. Due to a low 
mechanisation rate, sugarcane production is a highly labour intensive industry and NGOs 
have long criticised the industry for low wages and forced labour as well as poor health and 
safety conditions (Reuters, 2008; The Guardian, 2012). 
 
In the absence of effective public regulation and, given the industry’s multiple challenges, a 
number of private regulatory arrangements have emerged in recent years. The evolving 
system of private governance in the sugarcane sector includes firm- and industry-level self-
regulation as well as multi-stakeholder schemes (see Table 20).  
 
Table 20: Private Governance in the Sugarcane Industry 
Scheme Type Geographical 
focus 
Focus of standard 
BSI/Bonsucro Multi-stakeholder 
 
Global Social and environmental 
impacts  
Carbon Free Label Company scheme Global CO2 emissions 
Coca-Cola 
Sustainable 
Agriculture  
Company scheme Global Social and environmental 
impacts  
FLO Multi-stakeholder Global  Fair remuneration of 
sugarcane farmers  
Greenergy Company scheme Global Environmental impact of 
sugarcane ethanol 
production  
ISCC Multi-stakeholder Global Social and environmental 
impacts  
Sustainable 
Agriculture 
Network/Rainforest 
Alliance 
Coalition of NGOs South America  Social and environmental 
impacts  
Fairtrade USA Multi-stakeholder Global Fair remuneration of 
sugarcane farmers 
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These arrangements are now an important source of environmental and social regulation in 
the industry. They define standards for pesticide use, land-use change, labour rights, etc. and 
often rely on incentive-based mechanisms for their implementation. Probably the most 
significant private scheme in the sugarcane sector, in terms of visibility, membership, and 
volume, is BSI/Bonsucro. 
 
6.3 Better Sugarcane Initiative (Bonsucro) 
Launched in 2005, BSI/Bonsucro is a private standard-setting and certification body, created 
to mitigate the social and environmental impacts of global sugarcane production. In a multi-
stakeholder process, it defines principles and criteria for “better” sugarcane production and, 
via certification, provides market incentives for their implementation. This section traces the 
institutional development of BSI/Bonsucro form its inception to the launch of the formal 
organisation. Furthermore, with a focus on the organisation’s standard-setting and decision-
making arrangements, a more detailed assessment of its inclusiveness is provided.  
 
6.3.1 Inception 
In the early 2000s, the WWF turned towards agricultural induced land-use change as an 
important driver behind deforestation in the tropics. Spearheaded by WWF Switzerland, this 
shift in the NGO’s forest conservation strategy resulted in the creation of the RSPO and the 
RTRS as part of the FCI (see Chapter 5). But other parts of the WWF network also started 
working on agriculture and its impact on the environment. One important initiative was the 
WWF’s Global Freshwater Programme (GFP) which identified agriculture as having a key 
impact on water systems. According to the GFP, agriculture is by far the biggest user of 
water, accounting on average for about 70 percent of all freshwater withdrawn for human use. 
Furthermore, agricultural practices were held responsible for considerable freshwater 
pollution through the intensive use of fertilisers and pesticides. In this context, GFP identified 
sugarcane as one of the world’s “thirstiest” crops (WWF, 2003):  
 
“WWF became interested in agriculture’s impact on freshwater systems. We were 
looking at the crops that were having the biggest impact on water systems. This was 
in 2002 and we looked at seven major catchments and one of the crops that came out 
as the most important was sugarcane. Also cotton and rice were important. So that 
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meant that we had an impact that we wanted to see mitigated” (interview with a 
member of the WWF GFP). 
 
It was WWF UK and WWF US which, with support of the IFC, took the lead on sugarcane. 
In 2003, WWF officials attended the annual congress of the International Society of Sugar 
Cane Technologists (ISSCT), a leading industry association and important forum for 
sugarcane growers around the world. The following year, WWF UK published an article in 
which it outlined the rational and contours of a civil society-industry partnership in the 
sugarcane sector (Perkins, 2004). Around the same time, the GFP compiled a major report on 
the environmental impacts of sugarcane production and ways to mitigate them through better 
management practices (BMPs) (WWF, 2004c). Then, in the summer 2004, WWF UK 
reached out to Tate & Lyle, one of the world’s largest buyers and refiners of sugar, to discuss 
the possibility of creating a sustainability standard for sugarcane. After several meetings, the 
company agreed to host a workshop on BMPs for sugarcane at its London headquarters 
(interviews with representatives of WWF UK and Tate & Lyle). 
 
Held in June 2005, the Better Sugar Better Business Meeting brought together about 30 
stakeholders from industry and civil society. The meeting focused on identifying the key 
environmental and social impacts of sugarcane production. In particular, the topics of land 
use change, water use, pesticides, and labour practices were discussed together with how to 
improve them through the adoption of BMPs. Furthermore, the goals and objectives of a 
roundtable initiative for sugarcane were discussed in detail. At the end of the meeting, the 
workshop participants agreed to move forward with the plan and the WWF and IFC recruited 
members for a multi-stakeholder SC (WWF, 2005a). 
 
6.3.2 Formation Phase 
Like in the cases of the RSB and the RTRS, the SC consisted of an ad hoc group of people 
who had volunteered at the Better Sugar Better Business Meeting. In principle, participation 
in the SC was open to all interested parties. However, SC members had to pay a membership 
fee of US$ 25,000 which was used to fund the activities of the group (BSI, 2007a). Starting in 
January 2006, the SC members met several times a year via teleconference or in person. As in 
the others cases, the composition and membership of the SC varied over the period of its 
existence. New organisations joined the initiative, whereas others left or scaled back their 
involvement. Towards the end of the formation period, it had some 15 members. Industry 
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members included buyers of sugarcane or sugarcane ethanol (BP, British Sugar, Shell, Coca-
Cola, Tate & Lyle, and Cardbury Schweppes), and traders (Cargill), as well as a large 
Brazilian producer industry association (UNICA). From the civil society side, there were the 
WWF, Solidaridad, and Ethical Sugar (BSI, 2008d). Initially, the WWF provided secretarial 
support to the SC. Later a small secretariat based in London was established (interviews with 
the Coordinator and General Manager of the BSI). 
 
One important milestone during the formation period was the launch of the standard-setting 
process. Discussions about the key impacts of sugarcane production and ways to mitigate 
them had already begun at the foundational meeting in June 2005. Throughout 2006 and 
2007, the members of the SC continued the discussion about the key impacts of sugarcane 
production (BSI, 2007c). This led to the identification of five principles which served as the 
point of departure for the formal standard-setting process launched in early 2008. These 
principles were: (1) Obey the law; (2) respect human rights and labour standards; (3) manage 
input, production, and processing efficiently to enhance sustainability; (4) commit to 
continuous improvement in key areas of the business; (5) actively manage biodiversity and 
ecosystem services (BSI, 2008f).  
 
The refinement of the standard and the development of indicators then took place in three 
newly formed Technical Working Groups (TWGs) on agronomy, processing and milling, and 
social impacts. The distinctive feature of the Bonsucro standard is that it is based on metrics. 
Instead of BMPs which define principles and criteria for improving the process of production, 
the metric-based system attempts to measure impacts. In this regard, the BSI is different from 
the RSB and RTRS which follow the BMP approach. To define and operationalise the impact 
indicators, the SC adopted what it called an expert-based approach to standard-setting 
(Bonsucro, website-b). In this regard, the BSI is similar to the RTRS which also restricted 
access to its standard-setting body. The SC selected three TWG leaders who then recruited a 
small team of eight to nine experts for each of the three areas mentioned above. The role of 
the TWG leaders was to organise the meetings of their groups (mostly in the form of 
teleconferences), to circulate documents, and thus to develop the impact indicators for the 
BSI/Bonsucro Production Standard (interviews with the TWG leaders). However, in 
comparison to the RTRS, participation in the TWGs was less balanced. Overall, very few 
civil society actors participated in the process. Also, it was found that all three TWG leaders 
had an industry background (interviews with the three TWG leaders). Figure 3 provides a 
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more detailed breakdown of the composition of the three TWGs using the four key 
stakeholder categories defined in Chapter 2 (see Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23: Composition of BSI/Bonsucro’s Standard Setting Bodies (percent)31 
 
 
Over the course of 2008, the work of the TWGs produced some 150 indicators for measuring 
the environmental and social impact of sugarcane production. In a joint meeting of the three 
TWG leaders and the members of the SC these indicators were then revised and compiled 
into Version 1 of the BSI Production Standard. The meeting took place as part of the BSI’s 
first AGM held in São Paulo, Brazil, in November 2008 (interviews with the three TWG 
leaders). At the time, the BSI was not yet a formal organisation. However, some 70 
organisations had already registered with the initiative and at the meeting a decision was 
made to provide the BSI with a more formal and permanent structure (BSI, 2008b).  
 
6.3.3 The Formal Organisation  
The first step in this transition process was to dismantle the SC and to replace it with a so-
called Transitional Management Committee (TMC). Then, in March 2009, electronic 
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elections were held among the BSI membership. The TMC was replaced by a Management 
Committee (MC) and Supervisory Board of Directors (SBD). Furthermore, the AGM was 
formalised and the BSI was registered as a not for profit company under the laws of England 
and Wales (BSI, 2009c, 2009d). 
 
 In the newly formed organisation, decision-making was concentrated in the SBD, whereas 
the MC mainly functioned as an advisory body (BSI, 2009a). In practice, however, the two 
boards often held their meetings together (interviews with members of the MC and SBD). 
Also, the double board structure was somewhat artificial in the sense that their memberships 
strongly overlapped (BSI, 2009d). As having two boards was perceived by many as unwieldy 
and unnecessary, a decision was made at the AGM in Puerto Rico in November 2010 to 
replace them with a single BD. At this occasion, the BSI also changed its name to Bonsucro 
(Bonsucro, 2010). See Figure 24 for an organisational chart of Bonsucro.  
 
Figure 24: Organisational Chart of BSI/Bonsucro 
 
 
The BD is now the central locus of decision-making in Bonsucro. Its members (directors) 
convene several times a year to discuss and reach decisions on various matters of 
organisational strategy and development. Some of its core functions include: approving the 
standard, admitting new members, and appointing and controlling the activities of the 
Bonsucro secretariat. The SB is divided into four stakeholder categories: (1) 
growers/producers; (2) processors; (3) end users/intermediaries; (4) civil society. The 
Bonsucro Constitution stipulates that each constituency group shall be represented by at least 
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two Directors at the board level (BSI, 2009a).32 In contrast to the RSB and RTRS, the 
collective choice rules of Bonsucro do not include a right of veto for civil society actors. Its 
Articles of Association stipulate that the BD has a quorum of at least two directors. If the 
quorum is met, decisions are taken by a simple majority of votes. In the case of a draw, the 
chairman has a casting vote (Bonsucro, 2011). Effectively, as shown below, this translates 
into a dominant position of northern industry actors in the organisation’s central decision-
making body.  
 
Whereas the formal design of BSI/Bonsucro’s central decision-making body has changed 
over time, its composition has remained very similar (see Figure 25). In this regard, a 
breakdown of stakeholder participation using the categories defined in Chapter 2 reveals a 
dominant position of northern industry actors, mostly big brand companies like BP, Shell, 
Cargill, Tate & Lyle, and Coca Cola. Also, two large northern NGOs (WWF and Solidaridad) 
have been permanent members of the BSI/Bonsucro boards. There was also some 
participation from producer groups such as the Brazilian sugarcane industry association 
UNICA. However, civil society actors from the global south have had no representation in 
the organisation’s central decision-making body.  
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 In 2011, the composition of the BD was changed to (1) end users; (2) civil society; (3) farmers; (4) 
intermediaries; (5) industrial (Bonsucro, 2011). 
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Figure 25. Composition of BSI/Bonsucro’s Primary Decision-Making Body (percent)33 
 
 
Membership of Bonsucro is open to all organisations with a stake in the sugarcane sector. All 
members have to pay a membership fee, which varies depending on the type and size of the 
organisation (Bonsucro, website-a). In January 2014, BSI/Bonsucro had 102 members. Figure 
26 shows a detailed breakdown of its composition. Once a year, the members of Bonsucro are 
invited to convene for the AGM. As mentioned above, the first AGM took place in São Paulo 
in November 2008. At these meetings, the members receive the accounts of the organisation 
in the form of a written report. Furthermore, the AGM has some decision-making authority. 
Among the most important powers of the AGM is the election of the BD. Therefore, each 
“electing class” (growers/producers, processors, end users/intermediaries, and civil society) 
elects or re-elects their representatives at the BD. Furthermore, the AGM approves the 
standard and decides on resolutions referred to it by the BD. With regard to collective choice 
rules, the AGM has a quorum of at least seven members, comprising at least one person from 
each constituency group. Voting is done by a show of hands or (if demanded) a poll. The 
Decisions on resolution or amendments to resolutions are taken by a simple majority of votes 
(BSI, 2009a).34 
                                                          
33
 This figure has been composed from background materials. To this end, board members have been identified 
as either belonging to one of the following categories: Industry, civil society, or others. Then, the location of 
their home institution’s headquarter has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north or global 
south).  
34
 The 2011 version of the Articles of Association does not clearly specify the collective choice rules of the 
AGM  (Bonsucro, 2011). 
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Figure 26. Composition of the membership of BSI/Bonsucro (percent)35 
 
In the newly formed organisation, standard-setting continued in the TWGs. Furthermore, 
following the guidelines of the ISEAL Alliance, Version 1 of the standard was opened for a 
60-day public consultation period, starting in March 2009. During this period interested 
parties could comment and provide feedback on the standard. The standard was opened for a 
second public consultation period after Version 2 of the Bonsucro Production Standard was 
approved at the AGM in November 2009. During the first round of public consultation, 
eighteen organisations provided feedback on the standard (BSI, 2009b). Regarding the 
second round of public consultations, comments from four organisations were posted on the 
Bonsucro website (BSI, 2010). In addition to the public consultation period, the secretariat 
organised a number of stakeholder outreach meetings during 2009 and 2010. Meetings were 
conducted in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe. According to the Bonsucro 
Secretariat, more than 800 stakeholders were reached during this outreach programme 
(Bonsucro, website-b). The feedback from the stakeholder outreach meetings was worked 
back into the standard, leading to Version 3 of the Bonsucro Production Standard. However, 
no clear guidelines existed about how, and to what extent, the input from the stakeholder 
consultations had to be included in the standard. After the standard setting-process was 
concluded, the certification scheme was launched in June 2011. See Figure 27 for an 
overview of the institutional development of BSI/Bonsucro.  
                                                          
35
 This figure has been composed from the membership list provided on the Bonsucro website 
(http://bonsucro.com/site/members/list-of-members/, January 2014). To this end, members have been identified 
as either belonging to one of the following categories: Industry, civil society, or others. Then, the location of 
their home institution’s headquarter has been used to determine their geographic origin (global north or global 
south).   
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Figure 27. Institutional Development of BSI/Bonsucro (2005-2011) 
 
 
6.3.4 Assessing Inclusiveness 
Using the qualitative indicators developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1), this section assesses 
the inclusiveness of BSI/Bonsucro’s standard-setting and decision-making arrangements. To 
this end, their openness and composition, as well as their constitutive rules are examined.  
 
Standard-setting in BSI/Bonsucro was organised in three TGWs on agronomy, processing 
and milling, and social impacts. The TWGs were formed in early 2008 and over the course of 
the next three years defined and operationalised the BSI/Bonsucro Production Standard. Like 
the RTRS, BSI/Bonsucro restricted access to its standard-setting bodies. In this regard, the 
industry-dominated SC selected three TWG leaders who then recruited small groups of 
experts (8-9 people) for their respective areas. As can be seen from Figure 2 civil society 
actors in particular were strongly underrepresented in the TWGs. Once the first version of the 
standard was completed the BSI followed the guidelines of the ISEAL Alliance and opened 
its standard for two public consultation periods. Furthermore, a global outreach programme 
was conducted. This consultation process exposed the standard to a wider group of 
stakeholders, providing them with the opportunity to give feedback and to provide comments. 
However, there were no clear guidelines as to how and to what extent the SC had to 
incorporate this input. 
 
Decision-making authority in BSI/Bonsucro was initially concentrated in the SC and then in 
the TMC, SBD, and BD. The analysis of the composition of these bodies revealed the strong 
position of economic actors from the global north (mostly big brand companies) (see Figure 
4). They hold the majority of seats in the organisation’s central decision-making body. In 
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contrast, civil society actors from the global south have had no representation at the board-
level at all. Overall, there are very few civil society organisations among the members of 
BSI/Bonsucro, with only 9 out of 102 (9 percent) members belonging to this category. Also, 
it was found that the design of the collective choice rules of BSI/Bonsucro’s central decision-
making bodies do not protect the standard against the possibility of regulatory capture. Thus, 
in comparison to the RSB and RTRS, BSI/Bonsucro has a significantly lower level of 
inclusiveness. See Table 21 for an overview of the institutional design of BSI/Bonsucro.  
 
Table 21. Inclusiveness of BSI/Bonsucro (Overview) 
Standard-setting 
arrangement 
Technical Working Groups  
Membership rules Restricted (members appointed by Steering Committee) 
Composition Unbalanced  
Consultation mechanism  Yes 
Primary Decision-making 
arrangement  
 
Board of Directors 
(Steering Committee) 
Membership rules Restricted to members 
(Fee of US$25,000 to join the Steering Committee) 
Composition Unbalanced 
Collective choice rules No protection against regulatory capture  
 
Secondary Decision-making 
arrangement 
 
Annual General Meeting 
Membership rules Open 
(membership fees depending on size and stakeholder category) 
Composition Unbalanced 
Collective choice rules No protection against regulatory capture  
 
6.4 Tracing the Diffusion Process 
As in the previous two case study chapters, this section uses process-tracing to examine the 
diffusion and variation of the MSI institutional model in the agriculture sector. With a focus 
on BSI/Bonsucro in the sugarcane sector, the different stages of the diffusion process, as 
identified in Chapter 2, are assessed. The objective is to explain why, unlike the RSB and 
RTRS, the BSI/Bonsucro developed significantly less inclusive structures. The analysis 
begins with inquiring into the causes of the diffusion. Then, the selection, transmission, and 
adoption phases are examined in-depth. To this end, the empirical analysis can draw on 17 
semi-structured interviews conducted with members and observers of the BSI/Bonsucro 
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process. Furthermore, the analysis relies on the meeting minutes of the SC and other types of 
primary documents.  
 
6.4.1 Causes  
As in the previous cases, and consistent with the underlying diffusion model, the designers of 
BSI/Bonsucro did not design their organisation from scratch. Instead, they turned to already 
established initiatives in other fields for inspiration and to learn from their experiences. As 
diffusion “theory” would predict, the main motives were that the initiators of the BSI wanted 
to avoid making mistakes and to save time and resources.  
 
The decision to learn from the experiences of others was made early on in the process. 
Already at the initiative’s foundational workshop questions of institutional design were being 
discussed in detail. At the meeting, participants formed four working groups and each was 
given the task of discussing the structure of an MSI for better sugarcane production. Each 
group developed an organogram and these were then presented to the full meeting. In the 
subsequent discussion, participants expressed interest in learning from other commodity 
initiatives and to see how they were run and organised. By learning from the efforts and 
mistakes of others, they hoped to “add value rather than replicate existing programmes” 
(WWF, 2005a). As in the cases of the RSB and RTRS, this led the initiators of the BSI to turn 
to familiar and popular institutional designs. In an interview, the Coordinator of the BSI 
stated: 
 
“I personally had not set up one [MSI] before, but there was lots of experience within 
the WWF on these issues and I talked to a lot of people as many as I could have.” 
 
6.4.2 Source Selection 
The selection of a target institution or source marks the beginning of the diffusion process. A 
choice has to be made about whom to imitate, learn from, etc. Standard diffusion models 
assume the existence of a single central source. Often, however, multiple sources exist. When 
multiple sources are available institutional variation can occur as designers select different 
source models for imitation. These choices depend on factors such as familiarity, spatial 
proximity, and perceptions about the prestige of the target institution. Against this 
background, it was hypothesised that:  
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H1: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if the primary target 
institution exhibits a high (low) level of inclusiveness.  
 
To empirically examine this claim, interviews and primary documents will be used in order to 
establish which organisations served new adopters as a primary source model. 
 
The designers of the RSB had very close network ties to the FSC, which served them as an 
important point of reference. For the initiators of the RTRS, the RSPO was the primary target 
institution. For the case at hand, the diffusion pattern was found to be more diffuse. The 
available documentation and interview material reveals that its designers had knowledge 
about various MSIs. In this regard, in particular, WWF US was an important source of 
information. Its representative had been one of the main advocates for including agriculture-
induced land-use change in the WWF’s overall conservation strategy. In 2004, he had 
published a widely circulated book (World Agriculture and the Environment: A Commodity-
by-Commodity Guide to Impacts and Practices) which identified farming as the “single 
largest threat to biodiversity and ecosystem function of any single human activity on the 
planet” (Clay, 2004: vii). On various occasions, he briefed the members of the SC about other 
MSIs and their setups. For example, he held a presentation about governance options at the 
first meeting of the SC where he talked about the RSPO, the FSC and other roundtable 
initiatives (BSI, 2006e). The interviews confirmed that WWF US and its representative was 
an important source of information for the founders of the sugarcane roundtable.  
 
“He was setting the direction for us as he had set up other roundtables before. So 
when we had the first meeting in London, [Person X] did a lot of the talking. He is a 
fairly convincing person” (interview with a member of the SC).  
 
Before starting its work on sugar, WWF US had initiated and coordinated in the Aquaculture 
Dialogues (ADs). The ADs consisted of eight species-specific roundtables to develop 
standards for responsible aquaculture production. Each roundtable consisted of a multi-
stakeholder steering group, TWGs, and a series of stakeholder outreach meetings as, well as 
periods open to public comments. With a focus on salmon farming, the first AD was initiated 
in February 2004. In the following years, roundtables for others species (e.g. freshwater trout, 
pangasius, shrimp, and tilapia) were launched. Since 2009, the finalised standards have been 
managed by the ASC, a foundation under Dutch law (WWF, website-b). There is evidence 
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that the ADs served the members of the SC as a point of reference when creating the 
organisational structures of the BSI. In this regard, WWF US supplied the members of the SC 
with documents from the Salmon AD which were used as templates for setting up the TWGs 
(BSI, 2006c). However, as mentioned above, the founders of BSI/Bonsucro also considered 
the design of the RSPO, the FSC, and other MSIs when they created the organisational 
structures of their initiative (BSI, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e; WWF, 2005a). 
 
Thus, whereas in the previous two cases a clear primary target institution could be 
established, the diffusion pattern in the case of BSI/Bonsucro was found to be more diffuse. 
When creating the organisational structures of the sugarcane initiative, its founders looked at 
the design of several MSIs, including the ASC, RSPO, and the FSC. This means that in the 
case at hand no clear correlation between the inclusiveness of the primary target institution 
and the diffusion outcome could be established, providing no support for Hypothesis 1 (the 
primary target institution influences the diffusion outcome).   
 
6.4.3 Transmission 
Once a target institution, or institutions, is selected, a diffusion mechanism transmits 
information about the source model to the point of adoption. In Chapter 2, different types of 
diffusion mechanisms were discussed. It was argued that when imitation is the primary 
diffusion mechanism, then a close replication of the source model is the expected outcome. In 
contrast, learning can introduce variation. Variation occurs as adopters draw lessons from 
their experiences and the experiences of others. In doing so, they may find that some aspects 
of the source model are suboptimal for their purposes and make modifications accordingly 
(selective imitation). Also, they may combine the lessons learned at different places and thus 
synthesise new practices. The outcomes of learning processes are inherently difficult to 
predict a priori. They depend on a range of factors which are often case specific. They are 
likely to depend on the past experiences, information available, and interpretations of the 
adopter, as well as the situation and context in which the learning process takes place. 
Although difficult to predict, learning processes leave empirical “traces” (e.g. reflections 
about the pros and cons of a model) which can be examined through interviews and primary 
documents (e.g. meeting minutes, project proposals). Against this background it was 
hypothesised that:  
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H2: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if adopters learn that 
inclusiveness was good (bad) for the success of prior adopters. 
 
As the previous section revealed, the initiators of the BSI looked at several MSIs, including 
the ADs, RSPO, and FSC, when creating the structures of their organisation. However, they 
did not simply imitate any of these initiatives. Instead, learning from its experiences with 
these prior adopters, WWF US promoted a more streamlined and market-oriented approach 
to stakeholder inclusion. These experiences were circulated among founding members of the 
BSI in the form of a memo about WWF US’  “lessons learned from commodity-specific 
dialogues” (WWF, 2004b):  
 
“[Person Z] of WWF UK and [Person Y] of IFC asked me to put together a memo of 
some of my experiences and lessons learned as well as WWF US’ from engaging the 
private sector in commodity specific efforts such as roundtables, certification 
programs, and consortia. Here are some of the conclusions that I have come to over 
the past 15 years doing such work” (WWF, 2004b: 1). 
 
The memo develops the foundations of what is now known and widely publicised as the 
WWF’s theory of business transformation (WWF, website-c). According to this theory, there 
are 15 key agricultural commodities that are responsible for much of the sector’s 
environmental impact. Seventy percent of those commodities are under the control of a 
limited group of 300-500 companies. Against this background, the WWF seeks to engage the 
top 100 influential companies which between them control 25 percent of the trade in these 
commodities in its roundtable initiatives. In this way, the NGO hopes to significantly reduce 
the environmental impact of the agricultural sector on a global scale (Clay, 2010). This theory 
of change has important implications for the structure of MSIs. They are to focus on key 
crops, key impacts, and to leverage the influence of key players in the agro-supply chain. In 
this regard, the memo argues against the more open and experimentalist approach of previous 
roundtable initiatives:   
 
“While talk, discussion, or even consensus may be a means to an end, they are not a 
sufficient end in and of themselves to be worthy of WWF’s time. The goals need to be 
agreed to before the first meeting” (WWF, 2004b: 1). 
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For WWF US, these goals should be the 5-10 most significant impacts that result in 70-80 
percent of the adverse effects that WWF cares about. Rather than creating a more 
comprehensive standard, it is argued that the priority should be to engage a wider segment of 
the industry. Regarding stakeholder inclusion, the memo elaborates on the importance of 
identifying and engaging the “key leverage points for change”. The process should be driven 
by “the players that bring sustained interest in the commodity to the table, and that bring 
considerable financial resources to the work of the group as well” (WWF, 2004b: 3-4). On 
the corporate side, these are buyers and traders as well as banks. These companies, which 
transact with large numbers of producers, can induce environmental change by making their 
buying decisions and loans conditional on standard compliance. In contrast, the memo 
expresses scepticism about involving producers early on in the process. In particular, it warns 
not to involve producer or manufacturer associations which are identified as the most 
conservative members in the agro-supply chain. Also, civil society organisations should be 
selected using criteria such as their level of commitment and expertise. Once the key impacts 
and acceptable levels of overall performance have been identified, the size of the group can 
be expanded. However, the memo makes clear that there are many companies and NGOs that 
should not be included in the process:  
 
“Successful dialogues need a diversity of stakeholders at the table, but not necessarily 
everyone who might want to be there. It is important to get those at the table who are 
not only committed to changing a commodity system, but who are also committed to 
work together to make the change happen. Many different stakeholders (whether 
NGOs or companies) do not fit into this category for one reason or another (e.g. lack 
of expertise, lack of real knowledge or experience with the commodity in question, or 
ideologically opposed to the production of a commodity or finding a viable solution 
for reducing impacts). These types of stakeholders should not be invited to the table” 
(WWF, 2004b: 2). 
 
Furthermore, WWF US identifies the politicisation of the standard-setting process as one of 
the main problems of other roundtable initiatives. Often, these would “bring too much 
technical work into the central group which is more of a ‘political’ body”. Instead, the memo 
argued that the standard “should be set by dedicated standards groups or sub-committees that 
have the technical expertise to do so” (WWF, 2004b).  
 
The interviews with the members of the SC confirmed the importance of the memo for the 
genesis and development of the BSI. In the interviews, the representative of the WWF US 
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was described as the “intellectual architect” and “fountain head” of the initiative (interviews 
with members of the SC) and the then Coordinator of the BSI stated:   
 
“[Person X] had very clear ideas how to do this and wrote a paper about the principles 
that we should use to set up this kind of initiative. His idea was to get your arms 
around the chain at the bits where it is concentrated and then drive change through 
that. That was the thinking behind it” (interview with the Coordinator of the BSI). 
 
In this regard, many of the early decisions about how to setup a commodity roundtable can be 
traced back to WWF US’ theory of change. One example is the decision to first approach 
Tate & Lyle, one of the world’s largest buyers and refiners of sugar, before engaging other 
stakeholders in the process. Another example is the decision to introduce a fee of US$ 25.000 
for organisations wanting to join the SC. It seems that these decisions directly followed from 
WWF US’ advice to focus on the “key leverage points for change” and “the players that bring 
sustained interest in the commodity to the table, and that bring considerable financial 
resources to the work of the group as well” (WWF, 2004b: 3-4). 
 
In support of Hypothesis 2 (learning can influence the diffusion outcome), the above analysis 
uncovered clear traces of a learning process. However, unlike the founders of the RSB, the 
people behind BSI/Bonsucro came to believe that the more open and experimentalist 
approach of earlier commodity roundtables had been an obstacle to their success. Drawing 
lessons from their experiences, they developed a more instrumental and results-oriented 
approach to stakeholder inclusion. In this regard, they bought into WWF US’ “theory of 
change” which focuses on the key leverage points in the agro-supply chain (buyers, investors, 
and traders), whilst excluding more peripheral and critical actors. This learning process may 
explain why the founders of BSI/Bonsucro adopted a significantly less inclusive approach 
when compared to the RSB and RTRS. However, a complete analysis of the diffusion process 
also needs to consider processes of institutional bargaining, as well as the wider institutional 
environment in which the BSI was initiated.  
 
6.4.4 Adoption  
The adoption of the diffusion item marks the end of the diffusion process. In the broader 
diffusion literature this process is often described in a somewhat mechanistic way in which 
potential adopters make a decision to either accept or reject a diffusion item (Rogers, 1995: 
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364). However, a closer consideration of the issue suggests that adoption is not simply a ‘yes 
or no’ decision.  
 
Institutional Bargaining 
Multi-stakeholder processes are political arenas in which struggles over influence and 
diverging interests take place. When firms and NGOs collaborate to create new MSIs they 
typically differ sharply over the structure and governance of these schemes and the scope and 
content of their standards and procedures. As the primary targets of private regulation, 
corporate actors in particular will try to maximise their control over the regulatory process. 
Against this background, it was hypothesised that: 
 
H3: the diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if corporate actors are in weak 
(strong) bargaining position.  
 
To examine this claim, the empirical analysis identifies and describes processes of 
institutional bargaining during the adoption phase. Then, the distribution of bargaining power 
in these situations is examined. 
 
In the case at hand, the empirical analysis uncovered several episodes of institutional 
bargaining during the formation period of BSI/Bonsucro. As in the previous cases, these 
conflicts were found to be rooted in differences over the content and form of regulation. Like 
the interest constellations in the RSB and RTRS, major differences existed between NGOs, 
on the one hand, and producers groups from the global south, on the other. In an interview, 
one of the chairmen of the SC summarised the situation as follows:   
 
“I would say the people the most difficult to bring along were the NGOs and the 
producers. Those two were the two extremes I had to deal with and the most active in 
trying to shape the standard. They were opposite poles.” 
 
Like in the other cases, the cost of implementing sustainability standards was a key issue for 
sugarcane growers. They feared that the BSI/Bonsucro standard would be too demanding and 
that they would not be able to comply with it. Furthermore, there were concerns about 
BSI/Bonsucro being a barrier to trade and a mechanism to discriminate against producers 
from developing countries (BSI, 2006f, interviews with a sugarcane farmer). Another 
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perception was that, controlled by big buyers and Northern NGOs, BSI/Bonsucro and its 
standard was being imposed on producers. The meeting minutes of the SC summarise these 
concerns:   
 
“The producers (Australia, South Africa, et al) remain wary of BSI because of the 
perceived potential of BSI standards for introducing trade filters or other 
phytosanitary trade barriers, and because the BSI’s name (Better Sugarcane) makes 
them feel singled out. This, together with the BSI corporate and NGO members, who 
are mainly from the EU and the US, suggests to them that there may be a hidden 
protectionist trade agenda” (BSI, 2007c). 
 
On the other hand, NGOs within BSI/Bonsucro pushed for higher standards. At various 
occasions, this led to clashes with industry actors in the BSI (interviews with members of the 
SC and TWGs). However, there were also differences between civil society actors. Whereas 
the WWF wanted the BSI/Bonsucro standard to be limited to what it referred to as the core 
impacts of sugarcane production, other groups wanted to see a more comprehensive standard. 
In this regard, the social component of the BSI/Bonsucro standard became a notable bone of 
contention. As a labour intensive industry, workers’ rights are a highly contentious issue in 
the sugarcane sector and were on top of the agenda of some of the NGOs involved (interview 
with civil society representatives). At the same time, labour standards (health and safety 
standards, working hours, fair wages, etc.) have a direct impact on production costs and thus 
affect the core preferences of producer groups.  
 
Whereas producers and NGOs opposed each other on many issues, downstream industry 
actors often took a more moderate position. Depending on the issue at stake, they would 
either support the NGO position or that of producers. Through the interviews, the core 
preference of this stakeholder group could be identified as being focused on assurance and 
reputational protection. In this regard, a representative of a big beverage company and 
member of the BD explained in an interview:  
 
“One of the challenges that a company like Coca-Cola has is that we can do a lot of 
great work but just because I say we are doing this sustainably does not mean that 
anyone is going to believe me. There are a lot of questions about the company. There 
are a lot of concerns about greenwashing. So we got on board with Bonsucro because 
of the approach that was taken. It is multi-stakeholder and defines what sustainability 
is and with the certification programme there is third-party validation.” 
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These differences in preferences resulted in various episodes of institutional bargaining in 
and surrounding BSI/Bonsucro. Through the interviews and the analysis of primary 
documents two interrelated episodes of institutional bargaining could be identified. The first 
involved the NGO-buyer dominated SC and producer organisations outside the initiative. The 
second took place between producers and NGOs within BSI/Bonsucro over the content and 
scope of the standard. However, unlike the RSB, the empirical analysis produced little 
evidence for bargaining over governance structures. Still, as in the case of the RTRS, 
institutional bargaining was found to have had a more indirect effect on the inclusiveness of 
the sugarcane initiative. In this regard, examining the politics and conflicts surrounding 
BSI/Bonsucro was important in order to understand patterns of participation – that is, 
stakeholders’ decisions to engage or to not engage with private sustainability governance in 
this arena.  
 
From the very beginning, there was strong opposition from producer groups in Australia, 
South Africa, Brazil, and India against the BSI and its plans to develop a sustainability 
standard for sugarcane production (interview with the Coordinator of the BSI). By 2003, the 
WWF had already made attempts to reach out to the ISCCT, a leading industry association 
and important forum for sugarcane growers around the world. When the SC held its first 
meetings in 2006, a decision was made to again approach the ISCCT for technical support 
and formal endorsement. The contact was facilitated through a member of the ISCCT, who 
had attended several of the early SC meetings (interview with the Coordinator of the BSI). 
Then, later in 2006, the Coordinator of the BSI travelled to South Africa to meet with the 
members of the ISCCT Executive Council. The purpose of the visit was to seek the formal 
endorsement of the ISCCT and to use its annual congress as a forum to launch and promote 
the BSI within the wider industry. Furthermore, the SC was interested in the technical input 
the ISCCT could make to its standard-setting process (BSI, 2006a). However, the ISCCT 
leadership remained very suspicious of the BSI and after the meeting withdrew its 
representative from the BSI SC. Summarising the meeting, the report of the BSI Coordinator 
to the SC reads: 
 
“There was real concern from those present as to the construction of a barrier to entry 
and as to discrimination against producers with low environmental or social 
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performance. I was forcefully informed by [Person A] that these matters relating to 
sugarcane were ISSCT competence and not WWF’s” (BSI, 2006f). 
 
The BSI was also met with opposition from other producer groups, notably the South African 
Sugar Association (SASA) and the Australian sugarcane industry. SASA had participated in 
the Better Sugar Better Business Meeting in 2005, but remained wary of the process. In a 
letter to the SC, SASA raised concerns similar to those expressed by the ISSCT. The letter, 
which was discussed in detail by the members of the SC, the stated that “certain institutions 
are not adequately represented”. Furthermore, the South African sugarcane growers feared 
that the buyer-dominated BSI and its standard would negatively impact their businesses and 
distort trade practices (BSI, 2006e: 10). Attempts to win over the Australian sugarcane 
industry also met with little success. During 2006, members of the SC met with leading 
organisations in the Australian sugarcane industry, including Canegrowers, the Australian 
Sugar Milling Council, and the Australian Society of Sugar Cane Technologists. But the 
Australians also showed little interest in joining the BSI. Although less concerned about trade 
barriers or sustainability standards as such, they argued that the Australian sugarcane industry 
was already well down the road to implementing BMPs. During the meeting, they had asked 
the SC representative: “What is, and where is, the advantage of us becoming part of BSI?” 
(BSI, 2006b).  
 
As the world’s largest producer and exporter of sugarcane, Brazil was another priority region 
for the BSI. Starting in 2006, the SC members made several attempts to establish contacts 
with leading organisations of the Brazilian sugarcane industry. As part of the “Brazilian 
engagement strategy” a stakeholder outreach meeting was organised and UNICA was invited 
to join the SC. But the Brazilian sugarcane growers were also sceptical about the BSI 
(interview with a member of the SC). In the case of Brazil, the meeting minutes of the SC 
also mention language barriers and the absence of a person on the ground to represent the BSI 
as challenges (BSI, 2007b).  
 
Over the next two years, there was little progress on the issue and notably the ISCCT, SASA, 
and the Australian sugarcane industry continued to vehemently oppose the BSI. During 
further negotiations, they complained about the BSI’s focus on sugarcane and demanded a 
name change. Furthermore, they continuously criticised the BSI for trying to impose 
standards on them and to distort trade practices. The BSI responded by considering a name 
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change and ultimately changing its name to Bonsucro. Also, the word ‘standard’ was 
removed from the communication materials in order to alleviate concerns and misperception 
about the BSI developing a compulsory standard (BSI, 2007b, 2008e). However, the 
relationship between the BSI and producer groups in South Africa and Australia remained 
difficult as the former Chairman of the SC described in an interview:  
 
 “We had to cope with quite a lot of resistance. There was a lot of resistance in 
Australia and there was a lot of resistance in South Africa. Australia and South Africa 
took such an extreme position that we never really managed to get them involved and 
now they would lose too much face if they would get involved” (interview with the 
Chairmen of the SC). 
 
It was around 2008 when changes in the regulatory environment of the BSI also changed the 
dynamics in the bargaining game with producer organisations. With a focus on sugar, the BSI 
had started out as a food crop initiative. However, the adoption of biofuel quotas in the EU, 
USA, and elsewhere suddenly transformed sugarcane into an internationally traded bioenergy 
crop as one of the SC members explained in an interview:  
 
“When we started the process we were talking about a food commodity and midway 
through the process we were talking about a fuel commodity. We had a very 
interesting time when the dynamic of the conversation changed. That gave a 
momentum to the BSI process and kicked it up a gear” (interview with a member of 
the SC). 
 
It was in January 2008 when the EU Commission presented a draft directive which included a 
10-percent blending mandate for biofuels, to be reached by 2020. Furthermore, the proposal 
included a set of mandatory sustainability criteria which all biofuels produced in or exported 
to the EU would have to meet (EU Commission, 2008). Formally adopted in 2009, the EU 
RED created one of the world’s largest markets for biofuels (European Union, 2009). At the 
same time, a decision was made to rely on private certification schemes for the 
implementation of the EU RED’s sustainability component. Under the planned scheme, firms 
would be able to use initiatives like the BSI to demonstrate compliance with EU 
sustainability regulation and thus gain access to the European biofuel market (Schleifer, 
2013).  
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The prospect of selling large quantities of bioethanol to the EU changed the preferences of 
the strongly export-oriented Brazilian sugarcane industry – but not so much those of the 
Australian and South African sugarcane growers, who sell most of their production locally 
(interviews with an Australian sugarcane farmer). With its focus on sugarcane, the BSI was 
the natural forum for the Brazilian’s to seek certification. In an interview, the chairman of the 
SC described the development as follows:  
 
“The producers were the most difficult and they were the last people to come on 
board. It was always very difficult because the last thing they needed was more 
barriers put in front of them. (…) What drove it for Bonsucro in the end was 
legislation around ethanol production and the need for certification there” (interview 
with the chairman of the SC). 
 
In autumn 2007, the Project Manager of the BSI visited Brazil where he met with the 
President of UNICA, Brazil’s leading sugarcane industry association. With EU biofuel quotas 
and sustainability regulation looming on the horizon, UNICA expressed great interest in the 
BSI (interview with the General Manager of the BSI). In the following months, UNICA 
regularly attended the meetings of the SC, of which it became a formal member in mid-2008 
(BSI, 2008c). Later that year, in November 2008, UNICA hosted the BSI’s first AGM in São 
Paulo, Brazil (BSI, 2009c). Essentially, UNICA’s endorsement of the BSI functioned as a 
catalyst for the initiative. It explains the high proportion of Brazilian sugarcane growers 
among the members of BSI/Bonsucro (see Figure 5, Section 6.3.3).  
 
The influx of producer groups increased the level of heterogeneity in the BSI. As in the cases 
of the RSB, this led to conflict and bargaining between stakeholder groups. In this regard, the 
interviews provide evidence of various occasions during which producer groups clashed with 
civil society actors over the scope and content of standards. In particular, BSI/Bonsucro’s 
social component became a bone of contention. The background to this is that the EU RED 
does not include any social criteria under its sustainability scheme. Not surprisingly, producer 
organisations in the BSI wanted the standard to focus on the environmental criteria included 
in the EU RED, whilst keeping its social component as small as possible (interview with a 
member of the TWG Social Impacts). On the other hand, for some of the NGO 
representatives labour standards and human rights were a top priority (interviews with NGO 
representatives). Disagreements about the BSI’s approach towards labour rights violations in 
the industry had already previously caused tensions among the members of the SC. At some 
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point, an NGO representative had left the SC over a conflict about a report he wanted to see 
published on the history of human rights and labour rights violations in the sugarcane sector 
(interview with a member of the SC). 
 
In November 2008, the members of the SC met with the three leaders of the TWGs to put 
together the first version of the BSI Production Standard. Over the course, of 2008, the 
TWGs had produced some 150-200 indicators for measuring the environmental and social 
impacts of sugarcane production (interview with the TGW leaders). However, stakeholders in 
the BSI strongly diverged as to which and how many of the indicators should be included in 
the standard. Industry members felt that the standard should start from a low base. Instead of 
putting the bar too high, and thus excluding many producers from the initiative, it should 
highlight continuous improvement. On the other hand, NGOs representatives wanted to see a 
more comprehensive standard, with some insisting on a strong social component. These 
differences resulted in an intense round of institutional bargaining among the members of the 
SC, which its chairman described as “a bit of a bulldozing exercise because everyone was 
trying to get everything they thought needed to be in there and we got close to 200 major 
points and each had 4 sub points”. Asked about the different stakeholders and their positions, 
he explained:  
 
“WWF was more pragmatic than the others. Solidaridad was more left if we call 
NGOs left, and the Brazilian cooperative [UNICA] was stamping its feet from the 
other side. (…) Ethical Sugar was just a pain in the ass. They tried but they were 
manageable. They did not play much of a role. At times they were irritating but as 
they were so small they got swept along really. (…) Coca-Cola for me was the dark 
horse. They seemed to gang-up with WWF more often than not.”  
 
The result of these negotiations was the identification of 50 key indicators, which then 
formed the basis for the first version of the BSI Production Standard. However many of the 
initial social indicators, in particular, did not make their way into the standard. In this regard, 
the leader of the TWG Social Impacts stated in the interview:  
 
“It was a painful exercise. With regard to the social standards, I thought that we were 
losing a lot of the substance” (interview with the leader of the TWG Social Impacts). 
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A comparison of the social components of the RSB and the BSI/Bonsucro standard confirms 
significant differences between the two initiatives. Whereas the RSB includes a wide range of 
social criteria in its standard, BSI/Bonsucro is limited to a few core criteria in this area (see 
German & Schoneveld, 2011: 11-13). This suggests that producer organisations in 
BSI/Bonsucro were able to influence the bargaining game in their favour. The following 
analysis of the sources and distribution of bargaining power sheds some further light on the 
issue.  
 
Producer organisations in BSI/Bonsucro possessed a significant amount of GIAP. However, 
unlike the other cases this GIAP did not manifest itself in their ability to create or join 
alternative arrangements. Instead, it enabled them to not take regulatory action and to remain 
outside the initiative. The interview material points to the nature of the international sugar 
trade as the main reason. In comparison to other commodities, such as soybeans or palm oil, a 
much smaller proportion of global sugar production is traded internationally. In this regard, 
an expert from the IFC’s Biodiversity and Agricultural Commodities Program explained in an 
interview:  
 
“There are a couple of things about sugar that are different from other commodities I 
have worked on. One is that the bulk of sugar isn’t traded internationally. Sugar is 
very anomalous in that the vast majority of sugar that is produced in China, Brazil, or 
India does not reach international markets. It is used domestically.” 
 
A look at the trade statistics of the FAO confirms the lower export rate of sugar. Whereas 77 
percent of global palm oil production and 34 percent of global soybean production are 
exported, only 19 percent of the world’s sugar is traded internationally (values for 2011) 
(FAO, website-b). This means that producers in the global south are less dependent on world 
markets and, as a result, that buyers and NGOs have less leverage over them. In other words, 
they could afford to remain outside the initiative and not to engage in regulatory activity. The 
IFC expert, who was involved in the founding stage of the BSI, described the situation as 
follows:   
 
“The assumptions we had about trade flows and how to use the middle of the value 
chain to promote better practices doesn’t necessarily work as clearly for sugar as 
you’ve got massive domestic trade and consumption which isn’t really affected by 
this theory of change” (interview with an IFC agricultural commodities expert).  
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However, the situation changed as the EU launched its biofuels policy and plans to rely on 
private certification schemes to implement a set of mandatory sustainability standards. This 
created an attractive export opportunity, notably for the Brazilian bioethanol industry. At the 
same time, it reduced producers’ GIAP by increasing the cost of not taking regulatory action. 
Theoretically, the Brazilians could have created their own scheme, but there was a lot of time 
pressure and uncertainty surrounding EU biofuel regulation (interview with a sugarcane 
farmer and member of the SC). In the end, these factors played in favour of the BSI, and 
UNICA and its members made a decision to join the initiative. This explains the relatively 
high level of producer participation in BSI/Bonsucro.  
 
In the above section, the resulting conflicts between producer groups and NGOs within the 
BSI were described in detail. As in the case of the RTRS, bargaining mainly focused on the 
scope of the standard. However, unlike producer organisations in the RTRS, UNICA and its 
members were able to influence the bargaining game in their favour. Partially, this can be 
traced back to UNICA’s high level of inclusion power (i.e. its importance to the success of 
the BSI). For several years, the BSI had unsuccessfully negotiated with producer groups from 
important sugarcane growing regions to join the initiative. Now, the world’s most important 
industry association had decided to join the scheme and was negotiating on behalf of its 
members to become certified. It is needless to say that this put UNICA in a strong bargaining 
position.  
 
On the other hand, in comparison to the RSB and RTRS, NGOs in the BSI seem to have been 
in a weaker position. Not only were there fewer NGOs involved in the scheme but also there 
was little NGO activity outside the initiative. In this regard, a background analysis revealed 
that none of the big international NGOs was running campaigns on sugarcane. It seems that 
this lack of NGO activity in the sugarcane sector translated into a low level of inclusion 
power for civil society actors. Also, there is evidence to suggest that the business-dominated 
SC did not actively seek their inclusion. In this regard, an NGO representative and member of 
the MC stated in an interview:  
 
“I think if an NGO would have wanted to be a member I don't think it would have 
been turned down. That is my feeling. But I don't think that the members at the 
beginning tried to attract more NGOs.” 
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In sum, the analysis of the adoption process uncovered several rounds of institutional 
bargaining between the members of BSI/Bonsucro and producer groups outside the initiative. 
But, as in the previous cases, there is little evidence to suggest that these bargains had a 
significant effect on the institutional design of the sugarcane roundtable. Thus, overall the 
case study produced little evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 (institutional bargaining and 
the distribution of bargaining power influence the diffusion outcome). On the other hand, 
examining the politics and conflicts surrounding BSI/Bonsucro was important in order to 
understand patterns of participation – that is, stakeholders’ decisions to engage or to not 
engage with private sustainability governance in this arena. Whereas patterns of participation 
are different from institutional design (the focus of this project), the issue is closely related to 
the deeper research question studied in this dissertation: the inclusiveness of private 
governance institutions (see discussion in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1). 
 
Coercive Pressures 
The previous sections have discovered how the founders of BSI/Bonsucro considered the 
design of various MSIs in other fields when constructing the organisational structures of their 
initiative. It was shown that, drawing lessons from these experiences, they developed a more 
instrumental and results-oriented approach to stakeholder inclusion. Furthermore, processes 
of institutional bargaining were examined. However, BSI/Bonsucro and its design cannot be 
fully understood without considering the wider institutional environment in which the scheme 
was initiated.  
 
In Chapter 2, a distinction was made between normative and coercive environmental 
pressures. It was argued that the group of late adopters are likely to be subject to the same 
normative pressures and that this can have an isomorphic effect on them. On the other hand, 
there is reason to believe that coercive pressures may well vary across industry sectors and 
schemes. With a focus on transnational activist campaigns, it was argued that strong coercive 
pressures will lead to a more inclusive diffusion outcome. This is because in these 
environments business actors are likely to be more willing to engage with civil society actors 
in the context of MSIs. Also, advocacy groups may put pressure on the founders of new MSIs 
to adopt a more inclusive approach. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
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H4: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if coercive pressures at the 
point of adoption are strong (weak). 
 
To examine this hypothesis, a background analysis about the environmental conditions during 
the adoption process will be conducted. Therefore, the empirical analysis will draw on media 
reports, NGO reports, and secondary literature. Furthermore, interviews and primary 
documents (e.g. meeting minutes) will be used to examine how adopters perceived their 
institutional environment and how they responded to it. 
 
The previous case study chapters on the RSB and RTRS provided support of Hypothesis 4. It 
was shown how strong coercive institutional pressures in the biofuels and soy arenas pushed 
the founders of the RSB and RTRS to adopt a more inclusive approach. Launching their 
initiatives in these highly politicised and contested environments, they came to believe that 
only a highly participatory approach would have chances of success and of producing 
meaningful results. In the case of the RTRS, which was directly targeted by NGOs, adopting 
an inclusive design was also a strategy to shield the organisation from further criticism.  
 
In comparison, a background analysis of NGO activism and the interview material suggest 
that during its founding phase BSI/Bonsucro was subject to only weak coercive pressures. 
Unlike the soy and biofuels arenas, there was little NGO activism in the sugarcane sector. In 
the past, there had been some NGO criticism of poor working conditions in the industry 
(Amnesty International, 2008). However, background research revealed that none of the big 
international NGOs was running campaigns on sugarcane in the periods preceding or during 
the formation phase of the BSI. There are several reasons for that. Firstly, when compared to 
soy, sugarcane expansion had been relatively modest (see Figure 16, Section 6.2). Brazil had 
seen a significant increase of land under sugarcane, but soy was by far the bigger problem. In 
this regard, the statistics of the FAO reveal that in the decade preceding the launch of the BSI 
(1995-2005), sugarcane in Brazil expanded by 1.2 million hectares. In comparison, about 
11.2 million hectares of land had been converted into soybean fields during the same time 
period (FAO, website-b). Secondly, GMOs, which have sparked much controversy in the soy 
sector, were not an issue in the sugarcane sector. Trials with GM sugarcane have been 
conducted in a variety of countries, but the GM sugarcane proportion of global production 
remains insignificant (GRAIN, 2009).  
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The situation somewhat changed when sugarcane became an important feedstock for the 
world’s growing demand for biofuels (interview with a NGO activist). As a result, sugarcane 
became increasingly associated with the controversial topics dominating the debate on 
biofuels (land grabs, food vs. fuel, etc.) (Friends of the Earth, 2010). However, during its 
formation period, and in the minds of its creators, the BSI was primarily a food crop 
initiative. Only later in the process did BSI/Bonsucro enter the biofuels certification market 
(interview with a member of the SC). In this regard, the BSI’s starting point was different 
from those of the RSB and RTRS. Whereas these schemes had been initiated in highly 
politicised environments, the BSI was “sailing in calm waters” as one of the interviewees put 
it (interview with a member of the SC). Asked about the nature of NGO-business 
relationships in the sugarcane sector, this assessment was echoed by many of the other 
interviewees (interviews with various members of the SC). Background research on media 
coverage and NGO reports about the BSI confirmed the low level of coercive pressures 
during the scheme’s formation phase. It produced only one report, by European Corporate 
Observatory, in which the “little known Better Sugarcane Initiative” was critically mentioned 
(Corporate Europe Observatory, 2008).  
 
In sum, the analysis showed how, unlike the RSB and the RTRS, the sugarcane initiative was 
subject to only weak coercive pressures. Whereas strong coercive pressures had pushed the 
founders of the RSB and RTRS to adopt a more inclusive approach, the opposite effect could 
be observed in the case at hand. Here, weak coercive pressures were found to coincide with a 
low level of inclusiveness. In this regard, the case study provides further support to 
Hypothesis 4.  
 
Normative Pressures 
Like in the previous cases, the within-case analysis revealed how the ISEAL Alliance and its 
standard-setting code exercised normative pressures on the designers of BSI/Bonsucro. To 
recapitulate briefly, created in 2002, ISEAL is an association of leading private standard-
setting systems. Among its founding members are the FSC, the IFOAM, the FLO, and the 
MSC (ISEAL, website-a). Probably the most important normative document developed by 
ISEAL, is its Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards 
(ISEAL, 2012). First released in 2004, the code lays out principles and criteria for how to 
create credible private standard systems. One of the most important procedural requirements 
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of the ISEAL code is stakeholder inclusion in the decision-making and standard-setting 
process. In this regard, the code stipulates that (ISEAL, 2012: 8):  
 
• Standard-setting shall be open to all interested parties  
• Participation and decision-making needs to reflect a balance of interests (subject 
matter and geographic scope)  
• Participants shall include stakeholders with an expertise relevant to the subject, those 
that are materially affected by the standard, and those that could influence the 
implementation of the standard. 
 
The normative framework created by ISEAL has become an important reference point for 
private sustainability initiatives – including the founders of BSI/Bonsucro. At a meeting of 
the SC in December 2007, its members agreed that the BSI should work with ISEAL to 
achieve “credible standards of sustainability” (BSI, 2007c). Following this decision, the 
BSI’s General Manager established contacts with ISEAL and attended one of their workshops 
on emerging initiatives. In 2008, Bonsucro then applied for ISEAL membership and became 
an associate member the year after (interview with the General Manager of the BSI). 
Documentation from the standard-setting process, and the interviews with the three TWG 
leaders, confirm the importance of the ISEAL norms for Bonsucro. In this regard, as required 
by the ISEAL standards code, the Bonsucro Production Standard was opened for two 60-day 
public consultation periods during 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, a global stakeholder 
outreach programme was conducted (Bonsucro, website-b). Comparing the findings across 
cases, the analysis shows how the ISEAL norms have facilitated convergence between the 
three initiatives. However, the resulting ‘isomorphic effect’ remains limited as the in-depth 
analysis of their institutional designs revealed.  
 
6.5 Summary of Findings  
This was the last of three case study chapters. It examined the diffusion of private 
participatory governance to the sugarcane sector. After providing some case context and 
background information, the institutional development of BSI/Bonsucro from its inception to 
the launch of the formal organisation was described. As part of this, a detailed analysis of the 
scheme’s rule-making and decision-making arrangements was conducted, identifying the 
scheme as an MSI with a low level of inclusiveness. In order to explain this outcome, the 
process of institutional diffusion was traced. The process-analysis was guided by the 
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analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. This framework distinguishes three stages in 
the diffusion process – source selection, transmission, and adoption – and specifies a set of 
testable hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships that influence institutional 
outcomes (see Table 20, Section 5.4).  
 
Consistent with the underlying diffusion model, the empirical analysis revealed how the 
founders of BSI/Bonsucro did not design their organisation from scratch. Instead, they turned 
toward already established MSIs in other fields in order to learn from their experiences and to 
imitate their structures. Mirroring the findings from the previous case study chapters, 
inquiries into the causes of institutional diffusion suggest two main motives: costs savings 
(time and resources) and risk reduction (avoid making mistakes).  
 
Whereas in the previous two case study chapters a clear primary target institution could be 
established, the diffusion pattern in the case of BSI/Bonsucro was found to be more diffuse. 
When creating the structures of their organisation, the founders of BSI/Bonsucro looked at 
the design of several MSIs, including the ASC, RSPO, and the FSC. This means that in the 
case at hand no clear correlation between the inclusiveness of the primary target institution 
and the diffusion outcome could be established, providing no support for Hypothesis 1 (the 
primary target institution influences the diffusion outcome).   
  
Examining the transmission of ideas between BSI/Bonsucro and its various target institutions, 
the empirical analysis uncovered clear traces of a learning process. However, unlike the 
founders of the RSB, the people behind BSI/Bonsucro came to believe that the more open 
and experimentalist approach of earlier commodity roundtables had been an obstacle to their 
success. Drawing lessons from their experiences, they developed a more instrumental and 
results-oriented approach to stakeholder inclusion. Providing support to Hypotheses 2 
(learning can influence the diffusion outcome), this learning process partly explains why the 
founders of BSI/Bonsucro adopted a significantly less inclusive approach when compared to 
the RSB. However, a complete analysis of the diffusion process also needs to consider 
processes of institutional bargaining as well as the wider institutional environment in which 
the diffusion process takes place.  
 
Moving toward the adoption stage of the model, the process analysis uncovered several 
rounds of institutional bargaining between the members of BSI/Bonsucro and producer 
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groups outside the initiative. But, as in the previous cases, there is little evidence to suggest 
that these bargains had a significant effect on the institutional design of the sugarcane 
roundtable. Thus, overall the case study produced little evidence in support of Hypothesis 3 
(institutional bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power influence the diffusion 
outcome). On the other hand, examining the politics and conflicts surrounding BSI/Bonsucro 
was important in order to understand patterns of participation – that is, stakeholders’ 
decisions to engage or to not engage with private sustainability governance in this arena. 
Whereas patterns of participation are different from institutional design (the focus of this 
project), the issue is closely related to the deeper research question studied in this 
dissertation: the inclusiveness of private governance institutions (see discussion in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5.1). 
 
Finally, the nature and strength of environmental pressures at the point of adoption were 
examined. The findings provide further support for Hypothesis 4 (the strength of coercive 
pressures at the point of adoption influences the diffusion outcome). Whereas strong coercive 
pressures had pushed the founders of the RSB and RTRS to adopt a more inclusive approach, 
no similar effect could be observed in the case at hand. Here, weak coercive pressures were 
found to coincide with a low level of inclusiveness. Furthermore, as in the cases of the RSB 
and RTRS, the ISEAL alliance was found to have exercised normative pressures on the 
founders of BSI/Bonsucro. As the comparative analysis in the next chapter will show in more 
detail, these normative pressures had only a limited isomorphic effect on the three initiatives.  
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Chapter 7: Comparative Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction  
With a focus on the agriculture sector – the most dynamic site of MSI diffusion in recent 
years – Chapters 4-6 investigated the institutional diffusion and variation of private 
participatory governance in the biofuels, soy, and sugarcane industries. These individual case 
study chapters described the institutional development of the RSB, the RTRS, and 
BSI/Bonsucro. This included a more in-depth analysis of the inclusiveness of their standard-
setting and decision-making arrangements. Then, the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter 2 was used in order to trace the diffusion process and to explain the institutional 
outcome for each case. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is now to complete the empirical analysis by comparing the 
results of the individual case study chapters with one another. This will make it possible to 
identify the causes of variation for the cases studied. It will also provide a solid empirical 
basis for the formulation of more general hypotheses about the institutional diffusion and 
variation of private participatory governance. The remainder of this chapter is organised in 
three sections: the first section revisits the question of the legitimacy of transnational rule-
making organisations. Then, bringing together the findings from the individual case study 
chapters, the institutional designs of the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro are described and 
compared. In order to explain the observed variation in their levels of inclusiveness, a cross-
case comparison of their institutional diffusion pathways (source selection, transmission, and 
adoption) is conducted.   
 
7.2 Organising Legitimate Transnational Rule-Making 
The growing importance of private regulation in the global economy has raised pressing 
questions about the democratic legitimacy of private governance arrangements. In the 
transitional realm where these schemes operate, no clearly defined demos or self-governing 
community exists. Against this background, Chapter 1 argued that the liberal model of 
democracy, with its focus on formal accountability and representation, is not well suited for 
the reality of transnational rule-making with its multitude of actors, diffuse authority, and 
many levels. As part of a wider turn in the philosophy of democracy, deliberative democratic 
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theory has been proposed as an alternative normative basis for organising legitimate rule-
making at the transnational level (Dingwerth, 2007; Dryzek, 2000). In essence, the 
deliberative approach highlights the importance of participation and dialogue over the liberal 
ideas of representation and formal accountability. Among the various private governance 
arrangements that have emerged in recent years, MSIs are believed to most closely 
approximate the deliberative ideal. They try to organise legitimate private rule-making 
through participatory elements and procedural transparency. These design features follow 
directly from the two core procedural principles of deliberative democratic theory: 
inclusiveness and unconstrained dialogue. 
 
With regard to the first criterion, real-world MSIs practise inclusiveness through direct 
participation as well as consultation. In this context, direct participation means active 
involvement in the rule-making process, with the ability to influence its outcome; whilst 
consultation is a process of informing, and seeking the input of, a wider group of 
stakeholders. Generally, the participatory quality of consultation is considered to be inferior 
to direct participation as there are no clear guidelines as to how and to what extent power 
holders have to incorporate the input (cf. Arnstein, 1969).  
 
MSIs organise direct participation of those affected by their activities through the multi-
stakeholder structure of their decision-making and standard-setting bodies. Typically, 
organisational decision-making is concentrated in some form of board or executive 
committee. Representing key stakeholder groups (e.g. producers, buyers, and civil society), 
these bodies convene several times a year and reach decisions on standards, certification, and 
other organisational matters. In addition, many MSIs also feature a secondary decision-
making body in the form of an annual assembly of their members. The main purpose of these 
meetings is to engage and inform the wider membership about current developments and the 
organisation’s future plans. Their role in organisational decision-making is often limited to 
the election of the members of the executive board and the approval of the standard.   
 
In the cases studied, the standard-setting process was organised in separate bodies. The RSB 
had four WGs on environmental impacts, GHG, social impacts, and implementation; 
BSI/Bonsucro featured three TWGs on agronomy, processing and milling, and social 
impacts; and in the RTRS standard-setting was organised in a PCVDG. The main function of 
these bodies is to develop the principles, criteria, and indicators of the standard which are 
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then referred to the board and/or assembly of members for approval. Typically, these bodies 
reflect the multi-stakeholder structure of their organisations.  
 
Besides practising direct participation, many MSIs use consultation mechanisms to inform, 
and seek the input of, a wider group of stakeholders. Widely practised consultation 
techniques among sustainability MSIs are public comment periods on draft standards as well 
as stakeholder outreach meetings. With regard to public comment periods, MSIs make draft 
standards available on their website. For a designated period of time, external stakeholders 
can then provide comments and feedback on the standard. Through organising face-to-face 
meetings with external stakeholder groups, stakeholder outreach meetings serve a similar 
purpose of engaging and informing a wider audience about both the standard and the 
certification process.  
 
Unconstrained dialogue is the second core procedural principle of deliberative democratic 
theory. It means that the decision-making process needs to be free from domination and 
manipulation. The goal is an open dialogue or “ideal speech situation” in which actors try to 
persuade each other through argumentation and in which power relationships recede into the 
background (Risse, 2000). From an institutional design perspective, unconstrained dialogue is 
difficult to organise as it depends on so many factors – for example, the willingness of 
participants to engage in an open dialogue and to be persuaded by the better argument. 
However, there are certain design features which are thought to be conducive to 
unconstrained dialogue. In this regard, procedural transparency is widely regarded as a key 
element of good governance. According to Esty (2007: 525), seeing the decision-makers in 
action and observing who has influenced a decision is essential in establishing a sense of 
fairness, rationality, and neutrality. Also, it exposes the decision-making process to public 
scrutiny and thus discourages rent-seeking and other self-serving behaviour.  
 
Procedural transparency is an important design feature of MSIs. It is achieved through 
documenting the standard-setting and decision-making process and making this information 
accessible to external audiences. In this regard, the websites of MSIs typically include a 
section on governance and/or standards in which the composition and procedures of their 
decision-making bodies are described. Furthermore, many MSIs make their constitutional 
documents together with documentation about the standard-setting process and the 
implementation of the standard available on their websites. Some MSIs also make detailed 
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meeting minutes of their decision-making and standard-setting bodies available to external 
audiences – however, this is less widely practised.   
 
Due to their inclusiveness and transparency, MSIs have been praised for their democratising 
potential. In this regard, scholars have referred to them as “innovative institutional designs,” 
“good governance models,” and “sites of meaningful deliberation” (Cashore et al., 2004: 298; 
Dingwerth, 2007: 9; Gulbrandsen, 2008b). However, the democratic legitimacy of private 
multi-stakeholder governance remains contested (Cheyns, 2011; L. Fransen & Kolk, 2007; 
Schouten et al., 2012), and there is evidence to suggest that the institutional diffusion of MSIs 
has not spread a universal model of private participatory governance in the global economy.  
 
7.3 Variation in the Level of Inclusiveness 
In Chapter 1, an inventory of 16 environmental MSIs was conducted. With regard to 
measuring their levels of transparency, the quality of procedural information provided on 
their websites was assessed. This exercise revealed some variation in this dimension of 
institutional design. Whereas most schemes would provide detailed documentation about 
their decision-making organs, and more or less detailed documentation about their standard-
setting activities, very few would disclose information about internal decision-making 
processes. For the analysis of inclusiveness, the composition and constitutive rules of MSIs’ 
central decision-making bodies were examined, revealing significant variation in this key 
dimension of institutional design (see Table 22). It was found that some schemes carefully 
balance the influence of business and non-business actors and protect their standards against 
the possibility of regulatory capture. On the other hand, there are MSIs which are 
significantly less inclusive.  
 
In order to further investigate stakeholder inclusion in private sustainability governance and 
differences between initiatives, Chapters 4-6 conducted a more in-depth analysis of the 
inclusiveness of three agricultural commodity roundtables. The results of this analysis were 
summarised in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5.4, Table 3).  
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Using the qualitative indicators developed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.4, Table 5), the in-depth 
analysis of the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro provided further evidence for significant 
differences in the way in which real-world MSIs organise and practise stakeholder inclusion.  
 
Firstly, membership rules were analysed as to whether or not they restricted access to the 
governance arrangement’s standard-setting and decision-making bodies. If restrictions 
existed, the type of restriction was identified. Secondly, with regard to collective choice rules, 
the focus was on whether or not they protect against the possibility of regulatory capture. 
Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency is dominated by those whose actions it 
is supposed to control (Mattli & Woods, 2009). For example, regulatory capture becomes 
possible when a private regulator’s primary decision-making body is dominated by economic 
actors and decisions are taken by a simple majority of votes. Giving a right of veto or 
blocking minority to civil society actors is a common design feature to protect against 
regulatory capture. Finally, using the four key stakeholder categories identified in Chapter 2 
(civil society north, civil society south, economic north, and economic south), the 
compositions of the standard-setting and decision-making arrangements were included in the 
analysis.  
 
In all three cases, the standard-setting process was organised in a distinct standard-setting 
body. The RSB featured four WGs (environmental impacts, social impacts, GHGs, and 
implementation); in the RTRS standard-setting took place in the PCVDG; and BSI/Bonsucro 
had three TWGs (agronomy, processing and milling, and social impacts). The main function 
of these bodies was to develop and refine draft principles and criteria in order to reduce the 
environmental and social impacts of biofuel, soy, and sugarcane production. Whereas all 
three organisations used a similar rhetoric to describe their standard-setting processes (multi-
stakeholder, transparent, etc.), the more in-depth analysis revealed differences as well as 
similarities. Significant differences existed with regard to the design of membership rules and 
the composition of the standard-setting bodies. In the RSB, the WGs were open to all 
interested parties and membership was free of charge. Taken together, the WGs had some 
282 members. Unfortunately, the exact composition of the WGs could not be established. 
However, the available documentation and interviews provided evidence that all four key 
stakeholder groups were represented. Unlike the RSB, the RTRS and BSI/Bonsucro restricted 
access to their standard-setting processes. In both cases, a small number of experts were 
selected by the OC and SC, respectively. But whereas the RTRS’ PCVDG maintained a 
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careful balance between the key stakeholder groups, BSI/Bonsucro’s TWGs were dominated 
by industry actors. Overall, very few civil society actors participated in the standard-setting 
process of the sugarcane initiative.  
 
On the other hand, there were also similarities between the three organisations. In this regard, 
all three MSIs were found to organise public consultation periods and stakeholder outreach 
meetings. For example, during 2008 and 2010, the RSB conducted three public consultation 
periods in which external stakeholders could comment on the RSB Principle and Criteria. 
Furthermore, 15 stakeholder outreach meetings were conducted in Europe, Asia, North 
America, South America, and Africa. The RTRS also opened its standard for public 
consultation periods and organised stakeholder outreach meetings. Very similar consultation 
activities could be observed in the case of BSI/Bonsucro. With varying degrees of 
transparency, the three initiatives published information about their consultation activities on 
their websites. However, in none of the cases was it clear to what extent, and according to 
which criteria or guidelines, the feedback from the public consultation periods was worked 
into the standard, if at all. These findings confirm assumptions about the inferior participatory 
quality of stakeholder consultation when compared to direct participation. The former is 
mainly a process of informing, and seeking the input of, a wider group of stakeholders, 
whereas the later actively involves stakeholders in the rule-making process (cf. Arnstein, 
1969).   
 
The WGs, PCDVG, and TWGs were responsible for drafting the standard, but they did not 
possess decision-making authority. In all three cases, decision-making was concentrated in 
some kind of board or steering body. At the beginning of each process, these boards consisted 
of an initial founding body, an ad hoc group of people which had emerged from the 
organisations’ foundational meetings. Later, these bodies were formalised. With regard to 
membership rules, all three organisations restricted access to their primary decision-making 
bodies to their members. However, there were differences regarding the access to the initial 
founding bodies. In the case of the RSB, membership in the FSB was open and free of 
charge. In principle, all organisations with a stake in the biofuel industry could volunteer to 
participate in the FSB. In contrast, to become a member of the RTRS and BSI/Bonsucro 
initial founding bodies, stakeholders had to pay a membership fee of US$ 10,000 and US$ 
25,000, respectively. It is likely that these fees biased the membership of these bodies toward 
large, resource-rich organisations. Differences also existed with regard to the composition 
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and collective choice rules of the later formalised decision-making bodies. In this regard, the 
RSB’s SB and the RTRS’s EB were found to be balanced, and the design of their collective 
choice rules protected the organisation against the possibility of regulatory capture (right of 
veto/blocking minority for civil society actors). In contrast, the BSI/Bonsucro board was 
found to be unbalanced and a simple majority rule for decision-making put economic actors 
from the global north in a dominant position. 
 
Besides a central board, all three MSIs featured a secondary decision-making body; in the 
form of a GA in the case of the RTRS and an AGM in the case of BSI/Bonsucro. Somewhat 
differently, the RSB’s membership was organised in eleven, later seven, stakeholder 
chambers which convened separately several times per year. The importance of these bodies 
in terms of organisational decision-making varied across the three cases. In the RSB, the 
chambers, and therefore the wider members, were actively involved in various aspects of 
organisational decision-making, including the development of the standard. In contrast, the 
political function of the RTRS GA and the BSI/Bonsucro AGM was largely limited to the 
approval of the standard and the election of the central board. The membership rules of these 
bodies were found to be very similar across the three cases. In this regard, membership in all 
three organisations is open to all interested parties with a stake in the respective biofuels, soy, 
and sugarcane industries. Furthermore, all three organisations charge a similar membership 
fee which depends on the size and type (e.g. civil society or economic actor) of the member. 
However, the case study chapters revealed significant differences with regard to the 
composition and collective choice rules of these bodies. With 27 percent, the RSB is the only 
organisation with a strong civil society constituency. In contrast, with 12 percent (RTRS) and 
9 percent (BSI/Bonsucro), civil society participation is significantly lower in the other two 
schemes. But whereas civil society actors in the RTRS hold a right of veto in the GA, 
decisions by the AGM of BSI/Bonsucro are taken by a simple majority vote. The situation is 
somewhat different in the RSB where the membership is organised in seven stakeholder 
chambers which do not convene in one forum (see Chapter 4 for details).  
 
In sum, the in-depth analysis and comparison of the design of the three organisations’ 
standard-setting and decision-making bodies revealed significant differences in their levels of 
inclusiveness. Clearly, the most inclusive scheme (high level of inclusiveness) is the RSB. Its 
standard-setting and decision-making arrangements are open and balanced. Also, the design 
of its collective choice rules protects the organisation against the possibility of regulatory 
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capture. On the others side of the spectrum, with a low level of inclusiveness, is 
BSI/Bonsucro. In this case, access to the standard-setting process was restricted, the scheme’s 
standard-setting and decision-making bodies are dominated by corporate interests, and its 
collective choice rules provide no protection against regulatory capture. As can be seen from 
Table 24, the RTRS occupies a middle ground between the RSB and BSI/Bonsucro in terms 
of inclusiveness. 
 
Table 22: Inclusiveness of the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro in Comparison (Overview) 
 RSB RTRS BSI/Bonsucro 
 
Standard-setting 
arrangement 
Working Groups  Principles Criteria 
Verification Development 
Group 
Technical Working Groups  
Membership rules Open  Restricted (members 
appointed by Executive 
Committee) 
Restricted (members 
appointed by Steering 
Committee) 
Composition Balanced Balanced Unbalanced  
Consultation 
mechanism  
Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Decision-
making 
arrangement  
Steering Board 
(Founding Steering 
Board) 
Executive Board 
(Organising Committee) 
Board of Directors 
(Steering Committee) 
Membership rules Restricted to members  Restricted to members 
(Fee of US$ 10,000 to join 
Organising Committee) 
Restricted to members 
(Fee of US$ 25,000 to join 
the Steering Committee) 
Composition Balanced Balanced Unbalanced 
Collective choice 
rules 
Protection against 
regulatory capture (civil 
society actors possess a 
blocking minority) 
Protection against 
regulatory capture (civil 
society actors possess a 
formal right of veto) 
No protection against 
regulatory capture  
 
Secondary Decision-
making 
arrangement 
Stakeholder Chambers General Assembly Annual General Meeting 
Membership rules Open  
(membership fees 
depending on size and 
stakeholder category) 
Open 
(membership fees 
depending on size and 
stakeholder category) 
Open 
(membership fees depending 
on size and stakeholder 
category) 
Composition Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced 
Collective choice 
rules 
Protection against 
regulatory capture (via 
their representatives civil 
society chambers can 
block decisions at the 
SB-level) 
Protection against 
regulatory capture (civil 
society actors possess a 
formal right of veto) 
No protection against 
regulatory capture  
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7.4 The Institutional Diffusion and Variation of Private Participatory 
Governance: A Cross-Case Comparison  
Bringing together the findings from the single case study chapters, the previous section 
revealed significant variation in the level of inclusiveness of agro-MSIs operating in the 
biofuels, soy, and sugarcane sectors. Whereas the RSB was identified as a highly inclusive 
private governance arrangement, the RTRS and BSI/Bonsucro were found to exhibit a 
medium and a low level of inclusiveness, respectively. These findings confirm earlier 
observations that the institutional diffusion of MSIs has not spread a universal model of 
private participatory governance in the global economy. As ideas about multi-stakeholder 
governance have diffused across and within industry sectors, they have taken different forms 
at different places. It was argued that discoveries about more and less participatory 
arrangements have important political repercussions for the legitimacy and credibility of 
MSIs as a mode of global sustainability governance. Against this background, the central task 
of this dissertation has been to explain this variation in institutional outcomes.  
 
Whereas much has been written about the initial institutional emergence of MSIs (Bartley, 
2003, 2007b; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Haufler, 2003; McNichol, 2006; Pattberg, 2005; 
Zietsma & McKnight, 2009), as well as the activities and interactions of already established 
schemes (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; L. W. Fransen, 2011, 2012b; Kaan, 2008; Overdevest, 
2010; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009), only a few scholars have dealt with the process of 
institutional diffusion in more depth (Auld et al., 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2010). In order to 
address this gap and to advance our understanding of how institutions vary as they diffuse, 
Chapter 2 provided a detailed discussion of diffusion “theory”. It defined institutional 
diffusion as a causal process through which institutions and their elements are transmitted 
through time and space. It discussed why and when institutional diffusion occurs, and what 
its primary mechanisms and outcomes are. On that basis, three stages in the diffusion process 
– source selection, transmission, and adoption – were distinguished. For each of these stages, 
hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships that influence diffusion outcomes were 
formulated. Integrated into a causal model, these hypotheses take the form of intervening 
variables. They intervene in the diffusion process, causing it to produce more or less inclusive 
institutional outcomes (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4). This diffusion model was then put to 
work in three case study chapters which traced the diffusion of the MSI institutional model to 
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the biofuels, soy, and sugarcane sectors. In the following, the process-tracing evidence from 
the single case study chapters is compared across the three cases. The comparative analysis 
begins with an examination of what caused diffusion in each case, then the case study 
evidence regarding the model’s source, transmission, and adoption stages are summarised 
and compared.   
 
7.4.1 Causes  
Consistent with the underlying diffusion model, all three case study chapters provided clear 
evidence for the occurrence of an institutional diffusion process. This means that the founders 
of the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro did not create their organisations from scratch. 
Instead, they turned toward familiar and prestigious prior adopters in order to imitate their 
structures and to learn from their experiences. It also means that in order to explain their 
institutional designs (and variation between them) these processes have to be understood and 
examined. With regard to the causes of diffusion, adopters’ motives to imitate the design of 
others and to learn from their experiences were found to be very similar across the three 
cases. One important motive was the adopters’ desire to save time and resources. In this 
regard, the founders of the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro wanted to avoid “reinventing 
the wheel”, “replicating existing efforts”, or to “get off the ground as quick as possible”. On 
the other hand, reducing exploration costs could be identified as another important cause of 
institutional diffusion in the cases studied. For example, the founders of the RSB mentioned 
concerns about how poor decisions at an early stage could compromise legitimacy at a later 
one and documents from the founding phase of the RTRS read: “[c]opying existing models 
will provide opportunities to learn from mistakes and speed-up the process” (WWF, 2004a: 
3). In sum, the findings from the individual case study chapters suggest that cost 
considerations – time savings as well as the reduction of exploration costs – were the main 
drivers behind institutional diffusion in the cases studied. In organisational theory, these 
factors are discussed as important triggers behind processes of interorganisational imitation 
and learning (Dutton & Freedman, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; 
Ordanini et al., 2008).   
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7.4.2 Source Selection 
The selection of a target institution or source marks the beginning of the diffusion process. A 
choice has to be made about whom to imitate, learn from, etc. In Chapter 2, it was argued that 
diffusion will lead to a homogenisation of the adopting population when there is a single 
central source (broadcasting model of diffusion). In such cases, later adopters converge 
toward the prior adopter who is the target of diffusion. In contrast, diffusion outcomes can 
vary when the underlying diffusion model has multiple sources. In these situations, variation 
among late adopters occurs, when designers select different target institutions for imitation 
which exhibit different institutional features. These decisions are thought to depend on 
factors such as adopters’ network ties, their spatial proximity to prior adopters, as well as 
their perceptions about prior adopters’ performance records. Against this background, the 
following hypothesis was formulated:  
 
H1: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if the primary target 
institution exhibits a high (low) level of inclusiveness.  
 
The case study chapters provide some support for this hypothesis. The relationship between 
the institutional design of the target institution and the diffusion outcome was most evident in 
the case of the RSB. Through the interviews and available documentation at least five 
members of the founding group could be identified who previously had been involved in the 
FSC, among them the former Director General of FSC International. As diffusion “theory” 
would predict (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Haunschild, 1993), these 
close network ties led them to select the FSC as the primary target institution. Furthermore, 
the within-case analysis uncovered network ties to the RSPO which functioned as a 
secondary target institution. As evidenced by the meeting minutes of the RSB’s founding 
body and through the interviews with its members, the forestry scheme notably served the 
initiators of the biofuels roundtable as an important reference institution in discussions about 
organisational design and standards. In this regard, in the case of the RSB, a clear correlation 
between the high level of inclusiveness of the primary target institution and the diffusion 
outcome could be established.  
 
In reverse order, the FSC and RSPO were also important reference institutions for the 
founders of the RTRS. Both the RSPO and RTRS had their origin in the FCI of the WWF. 
The RSPO had been initiated in 2002 and the RTRS followed the palm oil scheme two years 
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later. Through the interviews it was established that several people who had been involved in 
the launch of the RSPO later helped to form the RTRS. In an interview, the Coordinator of 
the WWF FCI explained that the RTRS had essentially been modelled on the RSPO and that 
it was the plan from the very beginning to learn from the palm oil experience. Furthermore, 
the within-case analysis revealed that the RSPO, in turn, had been modelled after the FSC. In 
this regard, the RTRS and its design are partly the outcome of what in Chapter 2 has been 
discussed as chain mode diffusion (see Section 2.4.1). Providing some support for Hypothesis 
1, the RTRS resembles the RSPO and the FSC in many ways. However, the founders of the 
soy roundtable did not simply replicate the institutional design of the palm oil roundtable or 
the forestry initiative as a comparison between the three organisations revealed. Instead, it 
was found that they positioned their initiative somewhere in between the two schemes in 
terms of inclusiveness.  
 
On the other hand, the case study of BSI/Bonsucro provided little support for Hypothesis 1. 
In this case, the diffusion pattern was found to be more diffuse. The founders of the 
sugarcane initiative looked at several prior adopters, including the RSPO, FSC, and ADs, 
when designing the organisational structures of their initiative. However, unlike in the other 
two case studies, no clear primary target institution could be identified.  
 
Overall, the cases studied confirm assumptions about a complex diffusion pattern in the field 
of multi-stakeholder sustainability governance, involving multiple sources as well as chain 
mode diffusion. Also, there is some evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 that the selection of 
the primary target institution has an effect on the diffusion outcome. This relationship could 
be clearly observed in the case of the RSB. Also, the RTRS was found to resemble its 
primary target institution, the RSPO, in many ways. However, there was no systematic co-
variation of primary target institutions and diffusion outcomes as suggested by Hypothesis 1.  
 
7.4.3 Transmission  
Once a target institution, or institutions, is selected, a diffusion mechanism transmits 
information about the source model to the point of adoption. In Chapter 2, different types of 
diffusion mechanisms were discussed. It was argued that when imitation is the primary 
diffusion mechanism, then a close replication of the source model is the expected outcome. In 
contrast, learning can introduce variation. Variation occurs as adopters draw lessons from 
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their experiences and the experiences of others. In doing so, they may find that some aspects 
of the source model are suboptimal for their purposes and make modifications accordingly 
(selective imitation). Also, they may combine the lessons learned at different places and thus 
synthesise new practices. Against this background, it was hypothesised that:  
 
H2:  The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if adopters learn that 
inclusiveness was good (bad) for the success of prior adopters. 
 
Providing strong support for this hypothesis, the case study chapters uncovered how the 
founders of the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro did not simply imitate the design of prior 
adopters. Instead, they drew lessons from the experiences of prior adopters and adapted the 
MSI institutional model to the context at hand. However, as shown below, the lessons learned 
by the adopters were not the same across the three cases, putting them on different 
institutional trajectories.  
 
As described above, the founders of the RSB had very close network ties to the FSC, which 
they regarded as a success story. For example, the founding head of the RSB Secretariat 
stated in an interview that “the FSC was seen as the most successful standards initiative with 
the biggest market share, global reach, and respected among industry, NGOs, and 
governments. It also was the oldest, so it had the longest track record in terms of the lessons 
that we could draw from it”. Similar statements were made by other members of the founding 
group. The dominant interpretation was that the FSC’s highly participatory approach was of 
key importance to its success as a standards initiative. In their view, the FSC had proven that 
stakeholder inclusion was particularly important during crisis situations. In this regard, the 
forestry scheme was seen as a credible and robust system in which conflict among 
stakeholders were solved internally, whereas other schemes had fared less well in crisis 
situations. One example mentioned in the interviews was the MSC. The MSC came out of a 
bilateral partnership between Unilever and the WWF and was heavily criticised for not 
involving other stakeholder groups. Due to the highly controversial nature of biofuel 
production, the founders of the RSB were particularly worried about conflict and eager to 
learn about strategies and mechanisms of crisis management. Drawing lessons from the FSC 
experience, they therefore decided to follow the forestry initiative and its highly inclusive 
approach to stakeholder engagement. 
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The people behind the RTRS and RSPO also looked at the FSC as an important reference 
institution. However, the within-case analysis uncovered a different learning path. When 
WWF Switzerland started its work on forest conversion through agricultural-induced land-
use change, people within the FCI soon realised that the soy and palm oil sectors were 
fundamentally different from the forestry sector. Used to produce timber, wood products, 
paper, etc., most forestry products are visible to the end consumer. In contrast, palm oil and 
soy are what one interviewee referred to as “hidden commodities”. In the case of soy, only a 
very small fraction is directly consumed by humans, whereas the bulk of global production is 
used for producing high-protein animal feed. On the other hand, palm oil is an, often 
unnoticed, ingredient in many food and cosmetic products. Against this background, it was 
reasoned that the consumer-oriented approach of the FSC was not suitable for the palm oil 
and soy sectors.  
 
Like the fair trade organisation, the FSC operates a consumer-oriented label which is 
displayed on wood and timber products from companies that have undergone FSC 
certification. However, due to the nature of soy and palm oil consumption, the founders of the 
RSPO and RTRS saw little use for an on-product label and opted for a business-to-business 
approach instead. In this approach, there is no visible label or certificate involved. Instead, 
the scheme functions through business-to-business transactions only (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.4.3 for details). The interviews and available documentation show that this decision had 
two implications for stakeholder inclusion. A direct implication of the business-to-business 
approach was that the designers of the RSPO and RTRS had to differentiate between firms 
occupying different positions in the supply chain. At a minimum, a distinction needed to be 
made between corporate consumers, on the one hand, and producer groups, on the other. 
Also, they reflected about the relationship between stakeholder engagement and process 
efficiency. They reasoned that both were important for a scheme’s success, but identified a 
trade-off between the two. In their view, highly participatory schemes were often slow, 
whereas more streamlined initiatives lacked in credibility and legitimacy. Against this 
background, they concluded that an effective initiative would need to find a middle ground 
where it could be both inclusive and efficient. Furthermore, they came to believe that the 
right balance between the two was also a function of the initiative’s objectives. In this regard, 
they reasoned that the less visible business-to-business approach would require fewer non-
business stakeholders to be effective than the consumer-oriented approach. This explains why 
the RSPO and RTRS came out stronger on the business side when compared to the FSC.  
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Like the RTRS, the founders of BSI/Bonsucro developed a narrower approach to stakeholder 
engagement. When the initiative held its first meetings in 2006, WWF US advised the SC on 
governance options. It briefed its members about other MSIs, including the RSPO, the FSC, 
and the ADs, and circulated a memo about WWF US’ experiences and the lessons it had 
learned from commodity-specific roundtables and certification programmes. Within the 
WWF network, the US office has a reputation for being strongly market-focused and close to 
business. In its memo, it developed the foundation of what is now known and widely 
publicised as the WWF’s theory of business transformation (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3). 
This so-called “theory of change” has important implications for the structure and objectives 
of MSIs: they are to focus on key crops, key impacts, and key players. More specifically, in 
its memo WWF US argued against the more open and experimentalist approach of previous 
roundtable initiatives like the FSC. Instead, advice was given that the goals of a new initiative 
need to be defined before the first meeting and that stakeholder engagement should focus on 
the agro-supply chain’s “key leverage points for change”. On the corporate side, these are the 
players that command significant market power such as buyers and traders, as well as banks. 
In contrast, scepticism was expressed about involving producer groups early on in the 
process. In particular, WWF US warned not to involve producer or manufacturer associations 
which were identified as the most conservative members in the agro-supply chain. Also, civil 
society organisations should be selected using criteria such as their level of commitment and 
expertise. It was made clear that many stakeholders, due their lack of expertise or resources, 
or critical positions, should not be invited to the table. It was found that these principles were 
adopted by the founding members of BSI/Bonsucro and that they informed many of the 
institutional design decisions made during the formation period of the sugarcane initiative.  
 
In sum, the comparative perspective shows how learning processes have influenced the 
diffusion outcome in the three cases. In particular, the cases of the RSB and BSI/Bonsucro 
provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. In the biofuels case, the founders of the RSB learned 
that inclusiveness had been important in the institutional success of prior adopters, and the 
case study showed how this influenced their institutional design choices. On the other hand, 
the people behind BSI/Bonsucro came to the opposite conclusion. Based on their experiences, 
they reasoned that the open and experimentalist approach of earlier adopters had been an 
obstacle to the success of these initiatives, and they therefore opted for a narrower and more 
instrumentalist approach to stakeholder inclusion. Learning could also be observed in the 
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case of the RTRS. However, the decision of its founders to adopt a less inclusive design was 
only indirectly related to the experiences made by prior adopters. In this case, modifications 
to the source model (FSC) were made because people in the WWF learned about differences 
between the palm oil, soy, and forestry sectors which they believed required a different 
approach. 
 
7.4.4 Adoption  
The third stage of the causal model developed in Chapter 2 is the adoption process. It marks 
the end of the diffusion process. In the literature this process is often described in a somewhat 
mechanistic way in which potential adopters make a decision to either accept or reject a 
diffusion item (Rogers, 1995: 364). However, a closer consideration of the issue suggests that 
adoption is not simply a ‘yes or no’ decision. In this regard, the following sections examine 
and compare how processes of institutional bargaining and institutional pressures at the point 
of adoption have influenced the diffusion outcome in the three cases.  
 
Institutional Bargaining 
Multi-stakeholder processes are political arenas in which struggles over influence and 
diverging interests take place. When firms and NGOs collaborate to create new MSIs they 
typically differ sharply over the structure and governance of these schemes and the scope and 
content of their standards and procedures. As the primary targets of private regulation, 
corporate actors in particular will try to maximise their control over the regulatory process. 
Against this background, it was hypothesised that: 
 
H3: The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if corporate actors are in a 
weak (strong) bargaining position.  
 
Overall, the case studies produced little evidence that intergroup bargaining was an important 
mechanism of institutional choice in the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro. In fact, explicit 
bargaining over governance structures was only observed in two of the three cases, with no 
significant changes to the institutional status quo. Nevertheless, the analysis of institutional 
bargaining produced important insight into the deeper research question studied in this 
project: variation in the inclusiveness of private participatory governance. In this regard, the 
analysis of bargaining power was important in order to understand adoption patterns – that is, 
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stakeholders’ decisions to join, to not join, or to leave MSIs in the biofuels, soy, and 
sugarcane arenas.36 In this regard, it was found that differences in producer groups’ 
bargaining power explained variation in adoption patterns across the three cases. Producer 
groups were in a strong bargaining position in the cases of the RTRS and RSB where shifting 
trade patterns and the availability of alternative, and from a business point of view more 
attractive, options reduced the cost of leaving the two initiatives. On the other hand, it was 
shown how UNICA, the leading Brazilian sugarcane industry association, made a decision to 
join BSI/Bonsucro only after EU sustainability regulation around biofuels had weakened its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the sugarcane roundtable.  
 
Bringing together the evidence from the case study chapters, the remainder of this section 
describes the interest constellations and conflicts in the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro. 
Then, the distribution of bargaining power in these situations is analysed in order to explain 
variation in adoption patterns across the three cases.  
 
For the most part, the observed interest constellations were very similar in the RSB, the 
RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro. In all three cases, the empirical analysis uncovered significant 
differences in the core preferences of civil society actors, on the one hand, and for-profit 
actors, on the other. In particular, producer groups from the global south were often at odds 
with the other stakeholder groups.  
 
Concerned about the negative environmental and social impact of agricultural production in 
the global south, (northern) NGOs were found to be the main drivers behind transnational 
sustainability governance. Through initiating commodity roundtables like the RSB, the 
RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro, their intention was to reduce deforestation rates, conserve 
biodiversity, and protect the livelihoods of local communities. However, the case studies also 
revealed that the NGO community is far from being united on the issue of sustainability 
certification. In fact, many NGOs remain very critical of business-civil society partnerships 
which they see as mere “greenwashing” ploys. There appear to be deep-seated differences 
among civil society organisations about private regulatory mechanisms and the current model 
                                                          
36
 The focus of this project is on institutional design of MSIs’ standard-setting and decision-making 
arrangements (e.g. collective choice rules, membership rules). On the other hand, the concept of adoption refers 
to the decisions of individual stakeholders to engage or to not engage with multi-stakeholder governance. The 
focus on institutional design as a dependent variable has advantages as well as disadvantages, see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5.1 for a more detailed discussion.  
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of global industrial agriculture. On the one hand, certification proponents argue that 
harnessing market forces can be a powerful mechanism for making mainstream agricultural 
production more sustainable. On the other, certification critics dismiss the market as the 
appropriate forum for sustainability regulation and instead demand more radical changes in 
the way in which agricultural products are produced and consumed (e.g. a return to local 
production and distribution systems).37  
 
As the principal targets of regulation, producer groups from the global south were often 
opposed to private sustainability regulation for another reason. Many of them feared that high 
environmental and social standards would have a negative impact on their businesses. In this 
context, a major concern of these groups was that private sustainability regulation would pose 
a barrier to future economic growth (agricultural expansion) and that it would negatively 
affect their competitiveness vis-à-vis non-certified producers. Also, there were fears that 
many of the smaller producers in the global south would not be able to comply with 
demanding sustainability regulation and that as a consequence they would be excluded from 
northern consumer markets (trade barriers). In this regard, the case studies revealed how 
sugarcane growers accused BSI/Bonsucro of discriminating against developing countries, 
how soy producers opposed the RTRS’ plans to adopt a strict policy on deforestation 
practices, and how biofuel producers in the RSB considered any extra cost arising from 
sustainability certification as an “incurable” issue.  
 
Located at the downstream end of the supply chain, economic actors from the global north 
often took a more moderate position. Depending on the issue at stake, they would sometimes 
support the position of the more “pragmatic” NGOs, but on other issues their preferences 
were closely aligned with the interests of producer groups. There are several reasons for this 
“inbetween position”. Faced with intensifying pressures from NGOs, consumers, and 
regulators about their social and environmental impacts, the primary concern of this 
stakeholder group are assurance and reputational protection. Collaborating with NGOs in the 
context of MSIs has become an important mechanism for these companies to send credible 
signals about their sustainability performance to external audiences. Another reason for their 
more moderate position is that, as corporate consumers, downstream firms are not the 
                                                          
37
 Typically, these critical NGOs do not participate in MSIs. Therefore, there are not included in the analysis of 
institutional bargaining to create new MSIs. However, they are included in the analysis in the form of 
environmental pressures (see section on coercive pressures).  
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primary targets of regulation. Also, large multinational companies like Unilever, Coca-Cola, 
and Shell can use their market power to force upstream producers to absorb most of the costs 
arising from private sustainability governance. However, at the same time, these companies 
are for-profit actors and do not have an interest in strict regulation. Clearly, they would 
oppose any standard or regulation that would pose a threat to their business models or prevent 
them from exploiting lucrative business opportunities.  
 
Consistent with the assumption underlying Hypothesis 3, the case studies uncovered various 
episodes of institutional bargaining between stakeholder groups in the RSB, the RTRS, and 
BSI/Bonsucro. Often, NGOs and producer groups from the global south were at the centre of 
these conflicts. They clashed with one another over questions of governance and the scope 
and content of the regulatory outcome. This is not surprising given that the core preferences 
of these two stakeholder groups are diametrically opposed to one another. Still, there is little 
evidence to suggest that institutional bargaining was an important mechanism of institutional 
choice in the cases studied. Explicit bargaining over the design of constitutive rules could 
only be observed in two of the three cases, but even here bargaining was not an important 
mechanism of institutional choice.  
 
A first example comes from the case of the RSB. After the scheme had been launched as a 
formal organisation, its quickly expanding producer constituency became increasingly 
unsatisfied with the institutional status quo. In particular, producer groups were concerned 
about the strong position of civil society actors and demanded more influence over 
organisational decision-making. They made various attempts to renegotiate the existing set of 
constitutive rules. After much internal controversy and discussion, the conflict resulted in a 
reform of the RSB’s governance structure which, however, did not significantly change the 
balance between stakeholder groups in the organisation.  
 
Another episode of institutional bargaining over control and influence comes from the early 
days of BSI/Bonsucro. In this case, producer groups challenged the scheme for being 
dominated by large buyers and NGOs from the global north. For a long time, they remained 
opposed to the initiative and heavily criticised it for erecting trade barriers and for 
discriminating against producers from developing countries. Only changes in the regulatory 
environment of BSI/Bonsucro changed the situation and eventually got producer groups to 
sign up for the scheme.  
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Clashes between stakeholder groups were also common in the RTRS. However, here they 
were mostly focused on the scope and content of the standard – that is, the regulatory 
outcome. In this regard, GMO-critical NGOs bargained with economic actors and more 
“pragmatic” NGOs over the scheme’s position on GM technology. Later in the process, 
Brazilian producer groups clashed with NGOs and economic actors from the global north 
over the scheme’s policy on deforestation practices. The issue at stake was whether or not the 
RTRS should include a strict cut-off date for deforestation in its Principles and Criteria. For 
obvious reasons, producer groups from Brazil, the world’s largest and fastest expanding soy 
growing region, were strongly opposed to this proposal. The conflict ended when two 
Brazilian industry associations, representing a significant proportion of global production, 
decided to walk out on the RTRS. Conflicts and bargaining over the scope and content of 
standards were also common in the other two schemes. In the RSB, producer groups tried to 
renegotiate the scheme’s production standard, which they argued was too demanding and 
costly to implement. Largely unsuccessful in their attempt, several producer organisations left 
the RSB as a result. In BSI/Bonsucro, the standard’s social component became a major bone 
of contention between NGOs and industry actors.  
 
In all three cases, NGOs and producer groups from the global south were at the centre of 
conflicts surrounding the creation and design of transnational sustainability governance. 
However, there were also interesting differences. In this regard, it was observed how key 
producer groups pulled out of the RSB and RTRS, whereas, after a lengthy conflict, the 
world’s largest sugarcane industry association and its members made a decision to join 
BSI/Bonsucro. What explains these divergent outcomes? The following analysis of the 
sources and distribution of bargaining power in these situations helps to shed some light on 
the issue. 
 
In bargaining situations, bargaining power is an important intervening variable. Essentially, 
its distribution determines whose preferences prevail and which institutional outcome is 
selected (Abbott & Snidal, 2009a; Thompson, 2010). Abbott and Snidal (2009a: 72-82) 
describe how in these situations bargaining power manifests itself in two forms: GIAP and 
“inclusion power”. Whereas GIAP (i.e. an actor’s ability to create or join alternatives 
arrangements or not to engage in regulatory activity at all) creates an “outside option,” 
inclusion power (i.e. an actor’s importance to the success of the governance arrangement) 
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creates an “inside option” (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3 for details). In the cases at hand, it 
can be assumed that producer groups possessed a similar amount of inclusion power – all 
three initiatives needed producers to sign up for their schemes. In other words, inclusion 
power cannot account for the observed variation. However, the case studies revealed 
differences in producers’ GIAP, and changes therein, over time. 
 
When, in 2009, the EU announced its plans to rely on private certification schemes to 
implement its renewable energy policy a larger number of biofuel producers joined the 
RSB.38 The within-case analysis showed that they soon challenged the institutional status quo 
in the organisation. They demanded more influence over the decision-making process and 
tried to renegotiate the scheme’s standard. However, their attempts were met with strong 
opposition from the initiative’s civil society constituency and after a lengthy struggle several 
producer organisations decided to leave the RSB. Overall, the scheme’s slow market uptake 
suggests that important parts of the biofuel industry have turned their backs on the RSB. The 
analysis of bargaining power and its distribution helps to shed some light on the issue. 
Producer groups in the RSB are likely to have had a significant amount of GIAP. The EU’s 
renewable energy policies did not only increase firms’ interest in private sustainability 
certification, it also attracted several competitor initiatives to the biofuels sector. A number of 
new certification systems were created, and existing schemes in other sectors modified their 
standards and developed auditing protocols for biofuel certification. Among them were 
several schemes which, from a business point of view, offered more favourable conditions 
than the RSB (e.g. no social component, no NGO involvement) (cf. Schleifer, 2013). For 
producer groups in the RSB, this created a range of viable outside options. In other words, it 
increased their GIAP (or more accurately their go-with-others power). Thus, when their 
attempts to renegotiate the RSB’s control rules and standard failed, many of them decided to 
seek certification elsewhere.  
 
The EU’s biofuel policy also changed the dynamics of the bargaining game in the case of 
BSI/Bonsucro; however, it did so in a different direction. When the sugarcane roundtable was 
initiated, producers and their industry associations showed little interest in the initiative. On 
the contrary, they strongly criticised and opposed the scheme. The within-case study revealed 
                                                          
38
 In 2009, the EU adopted the EU RED. Besides a blending mandate for biofuels, the policy included a 
mandatory sustainability scheme which all biofuels produced in or exported to the EU must meet (European 
Union, 2009).  
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that their decision to remain outside the initiative had its foundation in the relatively low 
export rate of sugarcane. Most of the world’s sugarcane is processed and consumed locally, 
which made southern producers less dependent on international markets. Also, when 
compared to other sectors, sugarcane had seen little NGO activism and no major incidents or 
‘naming and shaming’ campaigns had put the industry under pressure. These factors 
translated into a high level of GIAP for southern producer groups. For them there was no 
need to engage in transnational sustainability governance. However, the situation changed 
when renewable energy policies in the EU created one of the world’s largest markets for 
sugarcane ethanol. This created an attractive export opportunity, notably for the Brazilian 
bioethanol industry. At the same time, it reduced its GIAP vis-à-vis BSI/Bonsucro as it made 
not engaging in transnational sustainability governance more costly. Bioethanol producers 
who wanted to export to the EU needed certification, and with its focus on sugarcane 
BSI/Bonsucro was the most suitable system available. After some negotiations concerning 
the scheme’s social component, the leading Brazilian sugarcane industry association decided 
to endorse the scheme, which explains the high level of (Brazilian) producer participation in 
BSI/Bonsucro.  
 
As only a very small fraction of the world’s soybean oil is processed into biofuels, the EU’s 
renewable energy policies had little effect on the dynamics of institutional bargaining in the 
RTRS. But here also, changing trade patterns affected producers’ GIAP and thus the 
dynamics and outcomes of the institutional bargaining game. When the standard-setting 
process in the RTRS was nearing completion, producer groups from South America and 
NGOs clashed over the scheme’s position on deforestation practices. There was little room 
for compromise as the issue was linked to the core preferences of the two stakeholder groups. 
In this regard, the two major Brazilian industry associations strongly opposed a strict cut-off 
date for deforestation practices because it would have posed an obstacle to future soy 
expansion. On the other hand, stopping deforestation in the Amazon was the main objective 
for many of the NGOs in the RTRS. When bargaining broke down, the Brazilian industry 
associations were quick to pull out of the RTRS and to create a self-regulatory scheme in the 
form of the SPP. The within-case analysis suggests that their GIAP was boosted by the 
changing nature of the international soybean trade. Beginning in the late 1990s, Chinese 
demand for soybeans grew exponentially and soon China replaced the EU as the primary 
export market of Brazilian soy. In the eyes of South American producers and their industry 
associations, this reduced the significance of the euro-centric RTRS. More generally, it has 
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reduced their willingness to engage in meaningful self-regulation, as Chinese buyers and 
consumers are less concerned about sustainability issues than their European counterparts.  
 
To sum up the above analysis, the case studies produced little support for Hypothesis 3, 
which causally linked the inclusiveness of the diffusion outcome to the distribution of 
bargaining power between corporate actors and NGOs. Overall, there is little evidence to 
suggest that institutional bargaining was an important mechanism of institutional choice in 
the cases studied. On the other hand, analysing corporate actors’ bargaining power was 
helpful in order to understand differences in adoption patterns across the three cases.  
 
Coercive Pressures 
Besides processes of institutional bargaining, the case study chapters examined the nature and 
strength of institutional environmental pressures at the point of adoption. In the literature on 
the new institutionalism, environmental pressures (normative, coercive, and mimetic 
pressures) are discussed as key drivers behind processes of institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The argument goes that organisations which occupy an 
organisational field are subject to the same environmental pressures, and that these pressures 
make them adopt similar structures. Whilst environmental pressures can be powerful forces 
behind processes of institutional isomorphism, Chapter 2 elaborated on how their strength is 
not necessarily the same in all places and at all times. With a focus on transnational activist 
campaigns, it was argued that strong coercive pressures will lead to a more inclusive 
diffusion outcome. This is because in these environments business actors are likely to be 
more willing to engage with civil society actors in the context of MSIs. Also, advocacy 
groups may put pressure on the founders of new MSIs to adopt a more inclusive approach. 
Against this background, the single case study chapters examined the following hypothesis:  
 
H4:  The diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if coercive pressures at the 
point of adoption are strong (weak).  
 
The case study chapters produced strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Through 
interviews and a background analysis of media and NGO reports, it was shown that coercive 
pressures were strong in the biofuels and soy arenas, whereas, in comparison, BSI/Bonsucro 
was subject to only weak coercive pressures during its formation period. Furthermore, 
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through the interviews and available documentation traces of the mechanism at work could 
be uncovered. In institutional environments characterised by strong coercive pressures, the 
founders of new MSIs felt under scrutiny and reasoned that a narrow approach would not be 
capable of gaining political authority – that is, legitimate decision-making power – in these 
arenas. They feared that not including important stakeholder groups would leave their 
institutions contested and delegitimised. Also, in one of the cases, adopting a more inclusive 
design was used as a strategy to shield the organisation, which had been targeted by 
transnational activist groups, from further criticism.  
 
Analysing the political situation in the biofuels and soy sectors at the time, the case study 
chapters discovered that the RSB and RTRS were created in highly contested environments. 
In the biofuels arena, the ‘food vs. fuel’ debate in particular had sparked a lot of controversy 
and political conflict. At the height of the world food crisis in 2007/2008, many blamed 
biofuels and the public policies promoting their production as one of the main drivers behind 
the high prices for staple foods during this period. Furthermore, biofuels were accused of 
causing land grabs in the global south and of being a driver behind deforestation and climate 
change due to processes of direct and indirect land-use change. Overall, there was a lot of 
NGO activism and critical media coverage concerning these topics, and it was in this 
environment in which the founders of the RSB held their initial meetings.  
 
Land-use change was also a major issue in the soy sector. Over the previous two decades, the 
so-called soy boom had converted some 50 million hectares of land into soybean fields. 
Much of this growth had occurred in South America where it was threating the Amazon 
rainforest. Soy production was highly controversial for another reason. Beginning in the early 
1990s, GM soybean varieties emerged and spread rapidly around the world. Today, close to 
80 percent of the global soybean harvest is GM (GMO Compass, website-a). When, at the 
very beginning of the process, the RTRS made a decision to include GM soy under its 
certification scheme, several GMO-critical organisations left the roundtable initiative. Since 
then, the RTRS has been strongly criticised by environmental groups for greenwashing GM 
soy as responsible.  
 
The case studies showed how the founders of the RSB and RTRS perceived their 
environments, and how these perceptions influenced their institutional design choices. They 
interpreted the highly politicised environments of the biofuels and soy sectors as difficult and 
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challenging and anticipated that soon their initiatives, too, would become (or already were) 
the subject of intense scrutiny and political contestation. Against this background, the 
founders of the RSB reasoned that a narrow approach, excluding important stakeholders, 
would not be able to gain political authority in the biofuels arena. In this regard, a member of 
RSB’s founding body explained that “ (…) there was so much controversy surrounding it 
[biofuel production]. Having something narrow was not useful in our thinking. It would not 
have had any credibility or legitimacy”. They feared that a narrow institution would become 
contested and ultimately fail in its task of developing “internationally accepted standards for 
sustainable biofuels production” (RSB, 2006: 1). The findings from the within-case study 
suggest that this was the main reason why they opted for a highly participatory approach. A 
similar relationship between the high level of coercive environmental pressures and the 
inclusiveness of the diffusion outcome could be observed in the soy case study. However, 
unlike the RSB, the RTRS was the target of NGO activism. This means the pressures were 
more direct. From the very beginning, the scheme was heavily criticised by an international 
coalition of NGOs for its decision to include GM soy under its certification scheme. Trying to 
find ways to respond to these pressures, its founders reasoned that the level of conflict 
surrounding a project determines its level of inclusiveness. In this regard, in the case of the 
RTRS, adopting a more inclusive approach was also a strategy to shield the organisation from 
further criticism, as one of the interviewees explained:  
 
“We were under very close scrutiny from the NGOs because of the GMO issue. 
Everything we were doing was watched closely and we did not want to give them 
another pretext to criticise us” (interview with a member of the RTRS Secretariat). 
 
BSI/Bonsucro’s starting position was a very different one. In comparison to the biofuels and 
soy sectors, sugarcane was a low conflict environment. In the mid-2000s, when the initiative 
was launched, sugarcane expansion rates were relatively moderate and GMOs were not an 
issue. In the past, problems with labour standards had made some headlines. However, a 
background analysis revealed that none of the big international NGOs was campaigning on 
sugarcane and that, overall, the sector had a very low media profile. The situation somewhat 
changed when sugarcane became an important feedstock for the biofuels needed to meet the 
world’s growing demand. However, during its formation period, BSI/Bonsucro was a food 
crop initiative and therefore was not associated with the controversial topics of the biofuels 
debate. Later in the process, the scheme developed standards and auditing procedures for 
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bioethanol production, but at no point was the initiative the target of direct NGO activism or 
media criticism. In this regard, BSI/Bonsucro was “sailing in calm waters”, as one of the 
interviewees put it, whereas the RSB and RTRS started off in heavy seas (interview with a 
member of the SC). It seems that the low conflict environment of the sugarcane sector 
enabled the founders of BSI/Bonsucro to go through with their narrower and more 
instrumentalist approach to stakeholder inclusion. Unlike its counterparts in the RSB and 
RTRS, they did not feel the scrutiny of critical NGOs or the media. In fact, the case study 
evidence suggests that for a long time the scheme was little known in NGO circles.  
 
Overall, the case study chapters produced strong support for Hypothesis 4. In this regard, a 
clear correlation could be established between the strength of coercive institutional pressures 
at the point of adoption and the inclusiveness of the diffusion outcome. Furthermore, the 
within-case studies provided evidence of the mechanism at work. In environments 
characterised by strong coercive pressures, the founders of new MSIs felt under scrutiny and 
reasoned that a narrow approach would have no chance of success. Also, in one of the cases, 
adopting a more inclusive design was used as a strategy to fend off direct pressures and to 
shield the organisation from further contestation.  
 
Normative Pressures 
Besides coercive pressures, the case study chapters examined the nature and strength of 
normative pressures in the environment of the three schemes. In Chapter 2, it was argued that 
the group of late adopters, like the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro, are likely to be subject to 
the same normative pressures and that this might have an ‘isomorphic effect’ on them. In this 
context, the standard-setting code of the ISEAL Alliance, an umbrella organisation of private 
sustainability initiatives, was discussed as exercising normative pressures on new MSIs to 
conform to these transnational norms of good private governance. ISEAL’s Code of Good 
Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards was released in 2004 and defined a 
set of principles and criteria of how to organise a private standard-setting process in an 
inclusive and transparent way. With regard to stakeholder participation in the rule-making 
process, the ISEAL code (ISEAL, 2012: 8) stipulates that:  
 
• Standard-setting shall be open to all interested parties  
• Participation and decision-making needs to reflect a balance of interests (subject 
matter and geographic scope)  
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• Participants shall include stakeholders with an expertise relevant to the subject, those 
that are materially affected by the standard, and those that could influence the 
implementation of the standard. 
 
ISEAL’s standard-setting code quickly became an important norm for transnational rule-
making organisations, including the MSIs studied in this dissertation. In this regard, the case 
studies showed that the founders of the three initiatives knew about ISEAL and that its 
standards code served them all as an important reference point. The RSB and BSI/Bonsucro 
became associate, and later full, members of the ISEAL Alliance. The ISEAL’s standard-
setting code was also central to the founders of RTRS, although the soy initiative did not 
become a formal member. In particular, the practices of opening standards to public 
consultation periods and conducting stakeholder-outreach meeting could be traced back to the 
ISEAL code. These findings confirm arguments made in the literature about ISEAL’s 
isomorphic effect on the field of transnational sustainability organisations (Dingwerth & 
Pattberg, 2009; Loconto & Fouilleux, 2013). However, the cases studies suggest that this 
effect remains limited to areas where stakeholder inclusion is relatively “cheap”. In this 
regard, the consultation mechanisms mentioned above primarily serve the purpose of 
informing, and seeking the input of, a wider group of stakeholders, and there are no clear 
guidelines as to how, and to what extent, power holders have to incorporate the input. On the 
other hand, the case studies showed how the RSB, RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro differ 
significantly in the way in which they organise direct participation – that is, the inclusion of 
key stakeholder groups in their standard-setting and decision-making arrangements. The 
causes of this variation were examined in this dissertation.  
 
7.5 Summary of Findings  
At the heart of this dissertation is the diffusion of private participatory governance in the 
global economy and the questions of why and how this process has introduced institutional 
variation in the field of sustainability MSIs. To empirically examine this question, Chapter 2 
developed an analytical framework which distinguishes three stages in the diffusion process: 
source selection, transmission, and adoption. For each of these stages, hypotheses were 
developed about the cause-and-effect relationships that make diffusion outcomes vary. In 
three case study chapters, this model was put to work in order to examine the diffusion of 
private participatory governance in the agriculture sector. Concluding the empirical analysis, 
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this chapter compared the findings across the three cases. This made it possible to identify the 
causes of variation for the organisations studied. It also provides a more solid empirical basis 
for the formulation of general hypotheses about the institutional diffusion and variation of 
private participatory governance.  
 
With regard to the model’s first stage, source selection, the case studies confirm assumptions 
about a complex diffusion pattern in the field of transnational sustainability governance. This 
pattern involves multiple sources as well as chain mode diffusion. Ideas about how to 
organise participatory governance are passed on from one adopter to the next, and often the 
founders of new arrangements combine design features from different source models with 
one another. The cases studies showed that network ties were an important factor, facilitating 
processes of institutional diffusion between prior and later adopters. In this regard, the 
findings confirm a widely held proposition in the diffusion literature that later adopters are 
most likely to imitate those whom they know and trust (Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989; Haunschild, 1993). Identifying the primary target institutions was 
particularly important in the cases of the RSB and the RTRS, which were modelled after the 
FSC and RSPO, respectively. However, in a comparative perspective, no systematic 
correlation between the level of inclusiveness of the primary target institution and the 
diffusion outcome could be established.  
 
Examining the transmission of ideas, this could partly be explained by the fact that learning, 
not imitation, was the primary diffusion mechanism in operation. In this regard, later adopters 
did not simply try to copy the design of prior adopters, but drew lessons from their 
experiences and adapted the model to the purpose at hand. In the cases of the RTRS and 
BSI/Bonsucro, this led institutional designers to develop a narrower and more instrumentalist 
approach to stakeholder inclusion. On the other hand, the founders of the RSB followed the 
highly participatory approach of the FSC, which they believed was of key importance to the 
organisational success of the forestry initiative. These findings show that lessons-drawing is 
an important intervening factor which can influence the diffusion outcome in one way or the 
other. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the outcomes of learning processes are inherently 
difficult to predict – although, they are not random phenomena as the concluding discussion 
in the following chapter will show (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.1) 
 
247 
 
Moving on to the adoption stage of the model, the analysis of institutional bargaining during 
the formation period of the three MSIs produced little evidence to suggest that bargaining 
was an important mechanism of institutional choice in the cases studied. On the other hand, 
examining processes of institutional bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power in 
these situations was important in order to understand adoption patterns (i.e. stakeholders’ 
decisions to join, to not join, or to leave a private governance arrangement). A notable finding 
was that differences in producer groups’ GIAP explained the variation in adoption patterns 
across the three cases. Producers from the global south were in a strong bargaining position in 
the cases of the RSB and RTRS where shifting trade patterns and the availability of 
alternative, and from a business point of view more attractive, institutional options reduced 
the cost of leaving the two initiatives. On the other hand, it was shown how southern 
producers made a decision to join BSI/Bonsucro only after EU sustainability regulation 
around biofuels had weakened its bargaining position vis-à-vis the sugarcane initiative.  
 
Finally, the nature and strength of institutional environmental pressures at the point of 
adoption were examined. With regard to coercive pressures (activity of transnational 
advocacy groups), a clear correlation could be established between their strength and the 
inclusiveness of the diffusion outcome. In this regard, it was found that adopters in high 
conflict environments (biofuels and soy) opted for a more inclusive approach, whereas in the 
low conflict environment of the sugarcane sector no comparable process of ‘institutional 
fitting’ could be observed. The within-case studies uncovered traces of the mechanism at 
work. In institutional environments characterised by strong coercive pressures, the founders 
of new MSIs felt under scrutiny and reasoned that a narrow approach would not be capable of 
gaining political authority – that is, legitimate decision-making power – in these arenas. They 
feared that not including important stakeholder groups would leave their institutions 
contested and delegitimised. Also, in one of the cases, adopting a more inclusive design was 
used as a strategy to shield the organisation, which had been targeted by transnational activist 
groups, from further criticism.  
 
With regard to normative pressures, the case study chapters found evidence for a (limited) 
isomorphic effect exercised by emerging transnational norms on good private standard-
setting practices. These norms are being developed by the ISEAL Alliance, a professional 
association of leading private sustainability initiatives. The ISEAL norms are believed to 
have a structuring effect on the field of transnational rule-making organisations (Dingwerth & 
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Pattberg, 2009; Loconto & Fouilleux, 2013). Providing some support for these assumptions, 
the case studies showed that the ISEAL code exercised pressures on the late adopters in the 
biofuels, soy, and sugarcane sectors to conform to these norms. On the other hand, it was 
found that ISEAL’s isomorphic effect was limited to areas where stakeholder inclusion is 
relatively “cheap” (e.g. the use of consultation mechanisms); and that, despite these 
normative pressures, the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro adopted institutional designs 
that differ significantly in their level of inclusiveness. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions  
 
8.1 Introduction  
This dissertation examined the institutional diffusion and variation of private participatory 
governance in the global economy. Over the last two decades, MSIs have become a popular 
model for organising private rule-making activities at the transnational level. Today, multi-
stakeholder schemes operate in many industry sectors, ranging from garment manufacturing 
and diamond mining to aquaculture production and soybean farming. Involving stakeholders 
from across these industries, they set standards for socially and environmentally sustainable 
production and often rely on market-based mechanisms for their implementation. Because of 
their participatory approach, MSIs have been examined as part of a ‘deliberative turn’ in 
global sustainability politics (Bäckstrand et al., 2010c; Cheyns, 2011; Dingwerth, 2007; L. 
Fransen & Kolk, 2007; Schaller, 2007; Schouten et al., 2012). However, calling into question 
the notion of legitimate transnational rule-making, there is evidence to suggest that the 
diffusion of MSIs in the global economy has not spread a universal model of private 
participatory governance. In this regard, this and other studies (e.g. L. Fransen & Kolk, 2007) 
have uncovered significant variation in the level of inclusiveness of real-world MSIs. 
Whereas some schemes involve a wide range of stakeholders in their governance and 
standard-setting activities, others have been found to be far less participatory. It is this 
variation in the institutional design of MSIs and notably their level of inclusiveness which 
this dissertation set out to explain.  
 
It is the purpose of this final chapter to summarise and discuss the main findings of this study 
and to place them in the context of the literature on the deliberative turn in global 
sustainability politics. Furthermore, the dissertation’s contributions to the study of diffusion 
and institutional design and the specialised literature on multi-stakeholder sustainability 
governance are briefly discussed.  
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8.2 Explaining Variation in Diffusion Outcomes 
The starting point of this study was the observation that the diffusion of the MSI 
organisational model in the global economy has led to variation in a key dimension of 
institutional design, namely their level of inclusiveness. In order to explain this variation, 
Chapter 2 developed an analytical framework which distinguishes three stages in the 
diffusion process: source selection, transmission, and adoption. For the different stages, 
hypotheses were formulated about the factors that “intervene” in the diffusion process, 
leading to more or less inclusive institutional outcomes. This framework was put to work in 
three case study chapters (Chapters 4-6) examining the diffusion of private participatory 
governance in the agriculture sector – the most dynamic site of MSI diffusion in recent years. 
Chapter 7 then compared the findings across the three cases. See Table 34 for a summary of 
the empirical results.  
 
Table 23: Explaining Variation in Diffusion Outcomes (Summary Table)39 
Diffusion 
Stage  
Hypotheses  RSB RTRS BSI/Bonsucro 
Source 
Selection  
H1: The diffusion outcome will 
be more (less) inclusive if the 
primary target institution exhibits 
a high (low) level of 
inclusiveness.  
 
 
++ + - 
Transmission  H2:  The diffusion outcome will 
be more (less) inclusive if 
adopters learn that inclusiveness 
was good (bad) for the success of 
prior adopters. 
 
++ + ++ 
Adoption  H3: The diffusion outcome will 
be more (less) inclusive if 
corporate actors are in a weak 
(strong) bargaining position.  
 
 
+ - - 
H4:  The diffusion outcome will 
be more (less) inclusive if 
coercive pressures at the point of 
adoption are strong (weak).  
 
++ ++ ++ 
 
 
                                                          
39
 Note: ++ = strong support; + = some support; - = no support.  
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As can be seen from the above table, the empirical analysis produced strong support for 
Hypothesis 2 and 4. In the following, these findings and their implications will be discussed 
in more detail. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the other hypotheses.  
 
8.2.1 Institutional Learning 
The analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 identified the transmission of the diffusion 
practice as a distinctive stage in the diffusion process. This stage describes the travel of ideas 
from the target institution or source model to the point of adoption. Standard diffusion 
models in organisational theory work with imitation as the underlying transmission 
mechanism. In this regard, DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 152) assume that organisations 
model themselves after similar organisations in their field which they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful. Whilst important, imitation is not the only diffusion mechanism of 
relevance in organisational fields. In this regard, Chapter 2 introduced learning as a second 
mode of adopter-driven diffusion. However, unlike imitation, learning implies a process of 
rational reflection on the part of the adopter. In learning mode, adopters consider the pros and 
cons of a design feature, and lessons are drawn from the experience of others. Against this 
background, it was hypothesised that the diffusion outcome will be more (less) inclusive if 
adopters learn that inclusiveness was good (bad) for the success of prior adopters. 
 
In support of Hypothesis 2, the empirical analysis uncovered how later adopters did not 
simply imitate the institutional design of prior adopters, but drew lessons from their 
experiences. Furthermore, the comparative analysis revealed that the type of lessons drawn 
differed across the three cases studied, introducing institutional variation between them. In 
this regard, the founders of the RSB learned from the FSC that its high level of inclusiveness 
was important for its robustness and credibility. In their perception, these attributes had made 
the FSC a successful private standards institution. On the other hand, the people behind 
BSI/Bonsucro reasoned that the open and experimentalist approach of previous roundtable 
initiatives had limited their effectiveness, and they therefore opted for a narrower and more 
instrumentalist approach to stakeholder inclusion. Learning could also be observed in the 
case of the RTRS. However, the decision of its founders to adopt a less inclusive design was 
only indirectly related to the experiences made by prior adopters. In this case, modifications 
to the source model (FSC) were made because people in the WWF learned about differences 
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between the palm oil, soy, and forestry sectors which they believed required a different 
approach to stakeholder inclusion.  
 
The empirical examination of Hypothesis 2 focused on uncovering learning processes and 
their outcomes, which were then compared across the three cases. However, for a more 
complete explanation it would be interesting to know why learning outcomes diverged in the 
first place. In other words, what makes later adopters differ in the lessons they draw from the 
experiences of prior adopters – why are they not the same? In order to shed some light on the 
issue, this section draws inductively on the case study chapters in order to derive some 
insights about the factors that have influenced learning processes and their outcomes in the 
three initiatives studied. This may inform future research on the role of learning in the context 
of institutional diffusion processes. In the following, three factors are briefly discussed: the 
nature of adopters’ experiences, the role of ‘carriers’, and the situation and context in which 
the learning process takes place.  
 
With regard to the first point, adopters do not necessarily draw their lessons from the same 
experience base. For example, through their network ties the founders of the RSB had very 
detailed information about the internal workings of the FSC, whereas the initiators of the 
RTRS possessed a lot of institutional knowledge about the RSPO. In the case of 
BSI/Bonsucro, information about prior adopters was made available to its founders through 
WWF US, which had worked with several MSIs before. However, the experiences 
encountered at different times and places are not necessarily the same, and therefore the 
lessons that adopters draw from them may vary. Secondly the experiences of prior adopters 
are always conveyed by someone, in form of stories (oral or written). The translation 
literature assumes that these “someones”, or so-called ‘carriers’, are not neutral conduits of 
ideas (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Meyer, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002). 
When they report about events that have happened elsewhere, they do not simply state facts 
but interpret, dramatise, theorise, and re- and decontextualise these events. Thus, what flows 
are not objective descriptions of reality but subjective interpretations, dramatised stories, and 
theoretical models. In this regard, carriers are believed to modify and co-construct the ideas 
transmitted by them. In the cases studied, the influence of such carriers could be most clearly 
observed in the example of BSI/Bonsucro. Here, the WWF US supplied the founders of the 
sugarcane initiative with information about its previous experiences with multi-stakeholder 
governance. However, instead of providing a value-free description of different institutional 
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options, it promoted its “theory of change”, which advanced a very narrow and 
instrumentalist notion of stakeholder inclusion. This finding resonates with Auld et al.’s 
(2007) discussion of the WWF being an important organisational carrier of the MSI 
institutional model. Thirdly, the situation and context in which the learning process takes 
place appears to have an influence on its outcome. In this regard, the case study on the RTRS 
showed how differences between the soy, palm oil, and forestry sectors influenced the 
lessons its initiators drew from the experience of prior adopters. They came to believe that the 
“hidden” commodity soy required a different (less inclusive) approach from that of the FSC, 
which operates in the more visible forestry products field.  
 
Overall, the findings of this study show that analysing processes of learning is of key 
importance to understanding the institutional diffusion and variation of private participatory 
governance. Typically, the founders of new MSIs do not simply emulate the institutional 
designs of prior adopters, but draw lessons from their experiences. However, the type of 
lessons drawn can vary. In the cases studied, the nature of adopters’ experiences, the 
influence of carriers, as well as contextual factors, influenced the learning outcome, putting 
the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro on different institutional trajectories.  
 
8.2.2 Institutional Pressures 
Examining the adoption of the MSI institutional model in the biofuels, soy, and sugarcane 
sectors the case studies furthermore produced strong support for Hypothesis 4. This 
hypothesis maintains that the inclusiveness of the diffusion outcome depends on the strength 
of coercive institutional pressures at the point of adoption. In the literature on the new 
institutionalism, environmental pressures (normative, coercive, and mimetic pressures) are 
typically discussed as causes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Organisations within an organisational field are believed to be subject to the same 
environmental pressures, which make them become similar over time. Whilst environmental 
pressures can be powerful forces behind processes of institutional isomorphism, Chapter 2 
elaborated on how their strength is not necessarily the same in all places and at all times. 
With a focus on transnational activist campaigns, it was argued that strong coercive pressures 
will lead to a more inclusive diffusion outcome.   
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In support of Hypothesis 4, the case study chapters showed how transnational advocacy 
groups were very active in the biofuels and soy arenas and how they put pressure on firms, 
policy-makers, and the founders of the RSB and the RTRS. In the case of the RSB, it was the 
global food crisis of 2007/2008 which sparked much debate about biofuels. In the soy arena, 
it was the industry’s heavy reliance on GM technology which led environmental groups to 
mobilise against key firms in the soy supply chain. When a decision was made to certify GM 
soy as “responsible”, the RTRS also became the target of an internationally coordinated NGO 
campaign. In contrast, the case study on BSI/Bonsucro revealed that coercive pressures were 
comparatively weak in the sugarcane sector. During the scheme’s formation period there was 
little NGO activism in this arena. The empirical analysis suggests two main reasons for this: 
firstly, sugarcane expansion had been relatively modest when compared to other crops; 
secondly GMOs – which had sparked much controversy in the soy arena – played only a 
small role. Furthermore, launched in the first instance as a food crop initiative, the early BSI 
was not associated with the controversial topics of the biofuels discussion. In a comparative 
perspective, and consistent with Hypothesis 4, the case study chapters showed that adopters 
in high conflict environments (biofuels and soy) opted for a more inclusive approach, 
whereas in the low conflict environment of the sugarcane sector no comparable process of 
‘institutional fitting’ could be observed.  
 
The within-case study approach taken by this study allowed further insights into the 
mechanisms at work. Through the interviews and primary documents it could be established 
how adopters in the biofuels, soy, and sugarcane sectors perceived and responded to the 
institutional environments in which they were operating. In this regard, the biofuels and soy 
cases show how the founders of the RSB and RTRS felt under scrutiny and how they feared 
that not including important stakeholder groups would leave their institutions contested and 
delegitimised. They believed that a narrow approach would not be able to gain political 
authority – that is legitimate decision-making power – in these arenas. In their perception, 
this would have meant institutional failure for a regulatory institution created to define and 
implement a sustainability standard for the entire industry sector and its various stakeholder 
groups. In this regard, adopting a more inclusive approach can be understood as an 
organisational strategy aimed at increasing the political authority of private standards 
institutions operating in highly contested environments. In the case of the RTRS, it was also a 
strategy to fend off immediate coercive pressures. Unlike the RSB, the scheme became the 
target of direct NGO activism. In order to shield their organisation from further criticism, its 
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founders opted for a more inclusive design. In contrast to adopters in the biofuels and soy 
arenas, the founders of BSI/Bonsucro felt no need to modify their project in response to 
coercive pressures at the point of adoption.  
 
In sum, the examination of the adoption stage revealed that environmental institutional 
pressures can vary across industry sectors. Where coercive pressures are strong, we can 
expect the diffusion outcome to be more inclusive. On the other hand, weak coercive 
institutional pressures have been found to give rise to less participatory private governance 
institutions.  
 
8.3 (Legitimate) Transnational Rule-Making Revisited  
This study on the institutional diffusion and variation of private participatory governance has 
been conducted against the background of the debate on the ‘deliberative turn’ in global 
sustainability politics. A central question in this debate is whether new modes of governance 
can increase the participatory quality and thus legitimacy of global governance institutions 
(Bäckstrand et al., 2010c; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Bexel & Mörth, 2010; Dingwerth, 
2007; Risse, 2004). Contributing to this line of research, this dissertation set out to explain 
the varying levels of inclusiveness of private multi-stakeholder arrangements.  
 
The deliberative ideal as found in democratic theory, stipulates that all those affected by a 
rule should be given the opportunity to participate in the rule-making process (Bohman & 
Regh, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998). For deliberative democrats, inclusiveness is one of 
the core procedural requirements without which meaningful deliberation, and therefore 
legitimacy, is not possible (Lövbrand & Khan, 2010; Smith, 2003). MSIs try to approximate 
this ideal through the multi-stakeholder structure of their decision-making and standard-
setting arrangements and other procedural mechanisms such as public consultation periods 
and stakeholder outreach meetings. However, not surprisingly, real-world MSIs have been 
found to fall far short of the deliberative ideal. For example, in their study of the deliberative 
capacity of two agricultural commodity roundtables, Schouten et al. (2012) find that they 
include only a limited variety of pragmatic and technical discourses, whilst excluding local 
knowledge and ideological or emotional styles of communication. A similar criticism has 
been made by Cheyns (2011) who finds that small-scale farmers and communities from the 
global south are often excluded from these arrangements. Others, however, find that MSIs 
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can be meaningful sites of deliberation. For instance, in his study of three major 
environmental MSIs, Dingwerth (2007: 9) argues that they “include numerous innovative 
elements aimed at ensuring broad participation of affected communities; and they frequently 
base their decisions on sincere and meaningful deliberation among participants”. In a similar 
vein, Schaller (2007) describes the Ethical Trading Initiative, an MSI in the apparel sector, as 
a private governance arrangement with a “relatively high degree democratic legitimacy”.  
 
These divergent outcomes are not surprising given the intangible – there are no clear-cut 
criteria for measuring a concept like democratic legitimacy – and political nature of the 
subject under investigation. Regarding the latter, there are many scholars who oppose private 
governance arrangements on ideological grounds, arguing that they privatise practices which 
should be inherently public (Bartley, 2005; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005; Nölke & Graz, 2008). 
Also, as noted by Bäckstrand et al. (2010a: 229-231), the assessment of the deliberative 
quality of new modes of governance will depend on the point of reference. If this reference or 
vantage point is the deliberative ideal, then real-world MSIs are unlikely to do very well – 
from a practical perspective, it is nearly impossible to involve all those affected by a rule in 
the rule-making process. On the other hand, when compared to other arrangements, MSIs 
might well constitute an improvement over the institutional status quo.  
 
However, this does not mean that criticisms about the dominance of established stakeholder 
groups, a focus on selective topics and discourses, and power asymmetries between 
participants, can be easily dismissed. In fact, the cases studied in this dissertation confirm 
many of the shortcomings discussed in the literature. For example, the inventory of the 
central decision-making bodies of 16 environmental MSIs conducted in Chapter 1 revealed 
that civil society actors from the global south are not very well represented in these 
arrangements. At the same time, the inventory, together with other studies (L. Fransen & 
Kolk, 2007), has shown that some MSIs seem to do better than others when it comes to 
involving key stakeholder groups in their governance and standard-setting activities. 
However, as of yet, varying levels of inclusiveness remain largely underresearched. We know 
that they exist, but we do not know why and when they occur.  
 
Against this background, this study makes an important explanatory contribution to the 
literature on the deliberative turn in global sustainability politics. It describes the diffusion of 
private participatory governance in the global economy and maps the variation in the level of 
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inclusiveness across a large sample of environmental MSIs. Examining the diffusion of the 
MSI institutional model in the biofuels, soy, and sugarcane sectors, the study showed how 
processes of learning and the nature and strength of institutional environmental pressures 
have influenced the way in which it has been transmitted and adopted.  
 
Considering the aspect of institutional learning in more depth, the findings of this dissertation 
show that the model of private participatory governance is far from set in stone. While ideas 
about multi-stakeholder governance diffuse, late adopters learn from the experiences of prior 
adopters. Based on these experiences and the lessons they draw from them, they reinterpret, 
innovate, and de- and recontextualise the model. However, learning is not a uniform process 
and, depending on the available experience base, the influence of carriers, as well as 
contextual factors, its outcomes can vary. Furthermore, it became clear that private 
participatory governance does not exist and diffuse in an institutional vacuum. There are 
normative and coercive institutional pressures which influence the way in which the model is 
received and implemented. While these pressures can be a source of institutional 
isomorphism, they are not necessarily the same at all times and all places. In the cases 
studied, differences in the strength of coercive environmental pressures caused variation in 
diffusion outcomes. In this regard, in environments characterised by strong coercive 
pressures, adopting a more inclusive approach served institutional designers as a strategy to 
gain political authority and to protect their organisations from contestation. On the other 
hand, the low conflict environment of the sugarcane sector allowed the founder of 
BSI/Bonsucro to go through with their narrower and more instrumentalist approach to 
stakeholder inclusion.  
 
8.4 Diffusion and Institutional Design 
Besides making a contribution to the literature on the deliberative turn in global sustainability 
politics, this study improves our understanding of the relationship between diffusion and 
institutional design. The main focus of the institutional design literature is to explain why 
international institutions are designed in the way they are (Finke, 2013; Koremenos, Lipson, 
& Snidal, 2001; Koremenos & Snidal, 2003; Marcoux, 2009; Thompson, 2010). Grounded in 
game theory, the original rational design framework conceptualises institutions as 
components of equilibria. They are created by states and other international actors to help 
them achieve and maintain equilibrium outcomes (mutual beneficial cooperation). Institutions 
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do this by, for example, reducing information asymmetries and by supplying rules as well as 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The main argument of the rational design literature 
is that different cooperation problems require different solutions and this is why states and 
other international actors design institutions in different ways (Koremenos et al., 2001).  
 
Much of the institutional design literature treats institution building processes as independent 
events: each institution and its design are looked at and explained separately from those of 
others. For example, Koremenos et al. (2001: 773-796) hypothesise that the magnitude of 
distribution and enforcement problems or the level of uncertainty influences actors’ 
institutional design choices. Only recently have scholars of IR began to explore the 
relationship between diffusion and institutional design, and how institutional design choices 
made in one place can affect the institutional design choices made in others (Alter, 2012; 
Jetschke & Murray, 2011; Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012; Sommerer & Tallberg, 2014). These 
studies show that institutional diffusion is a pervasive phenomenon in international and 
transnational relations. When new institutions are created or existing ones are reformed, 
emulating others or drawing lessons from their experiences often plays an important role. For 
the study of international institutions, this means that in these cases institutional design 
choices have to be understood as interdependent rather than independent events. Furthermore, 
this literature suggests that while institutions diffuse, they often vary in form and content. For 
example, Adler describes how the European model of embedded international courts diffused 
around the world. Examining the diffusion outcomes, he finds that several of the adopted 
versions diverged significantly from the institutional design of the source model. In a similar 
vein, Jetschke and Murray find that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has not 
copied, but instead selectively imitated, the EU institutional model.  
 
The question of why institutions vary as they diffuse is an important one. A better 
understanding of these processes can teach us a great deal about why international institutions 
are designed in a certain way, and why they change in the way that they do.  However, as of 
yet, explanations of variation in the diffusion process remain largely context-specific and a 
more general and systematic treatment of the topic is still missing (Klingler-Vidra & 
Schleifer, 2014). In order to fill this gap, this dissertation makes an important theoretical 
contribution to the literature on international institutions. It unpacks diffusion “theory” and 
develops an analytical framework that distinguishes three stages in the diffusion process: 
source selection, transmission, and adoption. For each of these stages, hypotheses are 
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formulated about the cause-and-effect relationships that make diffusion outcomes vary. In 
this way, the dissertation offers a framework for studying processes of institutional diffusion, 
which is applicable beyond its specific empirical context.  
 
8.5 Multi-Stakeholder Sustainability Governance 
Finally, the study makes a contribution to the specialised literature on multi-stakeholder 
sustainability governance (Auld, 2009; Bartley, 2007b; Bloomfield, 2012; Cashore et al., 
2004; Gulbrandsen, 2010; Pattberg, 2005). In Chapter 2, a detailed review of the literature on 
the evolution of multi-stakeholder institutions was provided. It was shown that much of the 
existing literature focuses on processes surrounding the initial emergence of MSIs in the 
forestry and apparel industries (Bartley, 2003, 2007b; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Haufler, 
2003; McNichol, 2006; Pattberg, 2005; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). More recently, scholars 
have turned their attention to the question of institutional isomorphism or convergence 
between existing organisations (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009; L. W. Fransen, 2011, 2012b; 
Kaan, 2008; Loconto & Fouilleux, 2013; Overdevest, 2010; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009). On 
the other hand, the actual diffusion of the MSI institutional model has received considerably 
less attention. The works that do exist describe the emergence of institutional variation during 
the diffusion process (Auld et al., 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2010: 112-133). However, a more 
comprehensive treatment of the topic is still missing.  
 
In order to address this gap, this study advances our understanding of institutional diffusion 
in this area, both theoretically and empirically. With regard to theory, and as discussed in 
detail above, this dissertation developed an analytical framework and methodological 
approach to trace the process of diffusion and to explain variation in institutional outcomes. 
This framework was put to work in three case study chapters examining the diffusion of the 
MSI institutional model in the agriculture sector. The in-depth analysis of the RSB, the 
RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro confirmed the importance of diffusion for their institutional 
development. In this regard, their founders turned toward already-established MSIs in other 
fields, both in order to avoid making mistakes and to save time and costs. Through an 
examination of their sources, the transmission process, and the adoption of the diffusion 
practice, it was found how lessons drawing and the nature and strength of institutional 
pressures influenced the institutional outcome in the cases studied (see discussion in Section 
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8.2). Also, by studying the RSB, the RTRS, and BSI/Bonsucro, the dissertation makes an 
important empirical contribution. Much of the MSI literature focuses on schemes in the 
forestry, apparel, and fishery sectors. In particular, as the oldest and best-established system, 
the FSC has received much scholarly attention (Bloomfield, 2012; Cashore et al., 2004; 
Gulbrandsen, 2010; Marx & Cuypers, 2010; McNichol, 2006; Meidinger, 2006). On the other 
hand, the cases covered in this dissertation are still largely underresearched. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of interviews 
Organisation Country Date 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
International 31.10.2011 
Cosmo Biofuels Malaysia  20.12.2011 
Friends of the Earth Europe Belgium 05.12.2011 
National Wildlife Federation USA 14.11.2011 
Amazon Environmental Research Institute  Brazil 02.07.2013 
World Wide Fund for Nature International International 21.10.2011 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels International  18.11.2011 
Solidaridad Argentina 23.05.2012 
International Finance Corporation International 17.05.2012 
Grupo Los Grobo Brazil 17.07.2013 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne Switzerland 07.12.2011 
BP UK 30.05.2012 
Ethical Sugar France 02.07.2012 
La Isla Foundation Nicaragua 19.06.2013 
Swiss Energy Ministry Switzerland 01.11.2011 
Ec-Terra Sarl Switzerland 01.06.2012 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels International 18.11.2011 
United Nations Foundation International 02.12.2011 
Trace Consult Switzerland 23.06.2013 
ISEAL Alliance International 27.06.2013 
Coca-Cola USA 20.06.2012 
Cargill USA 13.06.2012 
Forest Stewardship Council International 23.11.2011 
International Union of Food International 04.07.2013 
International Union for Conservation of Nature Switzerland 29.11.2011 
World Wide Fund for Nature International International 28.11.2011 
Action for Social Advancement India 09.06.2013 
Tate & Lyle UK 07.06.2012 
Nutreco Netherlands 25.06.2013 
World Wide Fund for Nature USA USA 17.05.2012 
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels International 01.11.2011 
World Wide Fund for Nature UK UK 23.05.2012 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne International 18.11.2011 
Australian sugarcane grower Australia  24.05.2012 
Audobon Sugar Institute USA 24.05.2012 
BP UK 07.12.2011 
Ethical Sugar France 15.05.2012 
World Wide Fund for Nature Switzerland Switzerland 27.05.2013 
GM Watch UK 02.07.2013 
Proforest UK 29.05.2013 
International Air and Transport Association Switzerland 02.12.2011 
World Wide Fund for Nature Switzerland Switzerland 24.05.2013 
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South African sugarcane grower South Africa 15.06.2013 
Biojet Corp Argentina 09.11.2011 
Amigos da Terra Brazil 16.12.2011 
Sugarcane Research Services South Africa 12.06.2013 
Unilever Netherlands 03.06.2013 
Banco Real  Brazil 29.05.2013 
BSI/Bonsucro International  29.05.2012 
World Wide Fund for Nature International International  28.06.2013 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy International 18.06.2013 
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Appendix 2: Consent Form for Interviews  
Purpose of the study 
 
This study examines the emergence of multi-stakeholder initiatives as a new mode of global 
sustainability governance. The primary research objective is 
 
“to investigate the formation of multi-stakeholder initiatives and to explain similarities as 
well as differences between them”  
 
For the analysis, interviews are conducted with the different stakeholder groups involved in 
multi-stakeholder sustainability governance (civil society, corporate actors, and state actors). 
The information in this study will be used to draw conclusions about the formation and 
design of multi-stakeholder governance in the agriculture sector.  
 
The process 
 
Your participation in the study will involve an interview of approximately one hour’s 
duration, and a short questionnaire of 10 questions.  This interview will be audio taped, 
unless otherwise requested by the participant. 
 
Subject’s Understanding 
 
- I give my consent to participate in this study and I understand that the study will be 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
- I understand that my participation is voluntary. 
- I understand that if I so request I will not be identified by name in the final product. 
- I am aware that all records will be kept confidential in the secure possession of the 
researcher. 
- I acknowledge that the contact information of the researcher have been made 
available to me along with a duplicate copy of this consent form.  
- I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time with no adverse 
repercussions. 
 
By signing below you agree that you have read and understood the above information, and 
would be interested in participating in this study. 
 
 
Subject’s Full Name: __________________________________ 
 
 
Subject’s Signature: _______________ Date Signed: _____________ 
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Appendix 3: Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews 
A Background  
 
A1. Professional background of the interviewee.  
 
A2. Experience with sustainable agriculture/multi-stakeholder sustainability governance. 
 
A3. Questions about the interviewee’s involvement in the MSI under investigation. 
 
 
B Organisational Development and Design 
 
B1. Background information about the MSI under investigation. 
 
B2. Questions about the development/history of the MSI under investigation. 
 
B3. Questions about the organisational structure of the MSI under investigation. 
 
 
C Diffusion 
 
C1. Questions about key actors in the design process and their experience with multi-
stakeholder governance. 
 
C2. Questions about the extent and quality of information exchanges with other MSIs. 
 
C3. Questions about imitation and lessons drawing.  
 
C4. Questions about conflicts between stakeholder groups. 
 
C5. Questions about the institutional environment and how it affected the process of 
institutional formation. 
 
 
 
 
